Maghreb Blog

Panic in the Kingdom: U.S. MINURSO Proposal

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Tue, 16 Apr 2013 20:23:00 +0000

Panic reigned supreme in the halls of Morocco’s government yesterday. All of the political forces of the kingdom were placed on high alert as news surfaced of a US proposal to expand the UN mission in the Western Sahara to include human rights monitoring in the region and the POISARIO-controlled Tindouf camps in Algeria. Leaders of major political parties and the Moroccan cabinet were summoned to an emergency meeting in the palace. The details of the high level meeting with the king are unknown, but there was a swift statement rejecting the U.S. proposal and a terse condemnation of alleged U.S. “bias and unilateral move.” Morocco even announced today the cancelation of annual joint military exercise with the U.S.

 This marks a departure from past measured and carefully crafted communiqués, especially dealing with the U.S. which has been a staunch ally and benefactor of Morocco. This proposal was, however, expected given the increased pressure and attention devoted to human rights in the Western Sahara, and the UN desire to have human rights monitored, in the words of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, by a “neutral party”.

The shift in US position may also be a reflection of the change in the new leadership of the State Department. Secretary of State John Kerry is known for his close relationship with the Kennedys. Last August 2010, Kerry Kennedy, along with a delegation from the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, visited the Western Sahara to assess the state of human rights. The delegation was accused of bias by Moroccan authorities, while the delegation accused Moroccan officials of hampering their movement in the city of La’ayoune.  

Recently, there has been a palpable pivot in the conflict away from self-determination towards human rights violations by both sides. Morocco has largely been portrayed as the culprit of abuses of individual and group liberties in the region and for good cause. Sahrawis remain limited in the ability to peacefully protest and are subject to police brutality, and extra-judicial proceedings. Last February, a military tribunal sentenced several civilian individuals involved in the Gdim Izik incidents of November 2010 to harsh prison terms ranging from 20 years to life in prison.

Over the last several months, Morocco has been losing the battle for international public opinion. Several organizations have condemned Morocco’s treatment of civilians in the Western Sahara. Even A-list celebrities have joined in the pressure on the kingdom. Last month, Hollywood actor Javier Bardem came to the United States to publicize his new documentary feature film on the state of human rights violations in the Western Sahara. The visit also included a high level congressional screening of his “Sons of Clouds: The Last Colony”and a prime time interview with CNN’s Amanpour.  

Yesterday’s news and scurried Moroccan reaction underscores the failure of Morocco’s foreign policy establishment and its haphazard handling of the dossier of the Western Sahara. Despite the millions of dollars spent on public relations and lobbying, officials seemed to have been caught off guard with US plans.

The shift in US position is also indicative of the new trend in US foreign policy in the aftermath of the so called “Arab Spring,” where the US pushes ever so sheepishly the cause of democratic liberal reforms in the region, albeit with the usual double-standard lens. Morocco will be better served to promote democratization in the disputed land, while still maintaining its historical claims to the Sahara. The two are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, its heavy-handed strategy and repression in the region will only diminish the legitimacy of its ties to the people and territory of the Western Sahara.

It is unclear if the US proposal will be adopted, since France is likely to veto it in the Security Council. Nonetheless, this is such an embarrassment to Morocco and its agents of diplomacy in the US and at the UN. It behooves the Moroccan authorities to reassess its policies in the Western Sahara, but most importantly, the handling of this contentious and stalemated conflict by its foreign policy makers.

On Javier Bardem’s Cause in the Western Sahara

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 27 Mar 2013 01:51:00 +0000

This article appeared on the North Africa Post on March 24, 2013.

Western Sahara was front and center in CNN’s latest edition of Amanpour, marking a rare instance in which the oft-overlooked and stalemated conflict has been treated as more than a peripheral issue in the Western media. Amanpour hosted and plugged a new documentary film on the Western Sahara that claims to shed light on the Moroccan occupation of the territory and abuses of human rights. The documentary, “Sons of the Clouds: The Last Colony" probably wouldn’t have caught anyone’s attention, including a high-level congressional viewing, if it were not the project of Hollywood A-list and Oscar-winning actor Javier Bardem. Though he is most well-known for his love stories of “Vicky, Christina, Barcelona,” and villainous roles in “No Country for Old Men,” and in the latest James Bond “Skyfall”, the Spanish actor has been an active and staunch advocate for the POLISARIO and the right of the Sahrawis for self-determination.

Morocco’s litany of violations of human rights and individual liberties in and outside the Western Sahara are indeed indefensible. However, Bardem’s portrayal of the conflict is one-dimensional in its focus on human rights, and myopic in its scope. By facilely linking the issue of self-determination to human rights violations, Bardem deemphasizes Morocco's historical ties to the territory and presents a misleadingly uncomplicated treatment of the issue. The historical past of the Western Sahara is encumbered by of the colonial intrusion of North Africa by [specify by whom/give a little more info or link out to another source], which left its indelible marks on the culture, the people and the politics of the region. . However, the United Nations’ application of self-determination in the Saharan territory has completely ignored the colonial powers’ process of re-drawing the borders of the region, and how that affected the identity of the local population.

Self-determination has long been a concept that dominated the discourse on the conflict. In addition to regional rivalry, a solution to the conflict has been premised on/hinged on determining a rightful modicum for identifying who is considered Sahrawi, and therefore eligible to vote in the ever so elusive referendum. Though talks of a referendum have been de-emphasized given Moroccan plans for granting Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the quintessential issue, at least in my estimation, is an issue of identity, and how it has been conceptualized and articulated according to the terms of modern self-determination discourse.

Indeed, the modern notion of self-determination could grant people in the Western Sahara the opportunity to choose autonomy and sovereignty. However, it does not lay down the parameters of defining such people. A simple theoretical discussion on the evolution of the norm of self-determination leaves us with the contentious question: Who is entitled to take part in deciding the future of the Western Sahara through the UN sponsored referendum? To be sure, even the dizzying number of UN resolutions on the Western Sahara fail to demarcate the contours of Sahrawi identity, yet this identity undergirds the right of self-determination as sine qua non to self-governance. However, such conceptualizations of the Western Sahara reflect the United Nations’ lack of historical knowledge (or perhaps even ambivalent ignorance) of the territory, which could enriched how the complex identity issues at stake for all parties involved are understood.

The issue of self-determination, specifically a Wilsonian conception of it, would grant a vote for minorities in the region. However, this is difficult as we try to ascertain legal ties to the land since the territory was not clearly demarcated and many local tribes paid allegiance to different historical powers. It is also disingenuous to isolate said allegiances from the context of the historical Moroccan sharifian State, which exerted a pseudo-control over the territory. In fact, these Sahrawi tribes led an autonomous life and paid allegiance to the central authority of the Makhzen, with each tribe having an internal governance structure. This is not far off from what Morocco is offering today, which is located between paying allegiance to the central power and leading an autonomous lifestyle from within the tribe.

The interplay of power within the Makhzen between Bilad al-Makhzen (territories firmly under state control in terms of rule and taxation) and Bilad es-Siba (under nominal authority of the sultan) is often marginalized in discussions by analysts of the conflict, privileging the international community's efforts to force a self-determination referendum. The boundaries of the territory itself are colonial impositions and were drawn with no regard for the existing nomadic tribes that roamed throughout the entire sub-Saharan region. Self-determination of peoples, only in the Western Sahara (as demarcated now) legitimizes colonial structures that were imposed in the first place. In other words, the international community, through the United Nations, is trying to implement the referendum for self-determination in the Western Sahara based on the colonially-imposed demarcations of the region. Morocco opposes this simply because this application of the discourse of self-determination completely denies its historical ties with the region.

Morocco's plan for Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty has the U.S., France and Spain's support, but the POLISARIO and its benefactor Algeria have rejected the plan as a mere Moroccan attempt to tighten its de facto control over the territory. The talks between the two parties (some say three parties, including Algeria) to work on confidence-building measures have led nowhere over the last few years.

In addition to identity and historical factors, the conflict has regional and international dimensions. The non-interventionary strategies deployed by major international powers in the past as well as the general lack of international urgency on the issue have contributed to prolonging the conflict. Only targeted pressure and active diplomatic engagement from the United States, France, or the European community as a bloc can provide a window of hope in the resolution of the dispute, and provide some much-need relief to the plight of the thousands of Sahrawis in the camps of Tindouf in Algeria.

Regional issues have also hindered any successful resolution of the conflict. The nature of inter-Maghrebi politics, especially the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, have fueled the conflict and exacerbated the situation in the territory. Domestic issues have further fomented this rivalry, namely: the role of the military in Algeria and the state’s hardline strategy vis-à-vis the conflict in the Western Sahara; and in Morocco the intransigency of the government, which is backed by public opinion and staunch mass support for the "Moroccanity" of the Western Sahara and the territorial integrity of Morocco.

Bardem, who states he is motivated by human rights concerns in the Western Sahara, treats none of these complex historical and political issues. The Oscar-winning actor does not shed light on the role of Algeria in the conflict. Nor is the Hollywood star concerned about the treatment of the Sahrawis in the camps of Tindouf by their own POLISARIO Front, which the actor visited in 2008. According to a Human Rights Watch report from that same year (2008), many camp refugees are deprived of basic the rights of movement, assembly, and freedom of expression. There are even allegations of slavery inside the camps.

For the last 37 years, the Maghreb has been plagued by the conflict in the Western Sahara, which has greatly stalled any prospects of the regional integration and cooperation necessary to address the realities of an increasingly globalized world. As the de facto ruler of the Western Sahara, Morocco has its eye on the long-term benefits of reaching a compromise with Algeria over the Western Sahara, and has provided a serious plan for resolution of the conflict. Alas, Algeria's military and its political obsession with its larger geo-political ambitions in the region have hindered any attempt at a meaningful consideration of the Moroccan plan.

The blind rejectionism of anything Moroccan will only lead to maintaining the current status quo largely in favor of Morocco at this point. Any meaningful compromise between Morocco and Algeria is beneficial not only to the two countries, but also to the other three countries in the Maghreb region, as it could be a tremendous step towards full economic, political integration, and building a security regime in the face of mounting terrorist threats in the Sahel region.

The Algerian Hostage Crisis & Militant Islamism in the Sahara

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 30 Jan 2013 22:07:00 +0000

** A version of this article was published on Muftah.

The hostage crisis in Algeria is a violent reminder of the rapidly deteriorating security situation in the North Africa and the Sahel regions. On January 16^th, 32 armed militants stormed the In Amenas gas complex in southeast Algeria, holding several hundred hostages in the process. After four days of siege, and an early attack by the Algerian forces on the terrorists who tried to move the hostages, the Algerian army launched a final assault on the core gas facility where the terrorists were holding most of the hostages, and reportedly engaged in a collective assassination of the hostages. There is scant information about that assault and what transpired in the early morning hours of Saturday, January 20^th. What we now know through Algerian officials is at least 38 civilians had been killed during the course of the four-day siege, and 29 militants. Nearly 700 Algerians and 100 other foreigners survived, while five people are still missing.

The incident has increased interest in the region and led to exaggerated fears about the threat of al-Qaeda and militant Islamism in North Africa. Nevertheless, the increase in militant activity in the Sahara is cause for concern. While the various extremist groups are divided, their impact in the region and northern Mali can no longer be ignored.

The Rise of Islamism in the Sahel

Ever since the end of the Algerian civil war, various armed, Islamist splinter groups retreated to the vast stretch of the Sahara desert where they marauded smuggled, and occasionally kidnapped foreigners for ransom. For a time, these groups acted more like criminal gangs operating in the lawless territories north of the Sahel, than well-structured paramilitary groups.

However, with the so called “Arab Spring,” and the toppling of Muammar Ghaddafi’s dictatorial regime in Libya, various fighters from the nomadic Touareg tribe retreated back to their original homelands in the Sahel, which were now inhabited by the Islamists. Having previously worked for the Libyan government, the Touareg fighters brought with them vast piles of weapons and military training.

Longing for an autonomous state in the north of Mali, in less than a year, Toureg fighters, united under the banner of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), launched a secessionist war against Malian government troops. The fighters managed to push back most of the beleaguered Malian military to the capital city of Bamako. In March 2012, mounting pressure from the MNLA caused the military in Mali to oust president Amadou Toumani Toure.

Since then, the MNLA, which had formed an alliance with the Islamist “Ansar ad-Din” (Defenders of the Faith), led by Touareg rebel leader Iyad agh Ghali, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), have extended their control over most of northern Mali and its major cities of Gao, Kidal, and the mythical city of Timbuktu.

Reportedly receiving material support from AQIM, “Ansar ad-Din” split from the MNLA, and have since extended de facto control over parts of northern Mali. The “Ansar ad-Din” aims to impose fossilized interpretations of sharia law in Mali, and has instituted strict puritanical rule a la Taliban in the areas under its control in northern Mali, destroying a number of medieval Islamic shrines in Timbuktu.

Identifying the Sahel’s Most Active Militant Groups

The incident at In Amenas gas complex in eastern Algeria has effectively internationalized the conflict in Mali, and has shed much needed light on the deteriorating security state in the Sahel region. Nevertheless, militant Islamists operating in the region are too fragmented, and small in numbers to represent a major threat to states north of the Sahel.

Ansar ad-Din and AQIM are the most visible of all the militant Islamists operating in the Sahel region. Others include the Movement for Tawhid ( or “Unity”) and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), which has created a new brigade of 4 battalions named after former al-Qaeda leaders.

MUJAO is led by Mohammed Ould Nouimer and is mainly active in the northern parts of the Sahel region. It has links to various other militant groups operating in Chad, Libya, southeast Algeria, Nigeria, and Niger.

In addition to MUJAO, two other groups are actively marauding the region, “Ansar ash-Shari’a”, led by ‘Ammar Ould Hmaha, who was affiliated with MUJAO, and the recently-created “Signers-in-Blood” group, which has been implicated in the Algerian hostage crisis.

Some have suggested that the latest surge in militant activities is tied to rivalry between the region’s more significant Islamist factions, including “Ansar ad-Din”, and MUJAO, and the “Signers-in-Blood” group.

Moktar Belmokhtar, the one-eyed former “mujahid” who founded the “Signers-in-Blood” and fought against the Soviets in Afghanistan as well as in the Algerian civil war. has managed to elevate his status among militants operating in the region. Formerly responsible for the “al Mulathamin” (the Masked Ones) brigade inside AQIM, Belmokhtar created his own group after being sacked by AQIM’s leader, Abdel Malik Droukdal.

Belmokhtar’s was reportedly sacked because of his use of strategies that were not seen as puritanically jihadist. It is, understandably, difficult to reconcile Belmokhtar’s reputation for cigarettes, drugs, and car smuggling with the esoteric Islamic practice of jihad. Having frequently split money from kidnapping ransoms and smuggling activities with local tribes, Belmokhtar earned the nickname of “Mr. Marlboro,” and carefully cultivated an image as a “Robin Hood” of the desert.

All Islamist groups in the Sahel are loosely connected, and most of their leadership and fighters are former “Jihadis” from Afghanistan and Iraq, armed splinter groups from the civil war in Algeria, and local Touaregs formerly embedded in Ghaddafi’s corps of foreign fighters. These groups have all at one point been affiliated with AQIM, and share similar goals for establishing radical Islamic states in the region. Each group is also vying for regional supremacy, making periodic divisions between them a virtual certainty.

For instance on January 24th a major Touraeg leader within “Ansar ad-Din” announced his split from the Islamist group. Touareg leader, Alghabass Ag Intalla, stated that his decision to leave the group represented an attempt to open negotiations with the government to settle the crisis in Mali.

This latest rift comes amisst ongoing French strikes against Islamist rebels, and is due to fears of potential wider international retaliation in the aftermath of the Algerian hostage incident. It also reflects internal discussion within Ansar ad-Din about the movement’s future trajectory in the shadow of AQIM’s nefarious, and “foreign” Islamist plans for northern Mali.

The International Response

The international community has been timid in its response to events in northern Mali. France’s ongoing military strikes against the Islamist push toward Bamako were undertaken only after French geo-strategic interests were threatened. France is the largest importer of Malian uranium, which is key to the French nuclear industry. French companies have also invested heavily in uranium, minerals, and natural resources in neighboring Niger. The state-owned French energy company, Areva, has, for instance, invested more than $1.6 billion in Niger’s Imouraren uranium mine.

The latest military action by France is, as such, more about securing its investments in Mali and Niger,. The United States has provided logistical aid to France and has helped transport some French troops into the region, while the British have pledged to play some supporting role short of putting actual troops on the ground.

Conclusion

For a long time, North Africa was seen as a quiet region with little to no geo-strategic interest for the international community. The quagmire of Western Sahara, which has hindered any cooperation between Morocco and Algeria, has also prevented the creation of a regional security regime in the Maghreb and thwarted local coordination to rout out militant groups.

With the current security situation in the Sahel, the only way forward is for all regional countries to make a concerted effort, with the help of the United States and the Europeans, to increase multilateral security arrangements and intelligence sharing that integrates North Africa, Sahel, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This will allow states in the region to better combat militant groups and return some semblance of stability to the Sahara.

O Maghreb: Where Art Thou in US Foreign Policy?

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Tue, 11 Dec 2012 22:59:00 +0000

The Maghreb has long been a region forgotten, and detached from the rest of Middle East in US foreign policy making. The closest we came to hearing about the Maghreb or Sahel regions, albeit in passing, was during the third presidential debate between Romney and Obama. Recent events in the past few months have made it a necessity for the US to integrate the region in its regional assessment. The ever-changing nature of state-society relations in the region in the context of the Arab revolt; and the increasing threat of extremist Islamist influence in the southern borders of the Maghreb along the Sahel region, are two crucial strategic concerns for the US.

The political challenges facing the Maghreb region reflect the current Arab plight of the persistence of authoritarianism, economic backwardness and the rise of radical Islamism. Each of the five countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya and Mauritania) feature a set of authoritarian challenges that have to be incorporated in a general “Democracy Agenda” that the US has to pursue now, more than ever in the context of the Arab street movement for change. A cursory look at each of the Maghreb states reveals tremendous challenges for US foreign policy making.

Algeria is beset by an autocratic state dominated by the military, state security services, and rampant corrupt clientelistic political elite. Although the regime has survived the civil strife of the 1990s, the state never fully addressed the causes behind the Islamist insurgency, namely the prevalence of patrimonial practices and the lack of political accountability. The state in Algeria also tightened its control of political contestation as it banned the Islamist group the Islamist Salvation Front (FIS) and has curtailed the space for political participation for other opposition parties.

Morocco, like Algeria, features the same strategies of state political manipulation and stagnant reform agenda. State strategies have resulted in the relative ineffectiveness of proposed political reforms and the weakening of the major political opposition groups in the kingdom. The two main Islamist movements of Justice and Development (PJD) and Justice and Charity share a highly popular agenda of social, political and economic reforms. Despite the PJD electoral success in last November’s elections, it has since morphed into a loyal palace party functioning at the whim of the king’s vast executive prerogatives. Gone are the days where the PJD, formerly the largest Islamist opposition party in the Moroccan parliament, pursued a policy of political dissent seeking governmental accountability and transparency.

The passage of the new constitution did little to guarantee a steady movement towards democratic progress in Morocco. The space for freedom of expression and the press in the kingdom is ever so limited, as various journalists are driven to bankruptcy or to flee the country from legal prosecution. Moreover, peaceful activists of the Feb. 20 movement are facing the brunt of state repression. In the past few weeks, several key members of the movement have been arrested and handed draconian prison sentences.

While Morocco and Algeria still languish under the yoke authoritarian rule, Tunisia, Libya has each in differing ways toppled their despots, but still face important challenges. The announcement of the general elections in Tunisia next June will certainly be a test for the consolidation of peaceful contestation of power. The last few months have seen a stark division between the Islamist camp led by the ruling government of Ennahda, and the secularists led by the ceremonial president Moncef Marzouki. Tunisia’s predicament lies in the ability of Ennahda to tame, or perhaps distance itself from Salafi groups that long for a return to strict Islamic laws in politics and society.

A year after the historical elections in Tunisia, the Ennahda-led government’s record is mixed. A recent Amnesty International reportdecried the failure of the government to “fully outlaw discrimination against women,” the disproportionate, “unnecessary and excessive force” used by security forces, and the lack of a fully functional and independent judiciary. The report came amid fervent protests after the death of opposition politician Lotfi Nakdh in clashes between pro-and anti-government supporters.

Libya is perhaps more of concern as the central government in Tripoli has little influence over the rest of the country. The murder of US Ambassador crystallizes the creeping lawlessness in Libya. With the tribes of Bani Walid still in revolt, and the general lack of security, Libya’s path towards political and societal progress may still be a function of the ability of state to extend its central control. Toppling Qaddafi has come at a dire cost for the region. Spillover arms and ammunitions have found their way to northern Mail where “al-Qaedist” Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA) and Ansar ad-Dine have taken effective control of the area and imposed stricter interpretation of Shari’a law.

Finally, Mauritania is firmly under the control of a military junta, which staged two coups since 2005. The second putsch of August 6^th, 2008 put a stop to the promising civilian presidency of Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi. Elected through fair and free elections, Abdallahi showed deep commitment to democratic reforms. Soon his ambitions would clash with the military that toppled Abdallahi amidst economic hardship and increasing social unrest. Needless to say, the future of political reforms in the country is ambiguous at this point, amidst the “accidental” shooting of its current strong man Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz.

Given the current political climate, US foreign policy needs to address the political challenges facing the Maghreb region, in the contest of a vibrant “freedom agenda” that would promote meaningful reforms. The new U.S. administration needs to further press for good governance, rule of law and accountability in order to increase the scope of individual and group liberties. The relevance of the region to US foreign policy is intrinsically linked to a successful resolution of the Western Sahara conflict, which continues to stand as an albatross for regional cooperation. Furthermore, The region cannot be ignored by the International community especially within the context of the threat of terrorism in the Maghreb and the Sahel regions. Terrorist acts have increased in the Maghreb generally since 9/11, but especially after the collapses of Qaddafi’s regime and Malian central governmental control over the north of the country.

The US has thus far exerted no urgency in the Maghreb or Sahel regions as Iran’s nuclear ambitions continues to be the cause célèbre for US foreign policy. It is incumbent upon the U.S. to logistically assist the countries in the region in combatting the threat of radical militant Islamism. Joint US-Maghrebi exercises on counter-terrorism tactics could greatly help reduce or neutralize the threat of al-Qaeda-affiliated groups in the region. Economically, the U.S. should also seek engagement of the region through a broader Maghreb-US-EU partnership that would further economic growth and political reforms.

Violent Attack in Libya: A test for all Muslims

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 13 Sep 2012 03:26:00 +0000

Like many around the world I woke up today to the sad news of the death of Ambassador J. Christopher Stevens, three of his staffers and ten Libyan security guards who battled to protect the US Consulate in Benghazi last night. The savage attack was reportedly in reaction to the leaked movie called "Innocence of Muslims" released in the US about the Prophet of Islam Mohammed. I watched the leaked 10-minute segment of the video, and I was shocked, not only at the offensive content portraying the prophet as a pedophile, homosexual and a philanderer, but also at the low quality of the production, and the poor acting performance. The video, at least in my mind, was clearly leaked right before the 11^th anniversary of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, maybe in an attempt to inflame the passion of the irrational and fanatic few. The same kind of radical Muslims that took to the streets during the Danish cartoon furore and pastor Terry Jones' threat to stage a Quran burning event. So far, there is still wide confusion about the source of the video, since the early reports of an Israeli-American filmmaker were deemed untrue.

No matter what the movie’s content is, the reaction that it elicited was equally as offensive and savage. Egyptian mobs stormed the courtyard of the US embassy in Cairo, tore the US flag and erected an Islamic flag. Discontent continues to foment in Egypt today in clashes with security forces, amid a deafening silence from the Egyptian government, and Islamist president Mohamed Morsy. However, the more heinous attack occurred next door in Libya last night, where armed gangs of about 100 people reportedly launched a barbaric offensive on the US consulate. Once again, Muslims around the world are at a loss of words, trying to defend the peacefulness of their religion. We, as Muslims, have to stand steadfast against the cancer of extremism and the fossilized modes of thinking that have gnawed at the core of our societies. Acts of violence only perpetuates the pre-conceived ideas and stereotypes that Islam is a religion of war, and Muslims as radical fanatics thirsty for blood at the slightest act of provocation.

The Prophet of Islam himself was a peaceful, rational, and a patient individual, who preached temperance and condemned acts of foolish anger. I am not a religious scholar, but I was taught early on about well-known hadiths (Prophet’s deeds and sayings), in which he proclaimed that: "The strong man is not the one who can overpower others; rather, the strong man is the one who controls himself when he gets angry." Where are these extremists from the prophet’s teachings? And does the prophet need their protection from every little incitment? These acts that solely seek to inflame the passions of Muslims are a true test for all of us to channel our angst towards displaying a positive view of Islam.

Muslims continue to define their religion in terms of what it is not, instead of focusing on reaching out to other faiths and traditions to build the foundations for true inter-cultural dialogue. Others have engaged in the facile trope of blaming all the ills of the Middle East and the Muslim world on United States foreign policy. There are indeed too many shortcomings of a myopic US foreign policy in the region with its double standards, moral relativism and narrow focus on geo-strategic interests. However, we, Muslims, have to look inward and take action against the increasing, worrisome trend of extremism. Failing to educate and emancipate our own in the name of religion, while engaging in acts of abject violence to prove the virility of Islam does harm to Muslims and the religion we espouse.

This religion of peace has been bastardized to suit the purpose of those that resist and fear change. Contextualization of texts is blasphemous, adapting Quranic and Hadithic teachings to modern day realities is apostasy, and granting some basic individual and group freedoms is un-Islamic. People have not fought despots to succumb to the tyranny of the fanatically religious and misguided few. They've transgressed the limits of God and they are the blasphemers as they continue to spew hatred and sow the seeds of discord in Muslim land.

Ambassador Stevens was optimistic about the future of Libya, where he traveled with relatively little security. He interacted with average Libyans, and was integral to the US and NATO mission during the rebels’ push to topple Gaddafi. Libyans were and are grateful for the US, France and the UK for their assistance in their liberation. Ambassador Stevens would have been particularly pleased to see the many Libyans that took to the streets today in Tripoli and Benghazi to condemn the terrorist attack on the US consulate. Friends in Libya are all ashamed and unnecessarily apologetic about the vile attack on the consulate. They have demanded, along with other Libyans, stricter response from their government against armed extremist groups in their midst. Libya still struggles with internal issues of security and order, as many violent extremist groups are trying to hijack Libya’s path towards political progress. Now more than ever, Libya needs more assistance to steady its course towards a transition to democratic rule.

On Stephen Zunes’ Statement about Morocco, Israel, & the Western Sahara.

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 12 Sep 2012 02:44:00 +0000

*This article appeared in Muftah on September 10, 2012.

In a recent interview for Al Jazeera English with Mark LeVine, Professor Stephen Zunes provides a scathing critique of Morocco as an occupying force in the Western Sahara. Zunes, a well-respected scholar of international relations, goes so far as to compare Morocco’s 1975 annexation of the Western Sahara to Israel’s occupation of Palestine. Zunes declares:

"Morocco, like Israel, is in violation of a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions and a landmark decision of the International Court of Justice regarding their occupation. Morocco, like Israel, has illegally moved tens of thousands of settlers into the occupied territory. Morocco, like Israel, engages in gross and systematic human rights abuses in the occupied territories. Morocco, like Israel, has illegally built a separation wall through the occupied territories. Morocco, like Israel, relies on the United States and other Western support to maintain the occupation by rendering the UN powerless to enforce international law. Morocco, like Israel, is able to maintain the occupation in part through the support of multinational corporations."

While a number of those claims are factual, Zunes’ statement is also deceptively one-sided, simplistic, and fails to account for the political and historical dimensions of the conflict.

The Western Sahara has been the subject of controversy, international litigation, and bellicose conflict since 1975 when Spanish colonial forces left the territory. The territory was thereafter divided into two, with one part controlled by Morocco and the other by Mauritania.

Immediately after Spanish decolonization, a rebel Sahrawi group in the camps of Tindouf in Algeria led by the POLISARIO (Spanish acronym for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia al-Hamra and Rio de Oro) and supported by the Algerian government, declared the territory's independence and unilaterally proclaimed the establishment of the Sahraoui Arab Democratic Republic.

After Mauritania's withdrawal from the territory, Morocco quickly assumed control over the southern part of the Western Sahara. A decade of violence ensued, lasting most of the 1980s, between the POLISARIO and Moroccan forces. The conflict ended in 1991 with an UN-brokered cease-fire and a planned UN-sponsored referendum for self-determination, which has yet to take place.

As Zunes states, it is true that the UN has labeled Morocco an occupying force in the Western Sahara. It is also true that, during the long years of military conflict with the POLISARIO, Morocco built a fortified defensive wall called “berm” in the region.

However, in his interview, Zunes never mentions Algeria's influence over the conflict or its consistent rejectionist stance toward any solution to the stand off. Algeria has been the POLISARIO's principal benefactor since the beginning of the conflict in 1975, and has maintained a closed grip on the POLISARIO camps in Tindouf.

While talk of the referendum has diminished because of Morocco's plans to grant autonomy (though not independence) to the Sahrawi region, Zunes squarely blames Morocco for the referendum's failure. This allegation is misleading, and, again, fails to provide an accurate picture of the process.

Moroccan opposition to the referendum centers on two issues: the difficulty in determining voter eligibility, and Morocco's historical ties to the region.

The concept of self-determination has long dominated discourses on the Western Sahara conflict. As such, the conflict's resolution has depended on identifying who qualifies as Sahrawi, and is, thereby, eligible to vote in the referendum.

Modern theories on self-determination lack the basic parameters for defining a "people" entitled to self-determination or autonomy. As with most conflicts, the dizzying number of UN resolutions on the Western Sahara conflict fail to demarcate the contours of identity, while clearly positing self-determination as a sine qua non to self-governance.

This approach to the Western Sahara also reflects the UN's lack of historical knowledge about the territory. Such knowledge could have enriched its understanding of the complex identity issues at stake for all parties to the conflict.

Historically, the Western Sahara was not demarcated and may local tribes paid allegiance to different powers. Sahrawi tribes, which had their own internal governance structure, led an autonomous life and paid allegiance to the central authority of the Makhzen, or monarchy, in Morocco.

This power-sharing structure is similar to what Morocco is offering the Western Sahara today - under the autonomy plan, the region's residents would pay allegiance to the Moroccan king while leading an autonomous life within their tribes.

In his interview, Zunes refers to the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion, which sought to determine whether the Western Sahara was “terra nullius” (no man’s land) during Spanish colonization. On October 16, 1975, the Court rendered its opinion, finding no evidence “of any ties of territorial sovereignty” between the Western Sahara and either Morocco or Mauritania. It found, however, that there were “indications of a legal tie of allegiance between the MoroccanSultan (King) and some of the tribes in the territory.” It is on this basis that Morocco annexed the territory, albeit unlawfully according to the UN.

Zunes provides scant detail on the ICJ's decision and its historical context. Indeed, the interplay of power within the Makhzen between bled al-makhzen (territories firmly under state control in terms of rule and taxation) and bled es-Siba (territories paying allegiance to the Moroccan Sultan, but not necessarily paying taxes) is often de-emphasized both by analysts of the conflict and referendum advocates in the international community.

In North Africa, territorial boundaries are colonial creations, which were drawn with no respect for the nomadic tribes that roamed sub-Saharan region. The UN referendum seeks to define the Western Sahara based on colonially imposed demarcations of the region. What Zunes and other analysts fails to understand is that Moroccan opposition to this approach lies in its complete disregard for the Makhzen's historical ties to the Western Sahara.

The Western Sahara conflict will remain a contentious issue in the Maghreb region, especially in the absence of strong international pressure, Morocco's intransigence regarding its historical ties to the region, and Algeria's realpolitik, rejectionist posture. Arguments about Moroccan occupation of the territory, while valid from the point of view of international law, do not do justice to the intricate issues of identity, sovereignty, and history that define the conflict. In order to resolve the Western Sahara standoff, negotiators must reconcile these issues with the geopolitical aspirations of the involved parties.

Police Brutality and the Feb 20 Protests

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Mon, 23 Jul 2012 17:59:00 +0000

Horrific images have been surfacing from last night's Feb 20 protests in Casablanca, Rabat and El Jadida. Thousands took the streets demanding greater social justice and to condemn widespread corruption. The demonstrations were violently repressed by the police resulting in 14 injuries. This continues a state pattern of violence against peaceful protests. Despite the new constitution and the elections of the Islamist PJD which pledged human rights and dignity for all, the forces of order do no hesitate to use the baton to quell social protestations of increasingly tougher socio-economic indicators. Poverty rate exceeds 20% and unemployment exceeds 30% among people under 34 years-old. These are made worse by this year's chronic drought, drop in tourism, and economic recession in Europe (Morocco's leading trade partner).

The PJD government already launched controversial fiscal reforms as it took on the state's subsidy system in an attempt to bridge the gap between the rich and poor. The Benkirane government also unveiled a 20% increase in fuel prices, which angered many in the streets, already reeling from high levels of inflation and increased cost of living. The latest protests are about the recent government decisions, and the perceived lack of movement towards meaningful socio-economic and political reforms in the country as a whole. The demonstrations are only the first of many that the Feb 20 movement has promised over the month of Ramadan. Last night's police brutality will only make it difficult to contain the public sense of frustration with the Makhzen and its structures of social pacification.

The regime, since it is the one that holds all keys to power and not the PJD government, cannot continue on this dual policy of promoting fictitious reforms, and oppressing individual liberties at the same time. This only serves to undermine the current Islamist government hailed as a historic landmark in modern political history of Morocco. More importantly, it gradually erodes the regime's legitimacy especially as it is increasingly seen as an agent of immobilism and paralysis.

Photos from El Jadida (all photos are courtesy of Mamfakinch)

Video from the protests in Rabat.

Libya's Remarkable Elections

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Sun, 08 Jul 2012 21:14:00 +0000

Libya may be on its way to buck the trend of Islamist electoral victory in post-Arab Spring. Reports suggest that the liberal, and secular-minded ex-PM Mahmoud Jibril may be leading the elections of the National Congress. The 200-seat body will be a key transitional institution in the future of post-Gaddafi's Libya, as it will be entrusted with the task of choosing an interim government and a commission to draft a new constitution. The election commission will not report its preliminary results until Monday, but if the results hold, this will be a remarkable turn of events in post-Gaddafi Libya mired by occasional insecurity and warring armed tribal militias.

Despite initial unease, an estimated 60% of the 3 million registered Libyan voters woke up early, headed to the segregated polling stations and lined up in queues in the first such elections in the history of Libya. Despite reports of violence and burnt ballots in polling stations in Tobruq, Benghazi, Guba and Suluq, the elections went smoothly as jubilant and proud Libyans cast their vote for some of the 142 parties that have been registered.

My own sources in Libya reported a general jubilation on election day. Twittervese was buzzing with elated messages. Young Libyan, Malik L, captures this sense of joy as he states: "I'm happy w/environment we've experiencing over 48 hours. Just went through a war, guns everywhere & we had a peaceful day of voting." Libyans, rightly so, are proud of this monumental and historical achievement, and as their Tunisian and Egyptian neighbors to the east and west, sent a message to the world that electoral contests can take place in the Arab world without much irregularities or violence.

Mahmoud Jibril, who served as de facto prime minister in post-Gaddafi National Transitional Council, is now allegedly leading the poll results under his National Forces' Alliance. He is a centrist liberal candidate, who once even served as economy minister in Gaddafi's government. Despite Jibril's statements of defection from the old regime, some Libyan are still wary of him. This makes the current reports all the more perplexing, and given the general conservative tendency of the Libyan society, where the Islamists of el-Watan, led by Jihadi commander of the Tripoli militia Abdel Hakim Belhaj, were expected to hold a slight electoral advantage, especially since only 80 of the 200 seats are allocated on the basis of party lists. In that case, el Watan was perhaps slated to form a potential coalition with Muslim Brotherhood's Libyan offshoot, the Justice and Development party. The party is headed by moderate Islamist Muhammad Suwan, who languished for years in Gaddafi's prisons.

The National Salvation Front was also among the contenders in yesterday's elections. The front was one of the most steadfast and visible opponents to Gaddafi. Founded in the 1980s and forced into exile, the front was seen as the most consistent movement that has at all times kept its distance from Gaddafi's state. However, they have been unable to appeal to a substantial number of Libyans.

Whatever the final results are, this is a victory for Libya and Libyans amidst continuing anxiety about security, tribal rivalries, and some lack of respect for the law and legal procedures. Many Libyans are still armed, and some are even dangerous, as fighting and tensions occasionally flare up between tribes and clans. State control remains elusive in such cities as Zintan, Zwara, Sebha and Kufra.

The elections of the National Congress is a much needed step towards institutional and constitutional development of the country that was politically and economically depleted for 42 years. Libya faces arguably the toughest road of all the post-auhtoritarian states in North Africa. Whereas Tunisia and Egypt have varying levels of state institutions that can ease the two countries (albeit each with their idiosyncratic problems) through their transitions, Gaddafi has left a country with no state apparatus and a deeply divided society along tribal and regional lines.

Libya's elections are just the beginning of the long process of state formation, but this will inevitably be a tedious task if Libyans are collectively not able to cast their tribal, clan and regional identity for the sake of a more inclusive and subsuming national identity.

Dr. Mahmoud Jibril's first press conference after the elections

On Morocco's Supposed Reforms

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 14 Jun 2012 15:44:00 +0000

*This article is originally written for and appeared in Muftah today.

While Morocco continues to be hailed as a model for democratic reform and an exception to the Arab tempest of change, several indictors point to the fossilized and increasingly repressive behavior of the state. The Moroccan government has longed reveled in a myopic and contradictory strategy of institutional and constitutional manipulation. A recent article in the Washington Post exposes these flagrant contradictions in the form of regime promotion of the multi-million dollar music festival, “Mawazine,” starring the likes of Mariah Carey and Lenny Kravitz, versus its unjust imprisonment of Moroccan rapper Mouad Belghouat, aka “El 7aqed” (the indignant). El 7aqed was indicted and sentenced on May 11 to a year in jail on charges of contempt against public servants for his fiery anti-police song “Dogs of the State.”

Perhaps in a similar vain to the American rap group NWA in the 1990s, El 7aqed sought to express widely held indignation about police corruption in Morocco. Unlike the United States though, freedom of expression is severely limited in the kingdom and El 7aqed’s lyrics were deemed offensive to the state.

El 7aqed’s case is but one example of the state’s purposeful policy of promoting an environment of social activism and freedom of expression, buttressed by cosmetic constitutional reforms, while at the same time, undermining those same rights through summary indictments and unfair sentences. This is a calculated strategy meant to show the limits of freedom of the press and expression, and to define the contours of tolerated speech.

This strategy was particularly evident in the case of Moroccan journalist, Rachid Nini, who was arrested and sentenced on charges of "offense against national and citizens' security." The vagueness of the charge thinly masks the true nature of the indictment against Nini, who was rounded up for his critical stances against the government and, at times, vociferous comments about immorality and venality in Moroccan politics.

Morocco's attempt to shed the relics of its past limitations on associational and informational freedom has long been beset by unease toward the press' increasing criticism of the state. However, if the country is to achieve genuine democratic reform, freedom of the press must be one of the main elements of current debate in Morocco. Reforms can only start at the altar of the press, which is a watchdog for the travails of state-society negotiations.

The Moroccan government cannot claim reform and change on one hand, while continuing to brutalize society on the other. Democracy does not work without the rule of law and individual freedoms. Both precepts have been violated in the case of El 7aqed and Rachid Nini. The repression against theses individuals and their work has only refocused attention on the state’s shortcomings in managing an increasingly volatile social and political milieu rife with indignation and dissent.

Several people I have spoken to in Morocco maintain that the recent constitutional reforms, enacted in July 2011, are useless without the political will to implement them, especially those articles dealing with individual and group liberties and the rule of law. The last six months of Islamist-led government have seen slight, but largely inconsequential changes, and, even then, mostly in tone, rather than tenor. For instance, while the Islamist Minister of Justice, Mustapha ar-Ramid, pledged greater reforms and independence of the justice system, judicial progress has thus far been absent from politically motivated cases.

During a recent workshop I conducted for some 25 social activists in the Marrakech region, I was struck by the determination and enthusiasm evinced by young Moroccan activists. Committed in their desire for democratic reforms, they all expressed frustration at the state’s lack of political will to partner and promote socio-political projects. For the Moroccan government, social activism is only an additional venue to exert its vast control. By drowning civil society with thousands of associations and organizations, the state has attempted to limit the lobbying potential of activists, and has inserted key pro-state associations that feign independence while tacitly promoting regime interests.

Morocco is dominated by a carefully-engineered political system, where every structure, institution, and organization plays a particular role in advancing “makhzen” power.[1]The regime has managed an increasingly fragmented political party scene and devised what political scientist Ellen Lust has termed a “divided structure of contestation” that allows selected political opponents to take part in the political system, while excluding others. These structures condition relations between the government and opposition groups, dictate the rules of the game within the formal political system, and help state agents infiltrate Moroccan political electoral contests and civil society organization to create new allies for the regime.

Civil society has been successful over the years in bringing about many policy changes in the areas of human rights, family law, and gender equality. The state has, however, been able to co-opt and set the boundaries for activism on such issues. Women's rights, human rights and democratic reforms are but a few examples of the state's attempt to redefine the main points of contention during electoral contests and within civil society. Furthermore, the state has sought to fully integrate these discourses in the apparatus of the state. For instance, institutionalization of women rights discourse has occurred through the creation of the blue ribbon Cell for the Integration of Women in Development (CIFD), which was entrusted with the task of reforming the Moudawana (family code).

The slight Islamist electoral victory last November, the cosmetic constitutional changes of July 2011, and the semblance of a vibrant civil society serve to legitimize the Moroccan system, but undermine democratic progress in a country that stand as an exception to the vast popular changes sweeping the Middle East and North Africa region. Until there are meaningful and thorough reforms to the core structure of Makhzenite power and its feudal control over the kingdom’s economic sectors, democratic progress will remain elusive in Morocco, a mere illusion touted in international forums as a model for other Arab states.

[1] Makhzen refers to the state apparatus made of the monarchy and the political elite in control of the state and economy in Morocco

Aftermath of the Legislative Elections in Algeria: Women Made History and Hopes for True Change

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Tue, 05 Jun 2012 18:47:00 +0000

Many thanks to Algerian journalist and blogger Kamel Mansari, who was kind enough to contribute a guest post to Maghreb Blog on last month's legislative elections in Algeria.

Aftermath of the Legislative Elections in Algeria: Women Made History and Hopes for True Change

By Kamel Mansari*

ALGIERS -- A young man sits inside a crowded cafe here on a recent Thursday afternoon, watching Al Jazeera sports channel’s broadcast of a football match between Bayern Munich and Real Madrid, the semi-final of the European Champions’ league. He focuses on the plasma TV on the top of a counter where the waiter puts ashtrays to be emptied, before returning back to the packed and noisy tables. Kareem is mostly watching this match to admire the magic touches of his favorite French star, Franck Ribery, the Bayern’s player who embraced Islam and who is married to an Algerian.

In his early 20s, Kareem Mokhtari abandoned school five years ago and often sneaks into the cafe to find refuge. He is part of the unemployed masses of young people in Algeria, who watch football to escape their daily constraints and frustrations in Bab el-Oued, a district of the capital Algiers that was an Islamist stronghold in the 1990s. Dozens of civilians, including journalists, were killed in the district during that decade. While he is still watching his favorite player, the official Algerian TV channels broadcast the opening session of the newly elected parliament. Kareem has no idea what is going on the other side of the channels. The cafe owner knows that football is the air his clients breath besides cigarette smoke.

On May10, legislative elections were held in Algeria, and the turnout was low. Some 42 per cent of the voters showed up at the polls, according to the official figures. Kareem is among the thousands of young people who did not turn out to vote because they do not trust the politicians. Polls have shown young Algerians do not believe that elections could bring changes to their daily life. They still dream of leaving the country, but the economic crises in Europe or Canada and elsewhere in the West have frozen their will to leave.

“I did not vote. I don’t believe elections could ever change my life,” says Kareem while sipping his “goudron” a local name for a short espresso. “Most of the members of the Parliament hone in on their own interests and future carriers”, Kareem says. Nepotism still happens in Algeria, with family members or friends of influential people receiving high-paying government jobs. “Nepotism and corruption still represent a huge obstacle to local development, and the government does little to fight it”, said Faycal Mataoui, a journalist at El Watan, one of the largest French-language newspapers in Algeria.

The government has taken on many huge projects such an East-West highway that cost US$20 billion, but the projects did not help the unemployment rate. Oil-rich Algeria is home to 36 million inhabitants. The country has US$300 billion in its coffers from oil production, but still 12 per cent are unemployed. The government tries to give loans to young people but most of the money is “hijacked by influential groups or given to people who are not unemployed.” Says Mataoui.

No Algeria Spring
Abdenour Ziani assumes that government loans attract greedy people, mafia groups or are spent on small businesses that do not generate high employment.

“The government has not been convincing during the past four years, that is why most of the Algerians hesitate to vote,” says Abdennour, who operates a retail shop in El Harrach, one of the most populous areas of Algiers. “Algeria has a pretty good chance to be a leading country in North Africa during a time where neighbouring countries are subject to turmoil in the aftermath of the Arab spring”, he said.

The Algerian Prime-Minister Ahmed Ouyahia admitted for the first time, on June 2^nd, that Mafia money is controlling the biggest investments, a situation that may cause troubles in the country. The “Arab spring” did not knock at Algeria’s door. It has happened, indeed, years before in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Morocco. On October 1988, riotous demonstrations and disturbances by Algerian youth led to the fall of the country's single-party system and the introduction of democratic and economic reform. But, in January 1992, the Army cancelled parliamentary elections that the Islamic salvation Front, an Islamist party, seemed set to win, paving the way to an unprecedented violence. Some 150,000 are believed to have been killed in a decade of violence.

The violence and chaos of the 1990s has left Algerians traumatic about echoing the upheavals in other Arab countries “What happened during the 1990’s freezes hell. Algerians are upset but no one wants to revisit the tormenting years”, said Naim Zaidi, Professor of political science at the University of Algiers.

In the meantime, debates were heating up on Facebook between supporters of the soft democratic changes and the sceptics. A fan page called “vote or no vote”, created by a group of activists is receiving a deluge of comments. Khaled Merouani, an Algerian who is managing the page, says he is amazed by the number of visitors it attracts. “I was overwhelmed by the nature of the comments. Some were inflammatory against the government and against some public figures. I had to delete some in the beginning after some criticism, but now I am convinced the debate is healthy,” he said.

Many facebookers are accusing the president Abdel’aziz Bouteflika of not having the guts to make the right decisions to fight corruption and others simply believe he has done a great job by getting Algeria back to a stable situation. Last April, Bouteflika ensured that the country would go into further democratic reforms that includes authorizing private owned TV channels.

Islamist Disillusion
In May’s election pro-government parties FLN and RND won the majority of the seats in the elections, but the opposition rejected the results saying the votes were rigged. Algeria's ruling National Liberation Front (FLN) has won 220 seats out of 462 seats. The National Democratic Rally (RND) placed second with 68 seats in the National People's Assembly, while the Islamist Alliance of Green Algeria came third with 48 seats. The Socialist Forces Front won 21 seats, followed closely by the Workers' Party with 20. Independent candidates took 19 seats, while the Algerian National Front and the Justice and Development Party won nine and seven seats respectively. The Islamists who ran a large campaign were the big losers. They were promising a sweeping victory in line with what happened in Tunisia, Morocco; but say there was huge electoral fraud in the voting.

The local and parliament elections usually do not attract the voters the way a presidential election does. Most of them support Bouteflika but do not trust the parties. Bouteflika, 75, has been in office since 1999 and was re-elected twice, in 2004 and 2009. He is believed to be sick since December 2005 when he had a stomach surgery in a military hospital in Paris. Bouteflika is expected to quit in 2014.

Women were the big winners. Some 146 women, a record number, were elected to the parliament. The proportion of women elected is higher than that in France, the United States or any other country in the West. Compared to other countries in the MENA region, women in Algeria are more active in policy through parties or local NGOs. Women electoral victory is believed to be an unexpected evolution in a country that is 99 per cent Muslim.

But many Algerians like Kareem still hold out hopes that real changes occur when they are provided with jobs and housing opportunities that are becoming rare in Algeria.

*Kamel Mansari is the editor-in-chief at Le Jeune Independent and prior to that he was deputy editor-in-chief at Ech-chorouk Arabic daily newspaper, and a reporter at the newswire service Algeria press service. He is also a TV correspondent and writes in Arabic, English and French for various international newspapers and websites. He is also a journalism and multimedia strategist and trainer.

C-SPAN Book TV Interview

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Sun, 06 May 2012 18:57:00 +0000

This is an interview that aired yesterday on C-SPAN's Book TV about my Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge. I also discuss the so called "Arab Spring" in the context of Morocco.

On Mona El Tahawy’s “Hate” Argument

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Mon, 30 Apr 2012 16:35:00 +0000

Mona El Tahawy’s latest article in Foreign Policy has provoked a firestorm of controversy in the blogosphere. Her provocative title “Why do they hate us?” evoked the much-loathed question posed by Bernard Lewis in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks of why the Middle East hates America. Perhaps therein lies one of the many contentious issues with what is otherwise a well-written essay. The use of the word “Hate” is harsh and is devoid of any explanatory value. It is also emotional and not based on an objective assessment of the plight of women in the MENA region. However, El Tahawy’s use is obviously intended to shock its readership into pondering what is arguably one of the most abysmal records of women’s rights in the world.

Most of the response so far have centered on stylistic issues with the use of the word “fear” and the use of the naked images of body-painted niqab, which many argued evokes orientalist stereotypes of the Middle East. No one seems to dispute the litany of statistics that El Tahawy quotes in the article, which paint a rather depressing, but accurate picture of the status of women in MENA. Perhaps we are shocked because honestly very few of us knew, for example, that 90% of all ever-married Egyptian women underwent female genital mutilation, or that 80% of Egyptian women have been sexually harassed. This is in addition to the litany of reports on women’s status in the MENA that are frankly embarrassing and immoral.

When I read the article and saw the images of the naked woman body-painted in niqab, I was struck by the boldness of the tone and tenor of the article. Mona’s juxtaposition between the “us”--downtrodden oppressed women-- against “them” –the oppressive, misogynistic Arab Muslim men--bifurcates MENA societies in parallel segregated realms, where men in the different contexts that she enumerates consciously reject equality for women simply because they hate females. This is, in and of itself, a meaningless argument, because it tells us little about the micro dynamics of gender relations in the region. More importantly, El Tahawy should have looked at more in-depth socio-political reasons for such a plight. Many scholars have provided sound and research-based analysis of women’s status in the MENA. Of particular note are the excellent studies of Leila Ahmed’s Women and Gender in Islam , and Nikki Keddie’s Women in the Middle East.

Having been on a panel with El Tahawy, I know that she is well-versed in feminist literature on the MENA and is not, as some suggested in their rejoinders, ill-informed. Mona El Tahawy is an opinion writer and as such, she has sought to provoke a debate about the issue of empowerment and the lack of socio-economic and political equal opportunities for women. The article could have been less harsh in its blanket indictment of all Middle Eastern Arab Muslim men, for that is hardly a fact and should not be taken by all as one. It is a heuristic device used by Mona to illustrate the misogynistic posture of Arab Muslim men. Misogyny after all results from contempt and tradition, but also from ignorance of one’s faith.

The issue of liberation of women does not solely hinge on the use of niqab or veil, which is fetishized in the images that accompanied the article in Foreign Policy (though one cannot be sure if El Tahawy chose the images or if that was an editorial decision). It is a policy issue that has to be targeted through active steps that involve state and civil society leaders. Liberation and freedom do not mean a rejection of women’s niqab as oppressive, since there are many women that wear it out of conviction. True liberation is to allow for choice, but not condemn the outcome of that choice if it is contrary to our own biased, skewed, often times western-tainted views of what women empowerment should look like.

I have to acknowledge that I am not a female, but I am Muslim and Arab, and have had a fair amount of interaction with women leaders, especially in Morocco, which El Tahawy singles out as lacking in true progress for women. It is difficult to argue against that position, for indeed Morocco has a long way to go in the areas of female empowerment and equality. The recent case of Amina Filali, who took her own life after being forced to marry her rapist due to an unjust loophole in the Moroccan penal code, is a testament to the distance that Morocco has still to cover to grant women their full human rights. Morocco, however, has one of the most vibrant and active women’s movements and organizations in the region. In the past decade, the work of organizations such as the Democratic Association of Women of Morocco (ADFM) and the Feminine Action Union (UAF) have been integral in bringing about laudable changes to the Mudwanna (family code). They have also articulated new discourses of women’s rights and adopted independent frameworks away from sterile party politics in Morocco.

Elsewhere women (veiled and unveiled) have been part of the nascent Middle East awakening: for instance, there are Brave women such as activist Lina Ben Mhenni in Tunisia, whose blog’s fiery rhetoric was instrumental in mobilizing Tunisian against the tyrannical regime of Ben ‘Ali; or Asmaa Mahfouz in Egypt, whose eloquent video on YouTube against the regime of Mubarak, calling on Egyptians to join Tahrir Square was key in fomenting the revolution in Egypt; or, the case of Tal Al-Molouhi in Syria, who stood tall against the repressive regime of al-Assad and was steadfast in her challenge to the regime until her arrest in February 2011; or, journalist and activist, Tawakkol Karman, better known as the “mother of the Revolution” in Yemen and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2011, who organized student rallies and protests against the regime of Ali Abdallah Saleh.

Mona El Tahawy’s article will surely be subject to more and more controversy, and that is exactly her intention as an opinion journalist. She has succeeded in crafting a well-written essay, backed with impressive statistics. However, El Tahawy also revels in a broad narrative that conjures up long despised stereotypes about the status of women and gender relations in the Middle East. Her essay has been successful in inciting the intellectual furor of many in and outside the region. This is the sort of debate that we need to increasingly have, both as Arabs and as Muslims. However, these debates should not turn into personal attacks on the author, no matter how passionately we feel about the content and images in the Foreign Policy article.

#RIPAmina

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Sun, 18 Mar 2012 04:56:00 +0000

News of Amina al-Filali’s suicide continues to create a seismic reaction everywhere around the world. Even in Singapore where I am currently on a teaching assignment, local newspapers reported on the tragedy. Twitterverse is abuzz with feeds under the hashtag #RIPAmina . The 16-year old teen that took her own life after she was forced to marry her rapist has become a symbol for resistance against anti-women laws in Morocco. Several sit-ins took place in Morocco denouncing the “marry rapist” law and calling for a ban on the law. The government has pledged that the law will be amended. But the law itself is not the only issue, but a general attitude towards rape, domestic violence and women status in Morocco.

According to article 475 of Morocco’s penal code, a rapist or abductor can be exempted from all criminal charges if they marry their minor rape victims. The law stipulates that the guardians of the victim have to consent to the marriage with the court approval. This is a triple tragedy: Amina was victimized twice by her aggressor and an archaic penal code, her family, concerned by an ignorant cultural shame of rape and pressure from the public prosecutor conceded to her marriage to the rapist who robbed her out of her childhood; and the court system did not exercise its oversight authority to veto such a grave injustice.

The panoply of injustices that befell Amina has rightfully sparked a national debate on women’s rights and status of women in the kingdom. Despite the much vaunted mudawanna (family code) reforms of 2004, which among other, raised the age of marriage from 15 to 18, placed limitations on the practice of polygamy and gave women the right to petition the court for divorce, women in Morocco continue to struggle for equal and fair social, economic and political opportunities.

Women suffer from a high rate of illiteracy (58% among females) nearing in some cases 90 percent among girls in rural areas and disproportionate rate of unemployment as they struggle against gender bias. More importantly, women are victims of cultural and traditional prejudices in divorce, rape and sexual harassment. Laws reflect prevailing attitudes of a society, and in a society that often blames women for the crimes of their rapists, where those crimes are even reported, article 475 is an unjust attempt to keep the lid on a crime commonly understood to be against social chastity.

The law should not have even existed in the books. Minors should unequivocally benefit from the protection of the state. Not even parents, who may succumb to societal and traditional pressure, should have the final say as Amina’s case tragically shows. What kind of society are we, if we cannot protect our most vulnerable? What does it say about our moral fabric if we remand a victim to their culprit?Morocco’s laws and justice system are in dire need for reform, much like the whole structure of political system. Increased pressure from women’s rights groups such as the Association Démocratique des Femmes du Maroc (ADFM) and the Union Action Féminine (UAF) is key to the renewal of public debate on the place of women in society. In the past, these groups articulated new discourses of women’s rights and human rights, and adopted a ‘self-limiting framework’ that is independent of political parties. With all their success ahead of the 2004 family code reforms, the infamous 475 law slipped through the cracks with the stipulation that the courts will exercise its authority judiciously and in favor of the weak and victim.

The case of Amina is a reminder that the kingdom long touted as a beacon for Arab progress still loiters under the brunt of archaic laws and a corrupt justice system. The sweeping reforms of 2004 are constantly challenged by tradition. It is time we fully empowered the existing laws that give women full citizenship rights, physical integrity, access to work, ownership and legal equality. It is also time we discarded all of he anti-women legislation like article 475.

Libya's Perilous Path

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 08 Mar 2012 21:24:00 +0000

News from Libya have seldom been positive lately, which in and of itself, is not cause for alarm. Freshly liberated from the despotic and megalomaniacal rule of Colonel Qaddafi, this heavily tribal society still wrestles to find its path for political and socio-economic progress. However, news reports of eastern Libyan leaders’ declaration of “semi autonomy” in the oil-rich region of Libya has caused quite a stir in and outside Libya. More importantly, the declaration was made in the city of Benghazi, cradle of resistance against Colonel Qaddafi. Despite reassurance that the move is not meant to divide the country, a unilateral proclamation of autonomy may affect the territorial and institutional unity of Libya. According to the tribal representatives, militia commanders and politicians that made the declaration, the eastern region will have policing powers, its own parliament, courts and capital. Foreign affairs, military and oil will be administered by the central government.

The central government currently runs by the caretaker National Transitional Council offered no resistance to this move so far. Its interim leader Mustapha Abdul Jalil rejected talks of military action against the eastern tribes, for the simple reason that the National Transitional Council (NTC) does not have the military capabilities for such undertaking. Instead he blamed foreign powers for sowing the seeds of division inside Libya, and the poor performance of his own NTC. The eastern declaration will in all likelihood be subject to intense negotiations behind the scenes between the NTC and the major factions in the East, that increasingly feel a bias towards the west from the current interim government. However, it also points o the fact that Libya is still unstable months after rebels ousted Qaddafi with the help of NATO.

The process of stabilizing and rebuilding Libya faces three monumental tasks: the vacuous nature of the state bequeathed by Qaddafi, the refusal of decommissioning by the armed militia, and a general sense of mistrust among the major tribal factions in the country. Each one of these issues is potentially critical for the future of Libya and could make the country susceptible to major instability.

Four decades of despotic rule of Qaddafi have had a devastating effect on Libya. More than any other Arab states affected by the Arab uprising, Libya stands as an oddity where the ancien regime left little to no institutional legacy. In Qaddafi’s Libya, there was a complete institutional void. There were hardly any institutions, and where they existed, they were inchoate and partially formed. Gaddafi had veto power over all decisions, not as a president, but a leader of the revolution. Much of the edifice of the state was shaped in the image of the mercurial Qaddafi and sustained by a dizzying number of populist rubber stamp committees. The military was completely gutted and replaced by armed platoons under the command his sons and tribal allies. As a result, Libya today lacks a state apparatus, an organized military and foundational institutions to ease it through this period of transition.

Libya also features significant tribal fissures. For four decades, Gaddafi played tribes against each other, and there are still significant tribal rivalries in Libya. Years of wily and cunning strategy by Qaddafi resulted in a tribal landscape hardly conducive to the establishment of a sense of national unity. Qaddafi co-opted most of the western tribes during his rule bestowing patronage on his own tribe al-Qaddadfa, and other tribes in Sirte. The recent Eastern proclamation of autonomy is rooted in a perception of years of discrimination against Cyrenaican tribes and region in Libya. During the uprising in 2011, there were many reports of inter-tribe violence and acts of reprisal in the aftermath of Qaddafi’s fall. Not lacking in arms, each tribe is well equipped with heavy artillery in including, machine guns, rocket propelled grenades and even landmines. Reports also suggest that hundred of thousands of guns and ammunition were taken by various anti-Qaddafi militia groups during and after the fight to topple Qaddafi. My own sources in Libya at that time suggest that Qaddafi himself opened up his gun depots for local residents in Tripoli to obtain various sorts of heavy weapons.

Most of the militia have thus far refused governmental appeals for arms decommissioning, which complicates the task of the NTC to secure order and stability in the country. The existence of armed groups has also inhibited the efforts of the nascent government in Tripoli to impose the law and administer justice. Amidst reports of militia vigilante violence, the NTC is gradually losing control over an increasingly fractured society bordering on lawlessness. After 42 years of repression and tribal divisions, many Libyans mistrust the state and are wary of opposing tribes. Weapons have thus become a deterrent source of safety.

Libya like most of the Arab states that deposed their autocratic leaders, is at a critical juncture. Much of its future depends on the ability of the transitional government to navigate through these three thorny issues. Without a disarmed society and strong transparent institutions of government, the prospect for positive change is limited. Promise of a peaceful and free society is still within grasp, but there is also a great deal of peril if the construction of a national identity that transcends local tribalism fails.

A Year After: The February 20 Protest Movement in Morocco

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 22 Feb 2012 17:38:00 +0000

*This article was written for Jadaliyya (an independent ezine produced by the Arab Studies Institute) and can be accessed here.

On the one-year anniversary of the February 20 protest movement in Morocco, (henceforth referred to as Feb. 20), the kingdom boasts relatively meager political progress. Despite the much-vaunted reforms and constitutional changes, Morocco has reinvigorated its state edifice, managed to outmaneuver an inexperienced Feb. 20 protest movement, and engaged in a crackdown on freedom of the press and speech. In the last couple of weeks, the regime has arrested three Moroccans for crimes against his majesty’s person and “defaming Morocco’s sacred values.” In a country where the monarch is inviolable, the use of cartoons depicting the king is considered an outrage to a symbol of the country.

More importantly, a year after the initial mass protests, we need to assess the record of the movement in terms of appeal and success in Morocco. The Feb. 20 movement has undoubtedly sparked a national discussion for institutional changes, but fell short in exercising enough pressure for deeper structural changes to both the political system dominated by the king, and a system of crony-capitalism that has for decades crippled the national economy. The new constitution is an impressive exercise in state management of dissent. Groundbreaking only in its style and cosmetic in terms of real effective change, the constitution allows for greater executive power for the Prime Minister, but falls short in tackling the vast discretionary powers of the monarchy.

The constitution does not address aspects of direly needed reforms. Kleptocracy and nepotism are endemic in the Moroccan administration and economy. No matter how inchoate institutional reforms are, they have to be complemented with stringent, implementable guarantees against abuse of power, corruption, and inequality of the laws. Individual freedom and liberty of the press are guaranteed in the constitution, but have to be safeguarded from the arbitrary abuses of the state. The result is the same maladies of yesteryear: a regime suffering from institutional schizophrenia, promoting inconsequential reforms, and tightening its grip on power and individual freedom.

Even the much-publicized electoral victory of the Justice and Development Party is hardly revolutionary, and is in fact out of sync with the ambitions of millions of Moroccans longing for democratic progress. The elections featured the same panoply of state engineering as past elections. In the absence of rigorous laws against corruption and fraud, one can expect the same old violations. Moroccans abroad were also barred from voting, the electoral districts were drawn arbitrarily to favor pro-palace parties, and some thirty-one parties from different ideological and non-ideological strands saturated the electoral scene. This inevitably bars any one party from gaining an outright majority in the 395-seat parliament. In such an environment, elections have brought minimal political progress to Morocco and are yet another tool for the regime to control the public discourse in the middle of turbulent times for the Middle East and North Africa region. The elections also served to legitimize the cosmetic constitutional changes of July 2011 as the regime sits unchallenged, uncontested, and jubilant.

The success of the regime so far is also a function of the weakness of the protest movement in Morocco. From the very first protests, the movement was beset by reports of infighting, as three founding members called for the cancellation of the demonstrations because of what they perceived as foreign interference with the movement. The movement lacks organization and popular appeal. I was at the movement's post-referendum protests in Marrakech, and the number of protesters was negligible. The results of the referendum have dealt the movement a major blow. It may not prove to be a fatal one, but it has severely restricted the movement’s ability to mount a significant challenge to the edifice of the state in Morocco.

The movement for reform in Morocco has to regroup and recast its message in more strategic ways, focusing on what can be achieved in the short versus long term. Any attempt, or perceived attempt, of reproach for the monarchical institution has to be carefully calibrated, in order to reflect the duality in the modern Moroccan state between the ‘Alaoui monarchical regime and the institutions of the government. The monarchy has been an institution above the political fray, of course, with total control over the travails of the political scene.

The Feb. 20 movement must, at this point, strive for cohesion and build the foundations for an autonomous visionary leadership away from widely perceived "puppet" relationships with the left or the right in Morocco. If this movement is a reflection of the youth movements elsewhere in the Arab world, it has to distance itself from old political and civil society organizations. Most of all, it has to polish its image and message and diversify its sources of information dissemination. Reliance on social media as a sole means of organization may prove limited given the state’s capacity to intercept and manipulate social media massages.

Social media has been crucial as a form of coordination for the Arab protest movements that toppled dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, while destabilizing others. Social media significantly increased the geographical reach of social movements and cemented members to each other. However, that same form of organization reduces the cost of participation and can limit the effectiveness of collective action. A movement that relies solely on media activism will inevitably face a greater dilemma of message control and member commitment. Additionally, such movements face the constant dual state response of censorship and propaganda. Social media isolates the movement from the majority non-users of its technological tools. In a country where the majority of population is illiterate, this creates a fundamental problem for the protest movement’s appeal. A mixture of strategies between social media and on the ground mobilization could prove more effective in re-branding the Feb. 20 movement, not just as a channel for disenchanted youth, but as a national movement for socioeconomic and political change.

The Feb. 20 movement is at a loss for a genuine strategy of contestation that provides an alternative challenge to the state discourse of socio-political reforms. Despite continued demonstrations and sit-ins, the movement is dwindling in numbers and has degenerated into unorganized gatherings of popular grievances. Some have suggested the evolution of the Feb. 20 protest movement into a political party; however, that will still not be successful. In the absence of a vibrant political party scene in the country, a new party will simply drown in the current fragmented and carefully managed party system. Instead of party politics, Feb. 20 has to re-organize as a social movement and identify a source for mobilization. As a movement with disruptive potential, its leadership, if any, needs to identify ways to generate and sustain organized mass action with new forms of diffusion and organization.

Time for Diplomacy is Over in Syria

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Sat, 11 Feb 2012 19:52:00 +0000

Marc Lynch has written an important piece on the Syrian conflict, in which he opposes the arming of the so called Free Syrian Army. Decrying what he terms as a bandwagon for arming the fighters, Lynch raises some pertinent questions on the usefulness of such undertaking. While I do understand the reservations against the action, I find myself joining this “bandwagon,” and arguing for the empowerment of the opposition movement through military and logistical means.

Granted the leadership and anatomy of such movement is still unclear, it is incumbent upon the international community to engage the opposition in an attempt to identify some viable leadership. Similarly, fears of reprisal by the regime, as Marc Lynch contends, are moot at this point as the Assad killing squads have already escalated their onslaught on civilians. Faced with the current state of affairs, it is immoral to sit idly by while hundreds of innocent Syrians are massacred especially as all avenues for diplomacy and tough sanctions have yielded no results.

Over the last couple of months, the intensity of the carnage has increased and there is no doubt that the Assad regime is now indiscriminately shelling civilian neighborhoods. In his final note from Syria, US ambassador Robert Ford provided satellite images that confirm the presence of mortars and artillery in residential neighborhoods. These are crimes against humanity that have been committed with impunity and little regard for international norms. In the absence of a clear plan to stop the bloodshed and to topple Assad, the international community has no options but to take concrete steps to provide material support for the opposition in Syria.

Even the Arab protocol that called for a Syrian army withdrawal from civilian neighborhood, and a complete cessation of the onslaught was met with the regime’s defiant refusal. But we cannot reply on the Arab League and its corrupt membership of dictatorial states to alleviate the suffering of the Syrian people (despite the strong criticism from King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia). In an ideal world in which international norms prevail, the massacre of Syrian civilians will be subject to the international norm of responsibility to protect. Under this principle, the international community has a duty to intervene to put an end to state-sponsored mass atrocities against their own people. These include war crimes, genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

While I tentatively support the arming of the FSA, this can only be of last resort and after we identify its leadership if that exists. It may be an act of desperation, but at this point it is the only option the international community has. The intervention in Libya worked because we could early on identify a somewhat coherent leadership within the Transitional National Council. We may never be able to do so in the case of Syria, but supporting those communities that are most directly under threat from the Syrian state is paramount.

To that end, I find myself in support of the latest Senate bipartisan plan to provide support for the opposition in Syria. The world can no longer watch while a minority regime is engaged in a systematic annihilation of its own people. These actions are not without precedent. In 1999, The United States exerted pressure and facilitated an active plan by NATO to help protect the Kosovars against Serbian ethnic cleansing. In 2011, NATO came to the rescue of the Libyan rebels under regime’s threat of reprisal. In Syria, 6000 people have been killed so far, and many more will join them if there is not a decisive plan that includes building a wider consensus in the region and international about the imperative of the responsibility to protect the Syrian people.

Tunisia: One Year after Ben 'Ali

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Sun, 15 Jan 2012 05:21:00 +0000

One year after Tunisia's Ben 'Ali is ousted, the face of the Arab world is forever changed. With the remarkable winds of change sweeping down the region, the middle East is perhaps forever changed. No longer are its populations fearful of despotic states. More importantly, the orientalist arguments for a democratically-challenged and freedom-resisting Middle East are shattered. This past year has forced us all to face down the realities of a new Middle East, brimming with youth, disenchanted, beset by grim prospects, but nonetheless eager to revolt in refusal of what their fathers and forefathers quiescently lived under for decades. The collapse of Ben 'Ali's dictatorship led to the increased vulnerability of the edifice of the Arab authoritarian state and created momentum for the other protest movements in the region. Despots have fallen in Egypt, Libya, and tremendous challenges for survival are facing those in Syria, Yemen. All the while monarchies in Morocco and Jordan have undergone sheepish constitutional and governmental reforms.

Tunisia, the cradle of the so-called Arab spring, is leading the torch so far by slowly building the foundations for democratic transition. Despite concerns of Islamist authoritarian tendencies by al-Nahda, I remain optimistic. Ideological divides are bound to occur in post-authoritarian regimes; however, these become detrimental when they are institutionally grounded and become hurdles in the way of socio-economic development. Many have addressed the secular-Islamist tension in the Tunisian society especially after the events in Manouba University where Salafists closed down the Humanities College to protest over the issue of niqab (integral veil).

The Islamists have not helped their cause either as they engaged in several foolhardy actions that have not generated any good will. PM Hamadi Jebali (secretary General of al-Nahda) took advantage of his appointment powers to bestow key ministerial portfolios upon close al-Nahda associates. However, it was his unilateral appointment of new directors for state media that drew most of the criticism, especially as many of the appointees are relics from the ancien regime. Finally, the recent visit of Qatar's Emir Hamad has further divided the country.

On the regional level, al-Nahda's courtship of HAMAS has drawn consternation from those that seek to cast a non-radical image of Islamists in power. This could prove to be a perilous relationship. Such association could also jeopardize Tunisia's prospects for foreign investments and capital. Unemployment rates are high and expected to be higher by the end of the year averaging %19-20. This is indeed the most pressing challenge for the current government that has to generate enough opportunities for foreign investment to boost a stagnant economy, spur productivity and lower the unemployment rate. Years of myopic economic plans and kleptocratic practices have resulted in uneven regional development between the affluent north and the marginal south of Tunisia.

One year after the collapse of Ben 'Ali, Tunisia is firmly in charge of its own destiny, but much of the future trajectory of the country will depend on the ability of the current leadership to shun ideological differences in favor of more pragmatic solutions for socio-economic development. The most excellent way to sidestep the secular-Islamist divide is to deliver in the process of governance and relegate much of the religious matters to the realm of individual privacy. The goal hopefully is to establish a civil state that recognizes the religious and ideological diversity of its own citizens.

One year ago, the singular desperate act of Mohamed Boua'zizi had tremendous reverberations throughout the world, not just the Arab world. Arabs taught every society democratic or none, that change is in the hands of those that protest actions of misguided or autocratic governments. Tunisia has since toppled its dictator and produced well-run free elections that resulted in the popular election of the Islamists of al-Nahda. The movement of Rachid Ghannouchi has initially shown great readiness to build compromises with different ideological positions in the Tunisian political landscape. It will be a misfortune for Tunisia if the movement abandons its conciliatory position and adopts some of the old regime's style of governance.

Tunisia's First Test

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 02 Nov 2011 15:41:00 +0000

As Egypt continues to spiral down the path of authoritarianism, Tunisia held its first free, fair and competitive elections on October 23rd. By all accounts, the elections registered virtually no violations, and witnessed the resounding plurality victory of the Islamist al-Nahda Movement. The movement cast to abeyance during the dictatorship of Ben ‘Ali won 41 percent of the votes and 90 seats of the Constituent Assembly. The first order of business for al-Nahda is to form an interim transitional government to oversee the promulgation of a new democratic constitution for Tunisia.

Like the electoral process, the aftermath of the election results unfolded in an impressive fashion. Most of the losing parties conceded defeat and “bowed to the will of the Tunisian people. The elections are historical not only in Tunisia, but for the rest of the Arab world as well. Tunisians rose up to the challenge as the whole world observed their electoral contest. In so doing, they set the example for the rest of the Arab world in their ability to conduct peaceful democratic elections. The Tunisian success assuages fears in some western circles and local skeptics on the ability of Arab societies to fully implement basic institutional tasks leading to the elections. In this respect, most Tunisians I talked to commend the colossal work of Yadh Ben Achour, head of the Election Commission (ISIE), in the tedious task of party list registration.

Tunisia has passed the first test with flying colors, but the toughest work lies ahead. The new government and constituent assembly have to tackle issues of freedom of the press, police reform and economic development. The new constitution should undoubtedly embody principles of separation of powers, horizontal accountability, individual and group liberties and a firm emphasis on the rule of law. Islamist leaders of al-Nahda will be the first Arab Islamist party in charge of a political system. The naysayers and alarmists will inevitably doubt the abilities of al-Nahda and question its motives. Al-Nahda will have to dispel orientalist arguments of democratic dissimulation and show real commitment to principles of good governance. Al-Nahda leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has so far spoken in favor of a civil state and Tunisia's secular liberal code of personal status, which among other things, bans polygamy. His vision is for a synthesis between Islam and modernity as al-Nahda aims "to ensure stability, to reform justice, and to prosecute corruption cases, putting an end to it, in all its forms."

These are remarkable times for Tunisia and the Arab world. Despite still re-entrenched dictatorial regimes in Syria and Yemen, Tunisia and Libya (except for the summary execution of Gaddafi) show the potential for an Arab democratic renewal. No longer can the world dismiss the Arab Middle East region as a zone of democratic deficit. As Tunisia undergoes a fascinating political experiment, the eyes of the world will be closely watching, but ultimately the fate of Tunisia is for the first time in the hands of its own people.

The End of Qaddafi: A New Beginning for Libya

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 20 Oct 2011 19:36:00 +0000

Dramatic news out Libya today. After weeks in hiding, Qaddafi is dead. The TNC has confirmed the news of Qaddafi and his son Mu'tassim's death today through its vice-chairman, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga. The details of Qaddafi's death are still unclear and there are several unconfirmed reports about the colonel's last minutes. Apparently, Qaddafi's convoy was shot by a US drone and after an attempt to flee, Qaddafi was later found holed in a storm rain where he was captured alive but wounded by rebel forces. The Daily Mail reports that the former dictator pleaded with his captors in vain and subsequently killed by the rebels (this vide show Qaddafi's capture by the rebels).

What's clear is that his death marks the effective end of 42 year-tyrannical rule and comes at the heel of successive military victories by the TNC forces. The demise of Qaddafi is only the beginning of the much tougher task of re-building Libya on new firm and democratic foundations. In a country that lacks minimum institutional structures, that task is increasingly difficult, complicated by deep regional and tribal divisions.

This latest episode in the Libyan saga will undoubtedly bring about the end of the military involvement of NATO in the conflict. It also signals a shift in international interventionism in global affairs as it is a successful precedent for calibrated and measured military involvement against states' imminent threat to their own people. It inevitably raises issues of double standards as the same approach has not been pursued in other cases, such as Syria, Yemen and Bahrain still reeling from tremendous state violence.

The news from Libya today will also provide much needed boost to some fledgling protest movements in other parts of the Arab world. This could embolden protest and oppositional factions as there is a increased palpable sense of regime vulnerability in much of the Middle East today. Some already see it as a message to Arab rulers for swift meaningful reforms.

As Libya celebrates its emancipation from the last vestiges of the former despotic regime, Tunisia is entering a new chapter in its nascent political history. The country is holding its first post-Ben Ali and the first post-Arab spring elections for a 217-member constituent assembly on Sunday. The stakes are high for the Maghrebi state, but the first phase of voter and party list registration concluded last month in relatively calm and transparent environment. Some 10000 candidates from over 100 parties are contesting the elections, but the major cleavages remain the Islamists of Ennahda and the center left (secular) Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). Future posts will attempt an analysis of the results of the elections and future trajectories for the Tunisian experiment.

Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Fri, 14 Oct 2011 17:22:00 +0000

Shameless self-promotion. My book on the Moroccan monarchy is out. As am I as an anonymous blogger. The following is an online interview on the book I did for Jaddaliya.

The book provides a new approach to the study of the prevalence of authoritarianism in the MENA. It re-introduces socio-institutional variables into this debate without resorting to essentialist macro-claims; rather, it focuses on the micro-dynamics of symbolic power. The book provides an alternative way to conceptualize political legitimacy and power in the Middle East. It argues that the monarchy’s religious authority and its use of rituals of power limit the ability of Islamist and non-Islamist opposition groups to contest the monarchy’s legitimacy. This study goes beyond most institutionalist accounts of authoritarian persistence by exploring the micro-dynamics of symbolic power and the extent to which the regime uses rituals of power to create a political culture conducive to the monarchy’s supremacy in the socio-political realm, thus promoting regime stability in Morocco.

These rituals have been institutionalized in the political system and have become part of the political discourse in Morocco. The study examines the effects of the ritualization of the political process on oppositional—especially Islamist—forces. The book argues that the monarchy’s religious authority and its use of rituals of power impede the ability of Islamist and other opposition groups to mobilize and to penetrate Moroccan society. The prevalence of this cultural and social hegemony contributes to the stability and resilience of the monarchical authoritarian regime in Morocco.

Transitions and Breakdowns in the Arab Spring.

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Wed, 14 Sep 2011 02:41:00 +0000

At a time where seismic changes are taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), few have noticed, or perhaps are reluctant to note the counterrevolution trends in the Arab spring. Already Egypt is struggling under the might of an unenlightened military regime, supposed to act in the best interest of the revolution. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has stymied dissent and subjected dissenters to its extrajudicial and military trials.

In Tunisia, perhaps the closest to a steady post-revolutionary transition, registration for the Constituent Assembly closed last Wednesday, September 7th with a dizzying 1750 electoral lists. The Islamists of Ennahda and the Community Party of Tunisia (PCOT) are the most noticeably organized in terms of party lists. Ennahda is fielding candidates in all of Tunisia's 23 governorates, while PCOT has 14 lists and the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) submitted a meager 8 lists. The Constituent Assembly elections set for October 23rd will be the first such contest in post-Ben 'Ali era and could be key analytical tool to examine the future of Tunisian democracy. In Libya, still jubilant after toppling the 42 rule of Colonel (fugitive) Gaddafi, the task of state-building looms in the horizon amidst unclear lines of leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC).

While no one can predict accurately the results of such elections, we do know for sure that post revolutionary aftermaths can be messy, fuzzy periods of uncertainty, where new socio-economic and political structures are formed. Elite predispositions are key after the breakdown of authoritarian rule. The fate of states and societies lies with the actions of the few political elite organizations and groups. From Latin American experience, we know regime transitions are abnormal periods of ‘undetermined’ political changes in which there are not enough structural or behavioral parameters to guide and predict the outcome. Transitologists O’Donnell and Schmitter, for instance, posit a ‘contingent’ model of change. This model assumes that in the political game during transition periods, one actor’s initiative prompts another actor’s response and that political events follow from one to another. From a contingent point of view, political outcomes stem from interaction and bargaining. The key to any democratic transition, then, is the ability of participants to arrive at negotiated agreements that grant everyone a piece of the transitional pie.

Absent from this political crafting is the will of the people in its exercise of accountability. Societal accountability is to be fostered within that dimension. Societal accountability is a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control of political authorities that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens’ associations and movements and on the media. These actions monitor the action of public officials, expose governmental wrongdoing, and can activate the operation of horizontal agencies. Absence of societal accountability leads to myopic democratic transitions susceptible to breakdown.

Democratic breakdown is not merely the result of ineffective leadership response to crisis, but goes more deeply to the response of various parties and groups to political and social change (i.e. in Latin America). As long as so called transition has a set of rules of the game that protect the purveyors of the regime's interests, democracy or some facade form of it is tolerated. Argentina's military, for instance, allowed democracy after 1955, as long as the "wrong" party of the Peronistas did not win. We could potentially see SCAF in Egypt taking on that role of the watchdog of a sham democratic transition, overseeing and controlling the outcome of electoral contests. however, history dictates that such military role is short-lived and never amounts to full-fledged consolidation of democratic governance.

For long, the MENA region languished under the yoke of Sultanistic authoritarian regimes (to borrow Juan Linz's terminology). These carry institutional baggage and memory of personalism and arbitrary rule, which hinder any movement towards the rule of law, an efficacious state bureaucracy and a vibrant free civil society. All necessary ingredients for any consolidation of democratic rule. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all suffered from decades of repression where civil society was battered by the state apparatus and dissent was suffocated. However, the existence of relatively organized opposition during the Mubarak era in Egypt, could prove important in rebuilding the current era if SCAF steps away from political rule. Military rule can only be acceptable if it subsides under the democratic civilian authority.

Tunisia had little in terms of civil society. Ben 'Ali virtually purged the political scene of all dissident and oppositional voices. Institutional purgatory was even extreme in Gaddafi's Libya, where state institutions are inchoate and no political parties existed in a quasi-totalitarian system. This approach to governance in both north African states inevitably affects the current political experiment in Tunisia and Libya. After all, the authoritarian dictatorships of Latin America and Southern Europe left a more positive legacy for the legal system and left a heritage for state building that was less negative than that of post-totalitarian regimes, where none of the ingredients of an effective economic or civil society existed.

Similarly, the continued existence of figures from the old guard threatens the transition to democracy. Whether it is the octogenarian interim prime minister Beji Caid Sebsi in Tunisia or Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi's SCAF in Egypt, the future of transition to democracy in either country remains improbable and uncertain. Libya so far suffers from a crisis of leadership despite attempts of Mustapha Abdul Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril to provide much needed guidance to conflicting tribes and militia groups. What the three newly emancipated countries share in common is that their future democratic transition and consolidation will greatly depend on choices, and decisions made in this tightly controlled inner circles of power.

Libya's Rebels' Rise from the Ashes

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Mon, 22 Aug 2011 19:01:00 +0000

Just when skeptics began writing obituaries of the Arab spring, the remarkable events unfolding in Libya over the last three days have renewed hope in the Arab struggle to rid the region of authoritarianism. The Libyan rebel forces have captured Tripoli and have finally stormed Bab al-'Aziziya compound (Gaddafi's fortified residence). There was no trace of Gaddafi and his family in the compound amidst wild speculations about his whearabouts.

Unlike the relatively easy toppling of Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, the Libyan affair dragged on for over six months. The liberation of Tripoli required intense fightng on the ground and some 75 NATO air sorties. Most importantly, the fighting have claimed more than 13ooo lives. Few feel vinidcated in their support of NATO's involvement in Libya, but that should be shortlived and all efforts must focus on post-Gaddafi reconstruction. The Libyan fight for liberation showcases the varied nature of the Arab spring as change can either result from peaceful protests or sometimes through violent means.

The Liberation of Libya also proved that NATO's involvement has been key in depleting the power of pro-Gaddafi forces. The air and ground fighting simply proved too much for Gaddafi loyalists. NATO's mandate to protect the advances of the rebels into Tripoli quickly turned into an action for regime change, following the launch, Saturday, August 20, of Operation "Siren of the Sea." NATO's involvement signals a new era in successful international intervention based on humanitarian legitimacy, where the cost of non-intervention is higher than measured and calibrated military involvement.

As Libyans regain control over their destiny and their oil resources for the first time in 42 years, the harder part of state building lies ahead. Libya presents greater challenges than any other Arab country. There is virtually no apparatus of the state, no constitution and no coherent political institutions that could serve as a platform for transition towards potential democratic governance. Libya also features significant tribal cleavages that have to be taken into consideration as the new Libyan state is built. For four decades, Gaddafi played tribes against each other, and there is still significant tribal rivalries in Libya. Everyone is jubilant in Libya today, but the future could prove even tougher than the military fighting.

The Feb. 20 Movement's Struggle for Relevance

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 07 Jul 2011 14:55:00 +0000

Finally back from a long sojourn in Morocco and Tunisia. My trip to Morocco coincided with the national debate on the constitutional revisions put forth by the palace commission's recommendations, and approved by an alarming 98% of voters. The high percentage of approval is indeed alarming because it signals a shocking return to the doctored percentages and egregious electoral transgressions of yesteryear. The years of Driss Basri, the former powerful Minister of the Interior. Several reports of fraud and lax voting procedures surfaced soon after the polls opened on July 1st. Though I didn't observe any in the voting station I visited.

The whopping 72% voter turnout is also an indicator of the state's successful campaign to alienate the "No" and boycott movements espoused by the Feb. 20 movement, and further dampened by the resounding royal endorsement of the new constitution. In a country with 44% illiteracy rate and where the king is semi-sacred, the vote for the constitution became a plebiscite on the monarchy itself. Any chances then for a popular rejection of the constitution was stillborn. Therein lied one of the many mistakes of the Feb. 20 movement: they have not adequately distinguished between their wholesale rejection of the proposed constitution and their specific position towards the monarchy in the constitutional draft. Their position on the role and status of the monarchy has been ambiguous and subject to several interpretations. The confusion made it easier for the state and its cronies to mount a counter campaign that cast the Feb. 20 movement against the monarchy and the territorial integrity of the country.

The mistakes of Feb. 20 movement were made all the more palpable by the apparent lack of organization and coherent strategy of protests which, at this point, are dwindling in strength and numbers. I was at the movement's post-referendum protests in Marrakech last Sunday, and the number of protesters didn't exceed 200 to 300 (see video I shot of the protests below). Most of the bystanders were gathered to deride and mock what a lot of Moroccans perceive today as an exercise in futility. That is the image the Feb. 20 movement has to shake off in the weeks to come. The results of the referendum have dealt the movement a major blow, maybe not a fatal one, but it has severely restricted its ability to mount a significant challenge to the corrupt undemocratic foundations of the state in Morocco.

The movement for reform in Morocco has to regroup and recast its message in more strategic ways focusing on what can be achieved in the short versus long terms in the kingdom. Any attempt or perceived attempt of reproach of the monarchical institution has to be carefully calibrated in order to reflect the duality in the modern Moroccan state between the Alaoui monarchical regime and the institutions of the government. The monarchy has been an institution above the political fray, of course with total control over the travails of the political scene. The Feb. 20 movement must at this point strive for cohesion and build the foundations for autonomous visionary leadership away from widely perceived "puppet" relationship with the left or the right in Morocco. If this movement is a reflection of the youth movements elsewhere in the Arab world, it has to distance itself from old aged political and civil society organizations. Most of all, it has to polish its image and message.

Ahead of Tomorrow's Constitutional Referendum

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Thu, 30 Jun 2011 19:02:00 +0000

Back from Tunisia where I was a guest observer at the Board meeting of the Foundation of the Future (this will be subject to a future blog post). Tunisia's post revolutionary experience is under way with its ups and downs. The first day I was there, my friend went to the movie theater to watch Nadia el Fani's "Ni dieu, ni Maitre," (Neither God, nor Master) where she was assaulted by so called Salafis. Nevertheless, Tunisia has started a progressive movement towards change. However, my mind is with Morocco ahead of the constitutional referendum tomorrow. I have made my position clear in previous posts. This one includes a couple of pictures I took and a wishful thought the referendum was about meaningful reforms.

In post-revolutionary Tunisia.

noreply@blogger.com (Mohamed Daadaoui) — Mon, 27 Jun 2011 18:01:00 +0000

I am in Tunisia where the atmosphere is cautious but optimistic. This is a new reinvigorated society inspired by ideals of freedom, human rights and democratic governance. Gone are all of the cult personalistic and ubiquitous portraits and pictures of deposed dictator Ben 'Ali. Instead, walls and streets are adorned by revolutionary graffiti and names of martyrs killed in the street demonstrations against the ancien regime. Many Tunisians are cognizant of the historical moment they have initiated in the Arab world. As the spark that ignited the wave of the Arab spring, Tunisia could stand as a model for post-revolutionary peaceful transitional politics.

While many are apprehensive of this or that group, namely the Islamists, Tunisians I spoke to feel empowered. Tunisians in the souks, cafes, taxicabs and streets has left a positive impression of reserved jubilance. Many have welcomed me to the "new Tunisia," and the "Tunisia in revolution." visiting the Qasba and the Avenue Bourguiba were truly inspiring, but made me think of elsewhere in the Arab world, where protests have not resulted in regime change. As the Arab spring turns slowly into summer, Tunisia gears up for the elections for the constituent assembly originally set for July, but recently postponed until October 23rd. Tunisians and Egyptians fare a lot better than their counterparts in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Morocco

Morocco, for instance, has a date with a constitutional referendum for which everyone knows the result. Especially after the state-orchestrated marches on Sunday and the ever present billboards calling for citizen participation on July 1st. There has also been no media space allowed for any movement calling for either a "no" vote or boycott of the referendum. Moroccan TV has purposefully alienated those opposition movements and engaged in mere propaganda for a "yes" vote. So on Friday, change will take place on paper and Morocco will have a new constitution, but it will not serve the cause of democratic change. In this sense, Morocco perfectly fits the old French adage: "plus ça change, plus ça reste le même."