Maghreb Blog

Tunisia: One Year after Ben 'Ali

2012-01-14T21:21:00.000-08:00

One year after Tunisia's Ben 'Ali is ousted, the face of the Arab world is forever changed. With the remarkable winds of change sweeping down the region, the middle East is perhaps forever changed. No longer are its populations fearful of despotic states. More importantly, the orientalist arguments for a democratically-challenged and freedom-resisting Middle East are shattered. This past year has forced us all to face down the realities of a new Middle East, brimming with youth, disenchanted, beset by grim prospects, but nonetheless eager to revolt in refusal of what their fathers and forefathers quiescently lived under for decades. The collapse of Ben 'Ali's dictatorship led to the increased vulnerability of the edifice of the Arab authoritarian state and created momentum for the other protest movements in the region. Despots have fallen in Egypt, Libya, and tremendous challenges for survival are facing those in Syria, Yemen. All the while monarchies in Morocco and Jordan have undergone sheepish constitutional and governmental reforms.

Tunisia, the cradle of the so-called Arab spring, is leading the torch so far by slowly building the foundations for democratic transition. Despite concerns of Islamist authoritarian tendencies by al-Nahda, I remain optimistic. Ideological divides are bound to occur in post-authoritarian regimes; however, these become detrimental when they are institutionally grounded and become hurdles in the way of socio-economic development. Many have addressed the secular-Islamist tension in the Tunisian society especially after the events in Manouba University where Salafists closed down the Humanities College to protest over the issue of niqab (integral veil).

The Islamists have not helped their cause either as they engaged in several foolhardy actions that have not generated any good will. PM Hamadi Jebali (secretary General of al-Nahda) took advantage of his appointment powers to bestow key ministerial portfolios upon close al-Nahda associates. However, it was his unilateral appointment of new directors for state media that drew most of the criticism, especially as many of the appointees are relics from the ancien regime. Finally, the recent visit of Qatar's Emir Hamad has further divided the country.

On the regional level, al-Nahda's courtship of HAMAS has drawn consternation from those that seek to cast a non-radical image of Islamists in power. This could prove to be a perilous relationship. Such association could also jeopardize Tunisia's prospects for foreign investments and capital. Unemployment rates are high and expected to be higher by the end of the year averaging %19-20. This is indeed the most pressing challenge for the current government that has to generate enough opportunities for foreign investment to boost a stagnant economy, spur productivity and lower the unemployment rate. Years of myopic economic plans and kleptocratic practices have resulted in uneven regional development between the affluent north and the marginal south of Tunisia.

One year after the collapse of Ben 'Ali, Tunisia is firmly in charge of its own destiny, but much of the future trajectory of the country will depend on the ability of the current leadership to shun ideological differences in favor of more pragmatic solutions for socio-economic development. The most excellent way to sidestep the secular-Islamist divide is to deliver in the process of governance and relegate much of the religious matters to the realm of individual privacy. The goal hopefully is to establish a civil state that recognizes the religious and ideological diversity of its own citizens.

One year ago, the singular desperate act of Mohamed Boua'zizi had tremendous reverberations throughout the world, not just the Arab world. Arabs taught every society democratic or none, that change is in the hands of those that protest actions of misguided or autocratic governments. Tunisia has since toppled its dictator and produced well-run free elections that resulted in the popular election of the Islamists of al-Nahda. The movement of Rachid Ghannouchi has initially shown great readiness to build compromises with different ideological positions in the Tunisian political landscape. It will be a misfortune for Tunisia if the movement abandons its conciliatory position and adopts some of the old regime's style of governance.

On PJD's Electoral Victory: Same Game, Different Pawn

2011-12-04T09:58:00.001-08:00

Lately it seems that the Islamists are coming to power wherever there are relatively free, fair and competitive elections in the Arab world. The latest legislative elections in Morocco follow closely in that trend. As it was expected, the November 25 elections revealed no surprises when the Islamist Party of Justice and Development (PJD) won a plurality 27% of the votes and a total of 107 seats of the newly promulgated 395-seat parliament. The elections witnessed a lackluster voter-turnout of 45%, albeit higher than the 37% voting in the 2007 legislative elections (See this excellent chart of results by CAPDEMA). The electoral contest of November 25th resulted in the usual fragmented party scene as no party, including the PJD, managed to win a majority of the votes in the lower house of the parliament (eight parties receiving more than 5% of the vote and will be represented in the parliament). Based on the elections results, the king as stated in the newly ratified constitution, appointed the head of the PJD 'Abdelilah Benkirane, prime minister and head of the government. Benkirane (pictured above) is amidst negotiations with several parties in the Koutla (political coalition of three parties: Istiqlal party, Socialist Union of Popular Forces USFP and the Party of Progress and Socialism PPS) to form a coalition government.

The lack of utter majoritarian political gain in the elections points to the persistence of old system of party politics and electoral engineering in Morocco. Despite the perfunctory congratulatory endorsement from foreign powers, the elections did not and will not usher in a new era of democratic governance in the kingdom, since the political framework has not changed. The prime minister is considered the head of the government, but still overshadowed by monarchy's hold over power. In addition to vast discretionary powers, the king is the head of state, and has supreme authority in matters of defense, security and religion. PJD, like the socialists of the USFP in 1997, are carefully given control over the government in a show of democratic power transfer to the opposition. It is also a deliberate tactic to manage the political system against the backdrop of the Arab spring's protest movement. The choice of PJD is nonetheless major in the context of Moroccan politics, since it is the first time an Islamist party is heading the government after years in the opposition.

While in the opposition, the PJD served as a critic of the government’s sluggish performance in the economy and state's rampant institutionalized corruption. Despite that, the party is not as popular as the banned al-Adl wal Ihsane (Justice and Charity), especially after joining the parliament. PJD's popularity is largely urban-based and enjoy moderate support in the ranks of university professors and middle class professionals.

PJD's discourse is of an ethical, non-violent and moral dimensions. Their major objective is the establishment an Islamically-oriented state through legal channels of reform, advocacy of Islamic education and promotion of Islamic values. PJD, like al-Adl, have become important in the Moroccan society and have taken advantage of the government’s limitations and inability to provide basic social services to its people. They also have similar means of disseminating their ideas and of recruiting supporters. Both rely on their publications and sources of communications such as the Internet to reach their audience.

It is worth noting here that both movements’ discourse has undergone certain changes before and after the state opened purposively courted PJD to take part in the 1997 elections. In the past, both movements, especially 'Abdessalam Yassine’s al-Adl Wal Ihsane, challenged the authority of the king. Yassine claimed that the monarchy is un-Islamic and the king's authority does not conform to the Islamic laws of Shari’a and is famous for his open epistle to the late King Hassan II admonishing him for lack of Islamic values in Moroccan politics and society. In 2000, Yassine penned a 35-page memorandum to the current king Mohammed VI urging him to repatriate his wealth back to Morocco. The movement also had an anti-west discourse. Accordingly, Yassine views the west as undermining the Islamic faith and as constantly waging a cultural war on Islam. Yassine also claims that this western “satanic” cultural invasion is taking the form of media campaigns against the Islamic faith.

Within the cosmetic process of reforms in Morocco, both movements have changed their discourse. They no longer question, at least openly, the religious identity of the monarchy. Instead, their discourse focuses more on social issues such as, poverty, education and good governance. However, both movements diverged in the strategies they use to achieve their goals. Whereas, al-Adl wal Ihsane has remained loyal to its path of non-rapprochement with the state, PJD transformed itself into a political party with plurality control over the Parliament.

In either case, the monarchical management style has had a taming effect on Islamist ideologies. Al-Adl wal Ihsane's moderation may just be a strategic position and an outcome of their failure to challenge the Islamic foundations of the monarchy. PJD, on the other hand, has moderated its agenda to take advantage of electoral opportunities and to work for social and political reforms within the political system. This moderation has finally paid dividends for the party and culminated in their first ever electoral victory in the last legislative elections.

The challenges before PJD, however, are manifold: first they face a colossal task of addressing the socio-economic problems that have plagued the kingdom for the last decades. Second, PJD has to live up to its campaign promises of eradicating corruption and all facets of kleptocracy in the government. No longer in the opposition, they will soon become part of the same system of patronage. But most importantly, they have to struggle against the image of being yet another co-opted pawn in the hands of the Makhzen. Consequently, it will be interesting to see whether they will attempt to fully take advantage of the executive powers that have been vested in the office of the PM in the new constitution. So far, Benkirane has shown himself a staunch supporter of the monarchy. In his first ever meeting with the sovereign last week, Benkirane said to have been impressed by the king as "a great and agreeable man." Time shall tell whether the new PM will be as docile as he is expected to be.

Morocco's Upcoming Elections: An Exercise in Futility

2011-11-24T07:55:00.000-08:00

Thousands of Moroccans took to the streets in protests demanding a boycott of Friday's legislative elections. The elections come at the heels of constitutional reforms proposed by a blue ribbon palace commission last June. The new constitution garnered a whopping 97% vote by Moroccan voters, who came out in droves to support royally endorsed changes. The reforms touted as revolutionary in the history of modern Moroccan political history, have been subject to large-scale criticism notably by opposition forces and the February 20 protest movement.

In a purely parliamentary fashion, the constitution mandates that the Prime Minister will come from the majority party in the lower house of the parliament. As head of the government, the PM will enjoy vast executive powers with significant appointment powers, the ability to dissolve the parliament and declare state of emergency with royal consent. The king, however, retains most discretionary powers, and authority over the military and the religious establishment. The elections are the culmination of months of national debate on the future democratic trajectory of Morocco.

The November 25 elections are hardly revolutionary, and out of sync with the ambitions of millions of Moroccans longing for democratic progress. The expectations are that these contests will feature the same panoply of state engineering as past elections. In the absence of rigorous laws against corruption and fraud, one can expect same old violations. Moroccans abroad are also barred from voting and the electoral districts are drawn arbitrarily to favor pro-palace parties. Some 31 parties from different ideological and non-ideological strands saturate the electoral scene. This inevitably bars anyone party from gaining sufficient outright majority to the 395-seat parliament. Analysts predict a slight plurality for the Islamist Justice and Development party (PJD), which in that case, will have to rely on other parties (perhaps the Istiqlal Party) to form a government. The PJD have long been hampered by unfavorable electoral districting and lack of appeal in rural Morocco. Pro-palace parties like the Party of Authenticity and Modernity along with the National Rally of Independent could also manage plurality gains in the elections. Regardless of the winner, the elections are without consequences for the future trajectory of Moroccan democracy.

This is not pessimism but an accurate reading of the elections in light of past and present indicators. Friday’s elections will bring no political progress to Morocco and are yet another tool for the regime to control the public discourse in the middle of turbulent times for the MENA region. These electoral contests, as in in the past, will be dominated by state’s manipulation of electoral laws and administration. And though recently freer than in the past, elections within the context of the new inconsequential constitutional reforms are still short of realizing the aspirations of millions of Moroccans for true democratic transition. Furthermore, elections in Morocco are in and themselves instances of regime projection of power promoting a cultural of dissonance of regime commitment to democratic change. In addition to being defensive mechanisms to maintain fledgling regime legitimacy, and “safety valves” used to diffuse challenges to state authority, especially in times of economic crises.

Moroccan elections are manifestations of regime supremacy in the political arena as they set the rules of electoral contestation, which is marked by extreme competition for legislative power. However, a puzzle offers itself, why do political parties take part in such limited elections, thus legitimizing an authoritarian regime? Why not boycott and denounce these electorally engineered contests? The paradox of rejection-participation in the electoral process is ever present in all authoritarian Arab regimes; however, Arab political parties still choose to participate in order to contest those same rules of the political game. In Morocco’s “manipulated pluralism,” the monarchy rules over a consensus among elite and society on its perennial role in both spiritual and temporal realms. Political opposition, as William Zartman argues, may appear as a support of the state within a notion of role complementarity, in which state and the opposition reinforce each other, where “neither uses the other, but each serves the other’s interests in performing its own role.” Therein lies one of the main sources of public disapproval of political parties perceived as coopted organs of the state. This accounts for anemic levels of popularity and general voters’ apathy, resulting in low voter turnout.

Friday’s legislative elections will continue this unfortunate trend of public cynicism and party fragmentation. Like other elections in the past, they will fail to usher in a new era in Moroccan politics as many anticipated. More importantly, the cosmetic constitutional changes and ensuing elections illustrate two distinct features of party politics and elections in Morocco. First, there is tremendous state’s penetration, which has been apparent in all the electoral contests Morocco has witnessed thus far and has shaped the party landscape today. Within Morocco’s political system, the state bestowed political favors and in some cases created loyal parties to power such as the Gathering of National Independents (RNI) in 1977, the Constitutional Union (UC) in 1984, the Social Democratic Movement (MDS) in 1997, and the Party of Authenticity and Modernity in 2008. The second feature of Morocco’s parties is their lack of ideological and political clarity; Parties are generally committed to socio-economic and democratic reforms but lack effective policy formulations and strategic planning.

In the midst of this carefully engineered political scene, the regime sits unchallenged and contested, jubilant over the masterful manner in which it managed to placate and enervate the protests movement in Morocco. The current elections legitimate the cosmetic constitutional changes of July 2011 and undermine the case of democratic progress in a country that may just stand as the exception to the vast popular changes sweeping over the MENA region. Until there are honest thorough reforms to the core structure of Makhzenite power, democratic progress will remain elusive in Morocco.

Tunisia's First Test

2011-11-02T08:41:00.000-07:00

As Egypt continues to spiral down the path of authoritarianism, Tunisia held its first free, fair and competitive elections on October 23rd. By all accounts, the elections registered virtually no violations, and witnessed the resounding plurality victory of the Islamist al-Nahda Movement. The movement cast to abeyance during the dictatorship of Ben ‘Ali won 41 percent of the votes and 90 seats of the Constituent Assembly. The first order of business for al-Nahda is to form an interim transitional government to oversee the promulgation of a new democratic constitution for Tunisia.

Like the electoral process, the aftermath of the election results unfolded in an impressive fashion. Most of the losing parties conceded defeat and “bowed to the will of the Tunisian people. The elections are historical not only in Tunisia, but for the rest of the Arab world as well. Tunisians rose up to the challenge as the whole world observed their electoral contest. In so doing, they set the example for the rest of the Arab world in their ability to conduct peaceful democratic elections. The Tunisian success assuages fears in some western circles and local skeptics on the ability of Arab societies to fully implement basic institutional tasks leading to the elections. In this respect, most Tunisians I talked to commend the colossal work of Yadh Ben Achour, head of the Election Commission (ISIE), in the tedious task of party list registration.

Tunisia has passed the first test with flying colors, but the toughest work lies ahead. The new government and constituent assembly have to tackle issues of freedom of the press, police reform and economic development. The new constitution should undoubtedly embody principles of separation of powers, horizontal accountability, individual and group liberties and a firm emphasis on the rule of law. Islamist leaders of al-Nahda will be the first Arab Islamist party in charge of a political system. The naysayers and alarmists will inevitably doubt the abilities of al-Nahda and question its motives. Al-Nahda will have to dispel orientalist arguments of democratic dissimulation and show real commitment to principles of good governance. Al-Nahda leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has so far spoken in favor of a civil state and Tunisia's secular liberal code of personal status, which among other things, bans polygamy. His vision is for a synthesis between Islam and modernity as al-Nahda aims "to ensure stability, to reform justice, and to prosecute corruption cases, putting an end to it, in all its forms."

These are remarkable times for Tunisia and the Arab world. Despite still re-entrenched dictatorial regimes in Syria and Yemen, Tunisia and Libya (except for the summary execution of Gaddafi) show the potential for an Arab democratic renewal. No longer can the world dismiss the Arab Middle East region as a zone of democratic deficit. As Tunisia undergoes a fascinating political experiment, the eyes of the world will be closely watching, but ultimately the fate of Tunisia is for the first time in the hands of its own people.

The End of Qaddafi: A New Beginning for Libya

2011-10-20T12:36:00.000-07:00

Dramatic news out Libya today. After weeks in hiding, Qaddafi is dead. The TNC has confirmed the news of Qaddafi and his son Mu'tassim's death today through its vice-chairman, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga. The details of Qaddafi's death are still unclear and there are several unconfirmed reports about the colonel's last minutes. Apparently, Qaddafi's convoy was shot by a US drone and after an attempt to flee, Qaddafi was later found holed in a storm rain where he was captured alive but wounded by rebel forces. The Daily Mail reports that the former dictator pleaded with his captors in vain and subsequently killed by the rebels (this vide show Qaddafi's capture by the rebels).

What's clear is that his death marks the effective end of 42 year-tyrannical rule and comes at the heel of successive military victories by the TNC forces. The demise of Qaddafi is only the beginning of the much tougher task of re-building Libya on new firm and democratic foundations. In a country that lacks minimum institutional structures, that task is increasingly difficult, complicated by deep regional and tribal divisions.

This latest episode in the Libyan saga will undoubtedly bring about the end of the military involvement of NATO in the conflict. It also signals a shift in international interventionism in global affairs as it is a successful precedent for calibrated and measured military involvement against states' imminent threat to their own people. It inevitably raises issues of double standards as the same approach has not been pursued in other cases, such as Syria, Yemen and Bahrain still reeling from tremendous state violence.

The news from Libya today will also provide much needed boost to some fledgling protest movements in other parts of the Arab world. This could embolden protest and oppositional factions as there is a increased palpable sense of regime vulnerability in much of the Middle East today. Some already see it as a message to Arab rulers for swift meaningful reforms.

As Libya celebrates its emancipation from the last vestiges of the former despotic regime, Tunisia is entering a new chapter in its nascent political history. The country is holding its first post-Ben Ali and the first post-Arab spring elections for a 217-member constituent assembly on Sunday. The stakes are high for the Maghrebi state, but the first phase of voter and party list registration concluded last month in relatively calm and transparent environment. Some 10000 candidates from over 100 parties are contesting the elections, but the major cleavages remain the Islamists of Ennahda and the center left (secular) Progressive Democratic Party (PDP). Future posts will attempt an analysis of the results of the elections and future trajectories for the Tunisian experiment.

Moroccan Monarchy and the Islamist Challenge

2011-10-14T10:22:00.000-07:00

Shameless self-promotion. My book on the Moroccan monarchy is out. As am I as an anonymous blogger. The following is an online interview on the book I did for Jaddaliya.

The book provides a new approach to the study of the prevalence of authoritarianism in the MENA. It re-introduces socio-institutional variables into this debate without resorting to essentialist macro-claims; rather, it focuses on the micro-dynamics of symbolic power. The book provides an alternative way to conceptualize political legitimacy and power in the Middle East. It argues that the monarchy’s religious authority and its use of rituals of power limit the ability of Islamist and non-Islamist opposition groups to contest the monarchy’s legitimacy. This study goes beyond most institutionalist accounts of authoritarian persistence by exploring the micro-dynamics of symbolic power and the extent to which the regime uses rituals of power to create a political culture conducive to the monarchy’s supremacy in the socio-political realm, thus promoting regime stability in Morocco.

These rituals have been institutionalized in the political system and have become part of the political discourse in Morocco. The study examines the effects of the ritualization of the political process on oppositional—especially Islamist—forces. The book argues that the monarchy’s religious authority and its use of rituals of power impede the ability of Islamist and other opposition groups to mobilize and to penetrate Moroccan society. The prevalence of this cultural and social hegemony contributes to the stability and resilience of the monarchical authoritarian regime in Morocco.

Transitions and Breakdowns in the Arab Spring.

2011-09-13T19:41:00.000-07:00

At a time where seismic changes are taking place in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), few have noticed, or perhaps are reluctant to note the counterrevolution trends in the Arab spring. Already Egypt is struggling under the might of an unenlightened military regime, supposed to act in the best interest of the revolution. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has stymied dissent and subjected dissenters to its extrajudicial and military trials.

In Tunisia, perhaps the closest to a steady post-revolutionary transition, registration for the Constituent Assembly closed last Wednesday, September 7th with a dizzying 1750 electoral lists. The Islamists of Ennahda and the Community Party of Tunisia (PCOT) are the most noticeably organized in terms of party lists. Ennahda is fielding candidates in all of Tunisia's 23 governorates, while PCOT has 14 lists and the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP) submitted a meager 8 lists. The Constituent Assembly elections set for October 23rd will be the first such contest in post-Ben 'Ali era and could be key analytical tool to examine the future of Tunisian democracy. In Libya, still jubilant after toppling the 42 rule of Colonel (fugitive) Gaddafi, the task of state-building looms in the horizon amidst unclear lines of leadership of the National Transitional Council (NTC).

While no one can predict accurately the results of such elections, we do know for sure that post revolutionary aftermaths can be messy, fuzzy periods of uncertainty, where new socio-economic and political structures are formed. Elite predispositions are key after the breakdown of authoritarian rule. The fate of states and societies lies with the actions of the few political elite organizations and groups. From Latin American experience, we know regime transitions are abnormal periods of ‘undetermined’ political changes in which there are not enough structural or behavioral parameters to guide and predict the outcome. Transitologists O’Donnell and Schmitter, for instance, posit a ‘contingent’ model of change. This model assumes that in the political game during transition periods, one actor’s initiative prompts another actor’s response and that political events follow from one to another. From a contingent point of view, political outcomes stem from interaction and bargaining. The key to any democratic transition, then, is the ability of participants to arrive at negotiated agreements that grant everyone a piece of the transitional pie.

Absent from this political crafting is the will of the people in its exercise of accountability. Societal accountability is to be fostered within that dimension. Societal accountability is a non-electoral, yet vertical mechanism of control of political authorities that rests on the actions of a multiple array of citizens’ associations and movements and on the media. These actions monitor the action of public officials, expose governmental wrongdoing, and can activate the operation of horizontal agencies. Absence of societal accountability leads to myopic democratic transitions susceptible to breakdown.

Democratic breakdown is not merely the result of ineffective leadership response to crisis, but goes more deeply to the response of various parties and groups to political and social change (i.e. in Latin America). As long as so called transition has a set of rules of the game that protect the purveyors of the regime's interests, democracy or some facade form of it is tolerated. Argentina's military, for instance, allowed democracy after 1955, as long as the "wrong" party of the Peronistas did not win. We could potentially see SCAF in Egypt taking on that role of the watchdog of a sham democratic transition, overseeing and controlling the outcome of electoral contests. however, history dictates that such military role is short-lived and never amounts to full-fledged consolidation of democratic governance.

For long, the MENA region languished under the yoke of Sultanistic authoritarian regimes (to borrow Juan Linz's terminology). These carry institutional baggage and memory of personalism and arbitrary rule, which hinder any movement towards the rule of law, an efficacious state bureaucracy and a vibrant free civil society. All necessary ingredients for any consolidation of democratic rule. Egypt, Libya and Tunisia all suffered from decades of repression where civil society was battered by the state apparatus and dissent was suffocated. However, the existence of relatively organized opposition during the Mubarak era in Egypt, could prove important in rebuilding the current era if SCAF steps away from political rule. Military rule can only be acceptable if it subsides under the democratic civilian authority.

Tunisia had little in terms of civil society. Ben 'Ali virtually purged the political scene of all dissident and oppositional voices. Institutional purgatory was even extreme in Gaddafi's Libya, where state institutions are inchoate and no political parties existed in a quasi-totalitarian system. This approach to governance in both north African states inevitably affects the current political experiment in Tunisia and Libya. After all, the authoritarian dictatorships of Latin America and Southern Europe left a more positive legacy for the legal system and left a heritage for state building that was less negative than that of post-totalitarian regimes, where none of the ingredients of an effective economic or civil society existed.

Similarly, the continued existence of figures from the old guard threatens the transition to democracy. Whether it is the octogenarian interim prime minister Beji Caid Sebsi in Tunisia or Field Marshall Mohamed Hussein Tantawi's SCAF in Egypt, the future of transition to democracy in either country remains improbable and uncertain. Libya so far suffers from a crisis of leadership despite attempts of Mustapha Abdul Jalil and Mahmoud Jibril to provide much needed guidance to conflicting tribes and militia groups. What the three newly emancipated countries share in common is that their future democratic transition and consolidation will greatly depend on choices, and decisions made in this tightly controlled inner circles of power.

Libya's Rebels' Rise from the Ashes

2011-08-22T12:01:00.000-07:00

Just when skeptics began writing obituaries of the Arab spring, the remarkable events unfolding in Libya over the last three days have renewed hope in the Arab struggle to rid the region of authoritarianism. The Libyan rebel forces have captured Tripoli and have finally stormed Bab al-'Aziziya compound (Gaddafi's fortified residence). There was no trace of Gaddafi and his family in the compound amidst wild speculations about his whearabouts.

Unlike the relatively easy toppling of Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt, the Libyan affair dragged on for over six months. The liberation of Tripoli required intense fightng on the ground and some 75 NATO air sorties. Most importantly, the fighting have claimed more than 13ooo lives. Few feel vinidcated in their support of NATO's involvement in Libya, but that should be shortlived and all efforts must focus on post-Gaddafi reconstruction. The Libyan fight for liberation showcases the varied nature of the Arab spring as change can either result from peaceful protests or sometimes through violent means.

The Liberation of Libya also proved that NATO's involvement has been key in depleting the power of pro-Gaddafi forces. The air and ground fighting simply proved too much for Gaddafi loyalists. NATO's mandate to protect the advances of the rebels into Tripoli quickly turned into an action for regime change, following the launch, Saturday, August 20, of Operation "Siren of the Sea." NATO's involvement signals a new era in successful international intervention based on humanitarian legitimacy, where the cost of non-intervention is higher than measured and calibrated military involvement.

As Libyans regain control over their destiny and their oil resources for the first time in 42 years, the harder part of state building lies ahead. Libya presents greater challenges than any other Arab country. There is virtually no apparatus of the state, no constitution and no coherent political institutions that could serve as a platform for transition towards potential democratic governance. Libya also features significant tribal cleavages that have to be taken into consideration as the new Libyan state is built. For four decades, Gaddafi played tribes against each other, and there is still significant tribal rivalries in Libya. Everyone is jubilant in Libya today, but the future could prove even tougher than the military fighting.

The Feb. 20 Movement's Struggle for Relevance

2011-07-07T07:55:00.001-07:00

Finally back from a long sojourn in Morocco and Tunisia. My trip to Morocco coincided with the national debate on the constitutional revisions put forth by the palace commission's recommendations, and approved by an alarming 98% of voters. The high percentage of approval is indeed alarming because it signals a shocking return to the doctored percentages and egregious electoral transgressions of yesteryear. The years of Driss Basri, the former powerful Minister of the Interior. Several reports of fraud and lax voting procedures surfaced soon after the polls opened on July 1st. Though I didn't observe any in the voting station I visited.

The whopping 72% voter turnout is also an indicator of the state's successful campaign to alienate the "No" and boycott movements espoused by the Feb. 20 movement, and further dampened by the resounding royal endorsement of the new constitution. In a country with 44% illiteracy rate and where the king is semi-sacred, the vote for the constitution became a plebiscite on the monarchy itself. Any chances then for a popular rejection of the constitution was stillborn. Therein lied one of the many mistakes of the Feb. 20 movement: they have not adequately distinguished between their wholesale rejection of the proposed constitution and their specific position towards the monarchy in the constitutional draft. Their position on the role and status of the monarchy has been ambiguous and subject to several interpretations. The confusion made it easier for the state and its cronies to mount a counter campaign that cast the Feb. 20 movement against the monarchy and the territorial integrity of the country.

The mistakes of Feb. 20 movement were made all the more palpable by the apparent lack of organization and coherent strategy of protests which, at this point, are dwindling in strength and numbers. I was at the movement's post-referendum protests in Marrakech last Sunday, and the number of protesters didn't exceed 200 to 300 (see video I shot of the protests below). Most of the bystanders were gathered to deride and mock what a lot of Moroccans perceive today as an exercise in futility. That is the image the Feb. 20 movement has to shake off in the weeks to come. The results of the referendum have dealt the movement a major blow, maybe not a fatal one, but it has severely restricted its ability to mount a significant challenge to the corrupt undemocratic foundations of the state in Morocco.

The movement for reform in Morocco has to regroup and recast its message in more strategic ways focusing on what can be achieved in the short versus long terms in the kingdom. Any attempt or perceived attempt of reproach of the monarchical institution has to be carefully calibrated in order to reflect the duality in the modern Moroccan state between the Alaoui monarchical regime and the institutions of the government. The monarchy has been an institution above the political fray, of course with total control over the travails of the political scene. The Feb. 20 movement must at this point strive for cohesion and build the foundations for autonomous visionary leadership away from widely perceived "puppet" relationship with the left or the right in Morocco. If this movement is a reflection of the youth movements elsewhere in the Arab world, it has to distance itself from old aged political and civil society organizations. Most of all, it has to polish its image and message.

Ahead of Tomorrow's Constitutional Referendum

2011-06-30T12:02:00.000-07:00

Back from Tunisia where I was a guest observer at the Board meeting of the Foundation of the Future (this will be subject to a future blog post). Tunisia's post revolutionary experience is under way with its ups and downs. The first day I was there, my friend went to the movie theater to watch Nadia el Fani's "Ni dieu, ni Maitre," (Neither God, nor Master) where she was assaulted by so called Salafis. Nevertheless, Tunisia has started a progressive movement towards change. However, my mind is with Morocco ahead of the constitutional referendum tomorrow. I have made my position clear in previous posts. This one includes a couple of pictures I took and a wishful thought the referendum was about meaningful reforms.

In post-revolutionary Tunisia.

2011-06-27T11:01:00.000-07:00

I am in Tunisia where the atmosphere is cautious but optimistic. This is a new reinvigorated society inspired by ideals of freedom, human rights and democratic governance. Gone are all of the cult personalistic and ubiquitous portraits and pictures of deposed dictator Ben 'Ali. Instead, walls and streets are adorned by revolutionary graffiti and names of martyrs killed in the street demonstrations against the ancien regime. Many Tunisians are cognizant of the historical moment they have initiated in the Arab world. As the spark that ignited the wave of the Arab spring, Tunisia could stand as a model for post-revolutionary peaceful transitional politics.

While many are apprehensive of this or that group, namely the Islamists, Tunisians I spoke to feel empowered. Tunisians in the souks, cafes, taxicabs and streets has left a positive impression of reserved jubilance. Many have welcomed me to the "new Tunisia," and the "Tunisia in revolution." visiting the Qasba and the Avenue Bourguiba were truly inspiring, but made me think of elsewhere in the Arab world, where protests have not resulted in regime change. As the Arab spring turns slowly into summer, Tunisia gears up for the elections for the constituent assembly originally set for July, but recently postponed until October 23rd. Tunisians and Egyptians fare a lot better than their counterparts in Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, and Morocco

Morocco, for instance, has a date with a constitutional referendum for which everyone knows the result. Especially after the state-orchestrated marches on Sunday and the ever present billboards calling for citizen participation on July 1st. There has also been no media space allowed for any movement calling for either a "no" vote or boycott of the referendum. Moroccan TV has purposefully alienated those opposition movements and engaged in mere propaganda for a "yes" vote. So on Friday, change will take place on paper and Morocco will have a new constitution, but it will not serve the cause of democratic change. In this sense, Morocco perfectly fits the old French adage: "plus ça change, plus ça reste le même."

King Mohammed VI Unveils New Draft Constitution

2011-06-17T14:57:00.000-07:00

After so much anticipation in Morocco, king Mohammed VI unveiled the outlines of a new draft constitution in a televised speech Friday evening (watch part 1 here and part 2 here). The revised constitution didn't veer off what I highlighted in this earlier post. The king is still the strong man of power, despite several key changes to the authority of the prime minister, a commitment to the separation of powers and autonomous judiciary.

The draft constitution consists of 180 articles and 14 chapters spread over 49 pages. There are numerous stylistic changes to the language of the proposed draft, and the king even introduced new concepts to Moroccan political parlance such as: "citizenship-based monarchy" and "citizen king." According to the new draft constitution, the king is no longer sacred, but still inviolable "and that respect and reverence shall be due to him as king, commander of the faithful (amir al-mu'minin) and head of state." In essence this splits the old article 19 into two new articles 43 and 44 specifying the religious and political powers of the monarch. accordingly, the king will still maintain authority over both spiritual and temporal authority.

The religious and cultural identity of the kingdom is Muslim, and as the draft states, has been enriched by a number of diverse influences: Hebraic, African, Andalusian and Mediterranean. The new constitution also recognizes Amazigh as a second official language and calls on the promotion of Hassani Sahraoui culture as part of the cultural, historical and social heritage of Morocco.

One of the most important changes in the new constitution pertains to the office of the Prime Minister, long rendered obsolete by royal control. The proposed revisions set the PM as a head of the government, appointed by the monarch from the party with the majority of seats in the parliament. The PM will have significant appointment powers, dissolve the parliament and declare state of emergency with royal consent.

The new constitution regulates party behavior as well. It addresses the loophole of "transhumance" in the existing regulatory laws in the parliament, and which accounted for much of the meteoric ascendance of palace party of authenticity and modernity in 2009. Accordingly, members of the parliament will lose their seats if they switch parties. The constitution also sets to empower parliamentary opposition as it stipulates that:

the Head of Government shall make a progress report to Parliament on government action, and answer questions on public policy. Similarly, the draft Constitution lowers the quorum required to move a motion of censure, set up commissions of inquiry and refer bills to the Constitutional Court. Parliamentary committees will have the right to address questions to officials in charge of administrations and public institutions.

The speech has so far been criticized by members of the Feb 20 movement on twitter as inadequate and short of the demands of the movement's demands for true democratic reforms. This is likely to draw more protests and possible general boycotts ahead of the July 1st referendum, where it is expected that the draft constitution will garner wide approval by Moroccans. Several cities have already witnessed jubilant street manifestations in support of the royal endorsement of the proposed constitution. An enthusiastic endorsement that should have been avoided by the monarch, given his influence on many of Moroccans.

The changes could only be acceptable as preliminary steps towards meaningful reforms of the role of monarchy in the political system. However, as an endgame, they are largely cosmetic. They lack institutional depth and will not affect the contours of power in Morocco. The king effectively sets his institution as an arbiter over a divided political system. More importantly there is absolutely no mechanism for horizontal accountability in the purported separation of powers, that includes the institution of the monarchy. The proposed revisions are a masterstroke by a popular monarchy in complete control of the political system, despite the claims of an increasingly fragmented Feb.20 movement.

Whither the Monarchy in Morocco?

2011-06-12T04:58:00.001-07:00

Just a couple of days in Morocco and all of the discussions I have had so far center around the February 20 movement and the issue of constitutional reforms. The movement engenders different reactions from people and there is no consensus on their aims and mission for change (this will be the subject of separate analysis in future blog entries). So many Moroccans, however, are in anticipation of the commission for constitutional revisions' final report and recommendations. The commission was set up after the royal address of March 9th to elicit proposals from a wide array of groups and individuals in Morocco's political scene and civil society.

On Tuesday, the head of the commission Abdelatif Mennouni and royal adviser Mohammed Mou'tassim met King Mohammed VI to present the results of three months of discussions on changes to the constitution. A first reading of an alleged leaked draft said proposals to the constitution suggests slight linguistic and style revisions in several articles, but insufficient deep institutional/structural changes. The most important change in the purported draft is the omission of the reference to the sanctity of the monarch. The king is still inviolable and will retain full control over the military and religions realms as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces and amir al-mu'minin (Arabic: أمير المؤمنين-commander of the faithful).

The office of the prime minister is expected to receive a complete make-over. The new PM will have vast executive and appointment powers, except in the military and the religious fields. The PM will control the government and its cabinet portfolios, save for the ministry of religious affairs, which will be reserved to the king. The PM will also appoint ambassadors, governors and heads of the various state agencies. The parliament will expand its law-making powers to more than 40 areas of policy-making. Finally the constitutional court will assume original jurisdiction opening its gates directly to the people, who could challenge the constitutionality of any law.

On the surface these projected changes to the constitution present significant modifications to the contours of the political system and regime. They reduce the vast powers of the monarch. If passed by the electorate (which is largely expected), the monarchy will effectively set itself a sphere higher than the travails of the political fray in Morocco. In essence, the monarchical institution devolves some of its powers to the elected bodies of the people in the executive and legislative branches, and at the same time, setting the judiciary a step further towards autonomy.

These are incremental changes that won't satisfy those, notably the kitchen sink that is Feb 20 movement, looking for radical transformation of the political system to a complete electoral, representative constitutional monarchy. For one, the monarchy still retains its all ubiquitous discretionary powers of Dahir (Arabic: الظهير-Royal decree), which in effect could suspend the law-making function of the legislative body of the parliament. Similarly, monarchical prerogative in dissolving the parliament and the government, albeit this time with the consent of the government, limits the principle of separation of powers.

More importantly, the constitution does not and cannot address other aspects of direly needed reforms. Of particular interest are the kleptocracy and nepotism in the Moroccan administration and economy. No matter how inchoate they are, institutional reforms have to be complemented with stringent guarantees against abuse of power, corruption and inequality of the laws. Individual freedom and liberty of the press are guaranteed in the constitution, but have to be safeguarded from the abuses of the state. The kingdom has for the most part engaged in an irreversible course of change, gradual as it may be today, but the biggest challenge in the future is to enable real socio-economic reforms. The pace of reforms may be slow, but could well be sped up by constant pressure from an increasingly restless society.

UPDATE: Rachid Nini Sentenced to Jail

2011-06-09T13:37:00.000-07:00

An update: a few post ago, I commented on the case of columnist Rachid Nini accused of "offense against national and the security of citizens." Today, the journalist has been sentenced to one year in jail and a fine of 1,000 DHs (around US $128). This is another sad day for freedom of the press in Morocco and a further negative signal pointing to the state intentions to stifle any impulse for the liberty of expression.

Police Brutality in Morocco

2011-05-31T17:15:00.000-07:00

Events are heating up in Morocco. The regime seems to have abandoned its early tactical reconciliatory approach to the demands of pro-democracy movement. Last Sunday, security forces violently repressed peaceful protesters in Casablanca. Protesters were clearly shouting: "no stone, no knife, peaceful [protests]" This still didn't deter the forces of order from using violence against everyone, including elderly women carrying young children.

It is apparent that early statements on reforms were mere strategies to diffuse a rapidly contagious and popular movement for change in Morocco. That early tactical retreat by the regime was meant to allay the Feb 20 movement, riding high on the wave of Arab spring. However, the plight of the Moroccan spring is in tatters as the little media attention it once garnered has virtually faded, especially with atrocities committed in Syria, Bahrain, ongoing conflict in Libya and shaky post-revolt tumult in Tunisia and Egypt. The regime is betting on this "quiet repression" of the protests, while engaging in rhetorical support for clichéd talking points of democratic change.

Recent police brutality is taking place as the whole country awaits the recommendations of the royal blue ribbon committee on constitutional reforms set by the king in March. Suffice it to say that no one is holding their breath for vast structural changes, still the scope of the recommendations could provide additional levels for analysis of the regime's strategy to placate the calls for reforms. The pro-democracy movement is steadfast in its demands and its call for weekly demonstrations. The recent repression will only galvanize the protesters with legitimate demands for political and socio-economic renewal in the kingdom.

Morocco's Shaky Commitment to Reforms

2011-05-15T15:59:00.001-07:00

One would think that Morocco is headed towards better times, especially as the king promised constitutional reforms last March. There also seemed to be an air of openness in state-society relations. Even after the Argana bombing in Marrakech, state authorities showed a measured response to the terrorists act far short from the wholesale arrests launched after the 2003 bombings in Casablanca. Those were promising indicators of a nuanced state approach to civil society and protest movement's demands for democratic reforms. However, events in the last two weeks suggest a determined state retreat from early progress, and a shaky commitment to meaningful reforms.

Two weeks ago, widely read and contentious columnist, editor in chief of the daily al-Massae Rachid Nini was arrested by state forces and is in prison on charges of "offense against national and citizens' security." The vagueness of the charge only masks the true nature of the indictment against Nini, for he has been rounded up for the totality of his critical stances of the government, and at times vociferous comments against immorality in Moroccan politics. Nini's daily column "shouf-tshouf," (in Arabic: شوف تشوف) has in the past talked about taboo subjects from the health of the king to the transgressions of the security forces in Morocco. He faced hefty fines, notably an exorbitant 6 million MAD (approx. US $500, 000) in 2008, knife assault in Rabat, and a near exodus of several members of the editorial team of al-Massae. Now his social commentary has become too much of a nuisance for the authorities.

I have long thought Nini to be a populist, vitriolic and at times, a misguided journalist. However, this should never serve as a pretext to silence what ought to be the expression of freedom in any society. Charges against Nini are similar to those leveled against other fiercely independent journalists in the Moroccan press. Last year, Abu Bakr Jama'i saw his Le Journal bled to death for similar offense of upsetting the power that be.

Morocco's attempt to shed the relics of past limitations on associational and informational freedom has long been beset by unease towards the press' increasing criticism of the state. Reforms or project of reforms has to start at the altar of the press as a watchdog for the travails of state-society negotiations. The state cannot claim reform and change on one hand, but continue to brutalize society on the other. Today's violent state repression of the protests near the purported detention center in Temara (5 miles southeast of Rabat) is yet another setback. Dubbed by many protesters as Guantemara for alleged torture of political prisoners, the mere alleged existence of the secret detention center indicates a reversion to the mindset of intransigence towards legitimate demands for change. The detention center is a definite reminder of the notorious "years of lead" of the ancien régime that should forever be cast in the ash heap of Moroccan history.

Arrests in the Marrakech Bombing

2011-05-08T18:57:00.000-07:00

Three suspects have been apprehended with alleged ties to the bombing in Argana cafe in Marrakech. Two are from the coastal town of Safi (220 miles south of Casablanca), while the third is a local Marrakechi (see Moroccan TV news cast here). Several questions have been raised about the absolute silence of the Moroccan authorities during the investigation. However, yesterday the Minister of the Interior Taieb CherKaoui held a press conference, in which he announced the capture of the three suspects. According to Moroccan authorities, the alleged conspirators are inspired by al-Qaeda an militant Jihadi ideology, but not operationally part of the terrorist network. Two of the suspects tried several times to join Iraq to partake in militant Jihad, but each time were expelled from Libya in 2008, Syria in 2007 and Portugal in 2004. This raises serious questions about Moroccan authorities' competence as they seem to have lost track of a committed militant Jihadi, and hence failing to anticipate the terrorist acts.

These developments were only eclipsed by the sensational news of the death of master terrorist Osama Bin Laden in Pakistan. Bin Laden's death deals a significant blow to al-Qaeda, but it is does not put an end to the militant ideology that has spelled disaster for the Islam and the world. Al-Qaeda may be losing ground, but al-Qaedism is still present amongst us, notably through its different subsidiaries in different parts of the world. In the Maghreb, the scepter of al-Qaeda is ever palpable with the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). AQIM remains marginally active in the northern Sahara region of Sahel, and responsible for kidnapping and killing scores of foreign aid workers and tourists.

AQIM maintains Jihadist aspirations to carry attacks in north African countries. But they've denied any involvement in the argana cafe bombing. In the midst of the Arab uprising, states might lose sight of the ever present threat of militant Islamism. There is a need for an effective counter terrorism strategy, which will not be successful without the joint cooperation between Maghreb and Sahel states. Perhaps the current Algerian-Moroccan rapprochement leading to an eventual re-opening of the borders is a positive step that could potentially aid in combatting AQIM. Such optimism is only tempered by the on-going conflict over the Western Sahara, which Algeria is significantly involved in on the side of POLISARIO.

UPDATE: Moroccan authorities arrested three more suspects in the argana bombing. All from Safi and allegedly had knowledge of the plot to bomb the cafe on April 28th.

Explosion in the Red City of Marrakech

2011-04-28T16:43:00.000-07:00

An explosion rocked the red city of Marrakech earlier today. The blast occurred around 11:30am local time at Argana Café right at the heart of the bustling and colorful Jama'a el Fna Square. The café and its famed terrace serve as a popular hangout spot for tourists and locals. The early tally of casualties reveals 14 dead and some 20 injured (see latest photos here or here). This is the second terrorist attack in Marrakech after the 1994 Atlas Asni hotel assault. For the first time in its long history, the fabled Jama'a el Fna Square is sad and empty tonight. Instead of the nightly festival of soothsayers, storytellers, mobile restaurants, singers and dancers, the square is a zone for investigative squads.

It is early to lay blame on any particular entity and I don't want to revel in conspiracy theories or premature analysis. Many have pointed the finger at militant Islamists, Algeria and the Polisario, but none of that is constructive at this point and is simply too early to ascertain. One thing is known so far is that the blast was a criminal act that sought to wreak chaos and fear in the hearts of tourists and Moroccans alike. In a city and country dependent on the tourism industry, this definitely deals a major blow to the Moroccan economy.

Today's tragic event transpires amidst a defining time for Morocco. Over the last couple of months, protesters have taken to the streets demanding greater political and socio-economic reforms. The king seemingly open to meaningful reforms promised constitutional revisions. There has been a general atmosphere of openness and proclivity towards dialogue. The Marrakech bombing couldn't have come at a worse time. This could potentially derail or delay the pace of reforms. One can certainly hope the blast would be an impetus to launch far reaching and systemic reforms in the face of whatever entity that seeks to tarnish the current national dialogue about the future trajectory of the kingdom.

My heart goes out to those affected by this tragic act of cowardice. Tonight I have my home city of Marrakech in my prayers and thoughts.

Large Protests in Morocco

2011-04-25T09:47:00.001-07:00

Tens of thousands of protesters took to the streets of several cities and towns in Morocco. Protesters were calling for an eradication of despotism and corruption. Despite royal efforts to contain the angst in the streets through proposed commission for constitutional reforms. Peaceful protesters specifically called for the abolition of said commission and for real, not cosmetic reforms of yesteryear.

So far, political parties and civil society organizations have offered their own versions of proposed reforms to the constitution. Their proposals largely reflect the wide ranging demands for complete overhaul of the constitution including the (in)famous article 19 of the constitution that sets the king as the purveyor of both spiritual and temporal powers. This article does not give effective powers to the king, but endows him with a symbolic status above all political forces in the kingdom, as "Amir al-Mu'minin (commander of the faithful), the supreme representative of the nation and the symbol of unity..the guarantor the perpetuation and continuity of the State."

Real reforms will have to focus on the principles of separation of powers and popular sovereignty. Setting those only as the backbone for a massive campaign to bring about accountability and transparency in the public sphere. This means dismantling the existing kleptocratic and nepotistic structure of government. The regime knows that whatever the constitutional revisions are in June will have to be vast in scope and radically different from earlier constitutional reforms. Moroccan society is growing anxious and bolder as they directly address their monarch with demands direly needed in a country placed to be a model for constitutional monarchism.

Unrest Continues in the Region

2011-04-05T20:20:00.001-07:00

As the Middle East continues to witness new waves of protests. Last week, Tunisians took to the streets to voice out dissatisfaction with the pace of change two months after the ouster of Ben 'Ali. Yemenis continue to display the same steadfast resolve against the thuggish regime of Saleh, who has unleashed the full might of his security forces killing scores of peaceful protesters. However, today he agreed to enter into talks with the opposition in Saudi Arabia. This might be a bit too late given Saleh's early intransigence that proved deadly for his own people.

Syria finally erupted as well with massive protests in the agricultural towns of Dar'a, Sanamin and the port city of Latakia. Sporadic protests also took place in Damascus. There in Syria as in Yemen, the regime responded with tremendous show of violence killing dozens of protesters. The events spurred the regime's attempt to address the protesters' demands fell as flat as the speech delivered by an aloof smug Bashar al-Asad. Blaming everyone but his repressive regime, Bashar talked about a foreign conspiracy behind the riots and lashed out on foreign media for what he viewed as systematic and deliberate lies against his regime.

Al-Assad's speech drew the ire of many Syrian activists. However, some argue that the speech accomplished its goal of rallying people around the security of the state of al-Assad especially after thousands of Syrian came out in support of the regime after the speech. This line of argumentation suggests Syrians are presented with two choices: security or mutli-ethnic civil strife, with the Syrians evidently opting for the former. This sounds myopic and reductionist since such argument is solely based on state-orchestrated demonstrations.

After a couple of weeks of sustained air strikes and a barrage of US Tomahawk missiles, Libya still oscillate between the ebb of pro-Gaddafi forces retreat and flow of rebel frustrated push towards the west in a hopeful attempt to topple Gaddafi. Both sides have shown fissures as the rebels continue to be mired in complete disorganization, while Gaddafi's inner circle lost some key officials to defection. Last week the all powerful former intelligence chief and foreign minister Moussa Koussa flew to London, where he resigned all of his formal posts in the Libyan state. Even Gaddafi's son Saif al-Islam came out with an outlandish plan to devolve power away from his megalomaniacal father, promising democratic reforms, but with only one caveat: all of that will be performed under Saif al-Islam. The conflict in Libya is destined to a stalemate unless there are more notable breaks within the inner circle of Gaddafi, who is increasingly isolated.

The deciding factor could well be provided by the international community, whose military, logistical and financial support is key in toppling the regime of Gaddafi in Tripoli. However such support raises great concern in the US, where shades of the past in Afghanistan haunts US foreign policy makers. Many raise the issue of Jihadi Libyans among the rebels that could benefit from US weaponry and later on use it against US interests. Others in the US want a strict adherence to the wide-ranging mandate in the UNSC resolution 1973 authorizing the safeguard of Libyan civilians, short of a military intervention on the ground. Lost in this debate is a clear goal for the international intervention. Granted it has saved thousands of lives, but anything other than effective military aid for the rebels will fall short of toppling Gaddafi thus turning the conflict in Libya into a stalemate.

Awaiting International Intervention...

2011-03-19T05:32:00.001-07:00

As the world awaits the first manifestations of the no-fly zone over Libya, Gaddafi forces continue its bombardment campaign on Misrata and Benghazi despite his declaration of a ceasefire. Videos showed utter destruction in the western part of Benghazi. Angst is growing amongst rebel leaders on what they perceive as the delay in deploying the no-fly zone. Meanwhile, Gaddafi is engaged in a last ditch effort to position his forces as close to Benghazi as possible, maybe in anticipation of a stalemated conflict in Libya.

In fact, short of substantial international military support beyond the no-fly zone decision, rebels couldn't probably topple Gaddafi in Tripoli. A lack of greater international involvement, short of ground invasion, could see Libya split into two parallel de facto region of influence. The Paris summit underway could go farther into providing much needed logistical and military support for the rebels. The summit also features Arab participation of Morocco, Jordan, UAE and Qatar part of what appears to be a gathering of an impressive international coalition against Gaddafi. In the coming hours, we should expect air strikes against select pro-Gaddafi targets. Such action is direly needed in order to destroy the air and ground capabilities of Gaddafi's forces. The latest reports suggest that Gaddafi is gathering civilians as a human shield around potential sites for international air strikes.

The coming days could decisively determine the future of the conflict in Libya. Hopefully the writing on the wall is clear for some in Gaddafi's entourage, and there is some substantial defection in his inner circle. However, that is highly unlikely as that circle is tightly knit and comprises his own sons with their military forces and members of his tribe. Gaddafi has shown utter contempt and disregard for the Libyan people, shelling at will in an attempt to punish those that dared to defy his dictatorial rule. Let's hope the international intervention swiftly bring about a successful conclusion to the turmoil in Libya, one that see Gaddafi's regime crumble.

Mohammed VI Promises Reforms in Morocco

2011-03-09T20:20:00.000-08:00

Morocco's king Mohammed VI pledged constitutional reforms in today's speech (full text). This is the first time the king has openly invoked talks of political reforms since the Moroccan "day of rage" on February 20th. The speech (watch here) addressed the regionalization process that was launched last year under the Advisory Commission on Regionalization. In his speech, king Mohammed promised political reforms: "We have decided to undertake a comprehensive constitutional reform." He also stated his "firm commitment to giving a strong impetus to the dynamic and deep reforms... taking place". The king provides some detailed specifics for the proposed constitutional changes including:

1. Enshrine in the Constitution the rich, variegated yet unified character of the Moroccan identity, including the Amazigh component as a core element and common asset belonging to all Moroccans;
2. Consolidate the rule of law and the institution-based State; expand the scope of collective and individual freedoms and guarantee their practice; promote all types of human rights - political, economic, social and cultural rights as well as those relating to development and the environment - especially by inscribing, in the Constitution, the Justice and Reconciliation Commission’s well-founded recommendations as well as Morocco’s international commitments in this domain.
3. Elevate the judiciary to the status of an independent power and reinforce the prerogatives of the Constitutional Council to enhance the primacy of the Constitution, of the rule of law and of equality before the law;
4. Strengthen the principle of separation of powers, with the relating checks and balances, and promote the democratization, revamping and rationalization of institutions through the following:
* A parliament emerging from free, fair elections, and in which the House of Representatives plays the prominent role; expand the scope of legislative action and provide parliament with new powers that enable it to discharge its representative, legislative and regulatory mission;
* An elected government which reflects the will of the people, through the ballot box, and which enjoys the confidence of the majority of the House of Representatives;
* Confirming the appointment of the Prime Minister from the political party which wins the most seats in parliamentary election, as attested by election results;
* Consolidating the status of the Prime Minister as the head of an effective executive branch, who is fully responsible for government, civil service and the implementation of the government’s agenda;
* Enshrining, in the Constitution, the Governing Council as an institution and specifying its prerogatives;
5. Shore up constitutional mechanisms for providing guidance to citizens, by invigorating the role of political parties within the framework of an effective pluralistic system, and by bolstering the standing of parliamentary opposition as well as the role of civil society;
6. Reinforce mechanisms for boosting moral integrity in public life, and establish a link between the exercise of power and the holding of public office with oversight and accountability;
7. Enshrine in the Constitution the institutions concerned with good governance, human rights and protection of liberties.

The king promisingly calls for more separation of power, but glaringly stops short of mentioning how the monarchy is going to fare in relation to these reforms. In the past, the kingdom underwent top-down constitutional reforms that only strengthened the monarchical control over the political system, drowned the party system with more political parties loyal to the palace and introduced mechanisms used for electoral engineering. However, this time, the discourse is full of strong language for reforms in king's speech calling for "comprehensive political, economic, social and cultural reforms."

Despite favorable reactions from the Islamist Party of Justice and Development and premature adulation from political scientist Mohammed Darif, constitutional reforms have to rise to the expectations of millions of Moroccans demanding a reduction in the scope of monarchical political prerogatives and discretionary powers in the political system. A system of checks and balances has to include the monarchy in it not as an arbiter above the political fray, but a component of a government that is subject to the processes of horizontal accountability. Similarly, concentration of power in the hands of a small political elite and Fassi families close to the palace has to be dismantled to provide representation and political participation across a broad spectrum of qualified Moroccans.

The events unfolding in the MENA region over the past two months have showcased that the Arab societies are no longer satisfied with cosmetic changes of yesteryear. Arab regimes have to devolve power back to their people and retreat from the political system in manners that satisfy fair, free and competitive elections, supremacy of the rule of law and vast individual liberties. The speech may well be a courageous first step undertaken by the king to provide meaningful reforms, but more is definitely needed. To be successful, the reforms have to involve a wide array of civil, political organizations and groups in a full and autonomous consultative way. Anything short of that will not meet what the king himself aims to set as a national dialogue on the future trajectory of the kingdom.

Libya's Nero

2011-02-27T13:42:00.000-08:00

As the noose tightens on Gaddafi, the dictator has resorted to unparalleled levels of violence. With massive defections in the ranks of the civilian and military authority, Gaddafi's Jamahiriyya has all but crumbled around Tripoli. Still in charge from Bab al-'Aziziyya, the megalomaniac is as unpredictable as Nero or Caligula were. In his speech yesterday from the Green Square, Gaddafi called on his supporters to go out: "sing, dance and get ready." This is not a man who will go down without a fight. It is clear that his sons are also behind the arrogant and murderous defiance of the regime. In an interview with CNN Turk, Seif al-Islam Gaddafi pledged that the Gaddafi clan has three plans and each one of them involve living and dying in Libya. Seif has also dismissed any reports of thousands of causalities, and foreign mercenaries roaming the streets of Tripoli and neighboring cities randomly killing innocent Libyans.

It is only a matter of time before Gaddafi either flees the country or is dragged down from his feet by throngs of angry jubilant crowds. Especially as the UN Security Council unanimously voted to impose sanctions on Gaddafi, his sons and associates, and to refer the matter to a war crimes tribunal. However, in the absence of some form of foreign intervention, Gaddafi's demise won't happen without a massive tally of casualties. The international community has always been slow to respond to humanitarian crises. This should not go down as another Bosnia or Rwanda. Calls for humanitarian interventions, severe economic and military sanctions, and a no-fly zone over Libya are multiple. The last two options should garner consensus, but with every minute that passes, more innocent Libyans lose their lives at the hands of Gaddafi's mercenaries and murderous revolutionary committees. The US is working to master an international coalition against Libya, but their initial hesitance has been disastrous.

In the event of the likely demise of Gaddafi, Libya faces a monumental task of building the institutional foundations of a new state from an absolute scratch. At least Tunisia and Egypt has some existing institutions that with reform could engage in some form of democratic transition. In Libya, there is a complete institutional void. There is hardly any institutions, and where they exist, they are inchoate and partially formed. Libya does not have a constitution and all laws are promulgated through revolutionary committees and annual popular congresses. Gaddafi has veto power over all decisions, not as a president, but a leader of the revolution. However, this is slightly premature and should not deter from a complete focus on toppling a dictator who for 41 years, has squandered Libyan resources and violated his own people.

Arab Uprising: Whose Turn Is It Now?

2011-02-19T14:27:00.001-08:00

The reverberations of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolts, which toppled two of the longest-ruling Arab dictators, continue to be felt throughout the Middle East. In Yemen, Iran, Bahrain and Libya, demonstrations are calling for political and economic reforms. Bahraini protesters have been brutally suppressed by security forces, killing two protesters, and even firing on funeral processions in the first two days of the protests. In Libya and with a complete media blackout, the police has been clashing with protesters for days and reportedly using foreign mercenaries to repress the rioters killing a reported 80 people in three days (The footage here is from Benghazi).

Morocco has a date with planned demonstrations on February 20th, amid recent reports that the youth movement behind it has withdrawn from the protest over disagreements with the Islamists of Justice and Charity. There are also divisions among some organizers of the protesters as three original founders of the movement called for the cancellation of the demonstrations because of what they perceived as foreign interference with the movement. Nonetheless, several human rights and activist organizations have joined the Feb 20 movement. Even the king's cousin Hicham has come out in support of the planned protests. the protest organizers are calling for sweeping constitutional changes, reducing the scope of monarchical powers, dissolving the parliament and sacking he government (see some of their slogans in Arabic).

Morocco has to be concerned about the events in the Arab world and of course it does share some of the socio-economic woes of many in the region, in terms of unemployment, poverty and the rising cost of basic commodities. However, Morocco's case may prove different from the mass-protests and uprisings that toppled dictators in Egypt in Tunisia. This does not mean we won’t see protests and demonstrations in the kingdom, but those, I suspect will be smaller in scale than what we saw in Tunisia and Egypt.

First of all, the nature and style of government in Morocco is different that in the Arab republican states, where political legitimacy is lacking. The Moroccan monarchy is largely popular and entrenched in the socio-cultural foundations of the country., so much so that in Morocco we can actually talk about two layers of political authority that help set the monarchy as regime and political order above the political fray, and one that is capable of deflecting all criticism towards the state government led by the prime minister. This is not surprising then that the small protests we’ve seen so far in Morocco, notably in Fes, Tangier have largely been demanding for the king to sack his government and away from any calls of regime change.

Another factor is that maybe M6’s early reforms proved key in deflecting some of the anger we see in the Arab world today. As he established one of the first truth and reconciliation commission to investigate the atrocities of years of lead and compensate victims of those years of state violence. The king also to introduce some small scale political reforms inviting vast array of political parties to partake in relatively open elections, and empowering a relatively viable civil society, which brought about significant policy changes to some social issues: women issues and Amazigh. However, there have been recent setbacks especially in the spaces allotted to the press, with the incarceration and economic asphyxiation of major independent newspapers and magazines. This is where the challenge for the country lies ahead. Allowing a modicum for freedom of expression outside state intimidation, retaliation and undergoing constitutional changes to reduce the scope of political powers of the monarchy.

February 2011 may go down in history as the most tumultuous month in the annals of Arab political history. These are truly historical times for the Middle East, and when the dust settles, we may come to see the region in a radically different new prism.

Ahead of Algeria's "Day of Rage"

2011-02-09T18:53:00.000-08:00

Algerian university students have already launched a general and indefinite strike ahead of the planned February 12 protests. It is difficult to prognosticate with great deal of accuracy about where the Algerian protests will go and it seems more and more analysts are cautions not to fall in the trap of over-generalization, expecting a domino-effect of sorts in the Arab world. Andrew Lebovich's excellent piece in today Middle East Channel on Foreign Policy predicts small-scale protests, but nothing à la Tunisian/Egyptian scenarios.

Already the Syrian "days of rage" last week didn't amount to anything significant. Syria is probably not ready yet for a mass uprising in a country where the Assad cult personality has managed to depoliticize Syrian society, and the security (mukhabarat) system has maintained a close grip on all socio-political activities in Syria's bunker state. However in a surprise but calculated move to keep tabs on potential irevolutionaries, Syria has lifted the ban on Facebook, Youtube and Twitter.

As events unfold in Tunisia and Egypt, Arab autocrats must all be concerned about the state of their republics and kingdoms. The Arab street has broken the shackles of fear towards their governments. No longer are Arabs lacking in bravery in their demands towards better governance, rule of law and individual freedoms. Years of economic deprivation and political decay are now under microscopic examination around the world. The pressure is on the tyrants to reform. It is not surprising that many are in a race to offer preventive cosmetic changes.

The Arab Winter Uprising

2011-02-02T08:22:00.000-08:00

The Arab world is undergoing a remarkable winter uprising. Unlike, the social revolutions of yesteryear, which were framed in the context of radical ideologies against a socio-economic elite, the revolts in the Arab street lack a clear ideological foundation and are spontaneous uprisings against the excesses of the state, lack of good governance, rule of law and accountability. The common denominator between Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria and Jordan is the inability of their regimes to promulgate real meaningful political and economic reforms. Politically, Arab authoritarian states feature the same menu of political manipulation featuring electoral engineering, limited space for opposition politics, and violations of individual civil liberties.

Economically, Arab autocrats in a bid to tighten control over the political system built an elaborate kleptocratic and clientelistic system that have siphoned off billions of dollars to the ruling elite and its state and social allies. It is not surprising then that the uprisings are largely led by disenchanted unemployed or under-employed youth. The IMF, for instance, estimates that Egypt needs approximately 10 million jobs, roughly 12% of its population. The numbers are even higher in countries such as Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan and Lebanon.

With protests scheduled in Syria (Feb.4-5), Algeria (Feb. 12) and Libya (Feb.17), Arab leaders are scrambling to engage in impromptu "reforms." King Abdullah of Jordan sacked the government for lack of economic and political progress, and Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh announced he won't be seeking reelection amidst protests in Sana'a. These knee-jerk decisions won't probably make a difference to the Arab street. We've already seen clear determination with the Egyptians that anything short of the complete ouster of the Mubarak regime is unacceptable.

The octogenarian has been stalling amidst local and international calls for a regime change. One thing is sure, Mubarak has started a power transition after declaring he will step down in September and his appointment of Omar Suleiman, former head of the intelligence services, as his VP for the first time in 30 years. He has also unleashed his thugs in Tahrir Square to intimidate and crack down on the protesters. All are acts of a desperate man cognizant of the fact that his days are numbered at the helm of the largest Arab country.

In all likelihood, we won't see a true transition to democratic (good) governance in Egypt, as the military has simply no vested interest in giving up its socio-economic privileges. The events in Tahrir today speak volumes about the complicity of the military in keeping more of the same regime structure intact. As we speak, the military is calling on the protesters to go back home. This is radically different from the Tunisian case where the military and General Ammar made a decision to back the Tunisian street, since the army has traditionally been apolitical and on the margin of political institutions. The short term future in Egypt bears continuous strikes and social mobilization efforts to sustain the pressure on the regime.

Finally, the US needs to better prepare and position itself for an eventual change of the guards in the Middle East. Behind the scenes, the US ought to exercise more pressure on all Arab regimes to undergo real, not cosmetic political reforms. This is a momentous opportunity for the US to appeal to the Arab street after decades of disastrous foreign policy in the region. In public, the US has to stand by the Arab street and engage channels of communication with all forces of the opposition, including the Islamists.

Any real democratic change in the Middle East won't be complete without a full Islamist participation. Setting the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or An-Nahda in Tunisia as scarecrows is dishonest and showcases the US continuous failure to accurately appraise political Islam. Being the most organized political force in Egypt dictates that the Muslim Brotherhood might have a larger role in any potential post-Mubarak, but freer Egypt. Inclusion of democratic Islamists will make them stakeholders in the political system and showcases their diversity as nationalist, liberal, entrepreneurial movement, and yes with an Islamic reference seeking a better future for Egypt. The US and domestic forces in the Arab world need not indulge in this mainstream "Ikhwanophobia," for as long as Islamist groups and parties are willing to abide by legal norms, their participation in the future of the Arab Middle East should be encouraged.

Open Letter to President Obama

2011-01-30T14:03:00.000-08:00

Several academics have drafted an open letter to President Obama urging him to stand behind the social protests in Egypt against the regime of Hosni Mubarak. The text of the letter can be found here and here.

An Open Letter to President Barack Obama

January 30, 2010

Dear President Obama:

As political scientists and historians who have studied the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy, we the undersigned believe you have a chance to move beyond rhetoric to support the democratic movement sweeping over Egypt. As citizens, we expect our president to uphold those values.

For thirty years, our government has spent billions of dollars to help build and sustain the system the Egyptian people are now trying to dismantle. Tens if not hundreds of thousands of demonstrators in Egypt and around the world have spoken. We believe their message is bold and clear: Mubarak should resign from office and allow Egyptians to establish a new government free of his and his family’s influence. It is also clear to us that if you seek, as you said Friday “political, social, and economic reforms that meet the aspirations of the Egyptian people,” your administration should publicly acknowledge those reforms will not be advanced by Mubarak or any of his adjutants.

There is another lesson from this crisis, a lesson not for the Egyptian government but for our own. In order for the United States to stand with the Egyptian people it must approach Egypt through a framework of shared values and hopes, not the prism of geostrategy. On Friday you rightly said that “suppressing ideas never succeeds in making them go away,” For that reason we urge your administration to seize this chance, turn away from the policies that brought us here, and embark on a new course toward peace, democracy and prosperity for the people of the Middle East. And we call on you to undertake a comprehensive review of US foreign policy on the major grievances voiced by the democratic opposition in Egypt and all other societies of the region.

Arab Awakening Sweeping Through the Middle East

2011-01-28T19:04:00.000-08:00

Tunisia has decidedly inspired the Arab street and the wind of freedom is moving east. As Tunisians labor through their post-uprising political experiment, Egyptian street has erupted in all corners of the country from Cairo to Suez demanding en end to Hosni Mubarak's 29-year autocratic rule. But unlike Ben 'Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak has decided to ride out this wave of demonstrations, plunging the whole country in a complete media blackout with no Internet.

After four days of deafening silence, a frail but defiant Mubarak appeared on national TV to sack his government, pledging to "fulfill his presidential duties" towards the Egyptian people for order and security. Mubarak's speech is unlikely to quench Egyptians' thirst for regime change. Many contend such change resides in th e military, which will have to forego its privileges and economic interests to appease the Egyptian street.

There is a feeling that an Arab awakening is taking place. This does not appear motivated by any one coherent ideological perspective or by external forces. The Islamist discourse didn't feature in the Tunisian uprising, nor is it prominent in the Egyptian "days of wrath." Instead, what we have are angry citizens disenchanted with despotic kakistocratic systems and bleak socio-economic prospects.

One tend to forget that Islamism is less of a force in Tunisia today due to years of state repression. Most importantly, Tunisia is an exception among the Arab states in its institutional and social secular character, first rooted by Habib Bourguiba after the independence from France in 1956. In Egypt, cradle of modern political Islam, a free post-Mubarak system will undoubtedly feature a strong presence for the Muslim Brotherhood, arguably the most organized political group in the country.

Henceforth, the tendency, even the jubilation among some to declare Islamism obsolete is premature and wrong. Similarly, dismissing the hitherto resilient Arab authoritarian state as a house of card susceptible to devastating mass street level revolutions is also misguided. If there is one thing that the Arab regimes have perfected throughout the years is the ability to reinvent their autocratic structures and placate new challenges to their authority. Alas, much to the chagrin of those of us longing for democratic transition in the Arab world.

Taste of Freedom in Tunisia

2011-01-22T10:33:00.000-08:00

Tunisians are reaping the benefits of their mass uprising. Der Spiegel ran a story on Tunisians' new found freedoms of expression, association and speech. This is nothing short of miraculous. In the span of a month, Tunisia went from one the most tightly-controlled countries in the world, second only to China in online censorship, to a bastion of civil liberties. Apparently, Bourguiba avenue in Tunis has now turned into a free speech zone, where Tunisians come freely to discuss politics, each establishing their own "speakers' corner."

Everyone in the Arab world is inspired by the valiant Tunisian uprising and almost all aspire to recreate that example in their own authoritarian milieu. However, what is the likelihood of a spillover effect? a domino effect of sorts? We've heard of several self-immolation attempts and protests in Algeria, Libya, Egypt, Jordan and Yemen. This blogger is cautiously optimistic. The factors behind the Tunisian case are unique resulting from a highly educated middle class, military reversal against Ben 'Ali and a state-society contest fomented by social media outlets.

In the days leading to Ben 'Ali's demise, Twitter was abuzz with up-to-date tweets on all things Tunisia. Following twitter accounts of Takriz, Nawaat and some Tunisian friends, we were captivated by the turn of unfolding events. Tunisians took the streets to protest a despot and his mafia-style family. Despite initial sheepish concessions from Ben 'Ali, Tunisian bloggers and activists maintained the pace of the uprising through constant tweets. Even after the collapse of the police state of Ben 'Ali, Twitter continues to play a major role in the post-uprising debates on the future trajectory of the country. Some of these accounts are from primary sources. Case in point is former dissident blogger Slim Amamou, current minister of sport and youth, who live-tweeted in the midst of the ministerial cabinet meetings.

While the Tunisian case shows how new technology can be utilized to wage cyber-revolutions to buttress social street protests. This is particularly important in the absence of a clear-cut revolutionary leadership structure. Framing the grievances against the regime was largely performed on the Internet, blogosphere, facebook and twitter accounts. This is the new frontier for most of Arab regimes in their continuous efforts to curb access to social media. This is not to say that technology solely brought down the regime, for I believe the army's principled stance against the bloodshed and the inability of Ben 'Ali to effectively reinvent his authoritarian regime relying more on political management instead of pure coercion and violence. This is not bemoaning the fall of the police state of Ben 'Ali (I was among the first bloggers to celebrate it), but questions of success and failure of the Arab street have to be conceptualized in comparison to other seemingly similar cases in the region. Ultimately, the revolt is a testament to the resilience of the Tunisian people, who set the example for all Arabs fed up with the their regimes' transgressions.

A New Government in Tunisia: Reinventing the "Old Regime"?

2011-01-17T10:28:00.000-08:00

Tunisia announces its new "national unity" government amid continuing disorder and insecurity. Over the weekend, the military clashed with Former president Ben 'Ali's security forces, notably around the Carthage presidential palace. The role of the current government headed by interim president Fouad Mebezaa and prime minister Mohammed Ghannouchi, former "Mr. Oui Oui" in Ben `Ali's state, is to oversee the upcoming elections in 60 days. Mebezaa, the former speaker of the parliament, is a 70 year-old technocrat, who served in different functions under both Bourguiba and Ben `Ali.

As Tunisia maneuvers through its "Jasmine Revolution," questions still remain as to the future trajectory of the country. Can this government provide a peaceful transition towards democratic governance, and a truly all inclusive political system? Already many complain about Ben `Ali's Constitutional Democratic Rally's control of the government, with notable cosmetic changes. Minor cabinet portfolios were bestowed upon the opposition. Ahmed Najib Chebbi of the Democratic Progressive Party is entrusted with the Ministry of Regional and Local Development, Moustapah ben Ja'afar of the Democratic Forum for Work and Freedom as Minister of Health, and Ahmed Ibrahim of the Ettajdid Movement is at the helm of the Ministry of the Ministry of Higher Education.

However, the key ministries of the Interior, Defense and Foreign Affairs are still held by former Ben `Ali ministers. Moreover, Prime Minister Ghannouchi admitted on French TV that he still maintains phone contact with the "deposed" president. So far, it seems that the pillars of the regime are not completely destroyed and there is a clear attempt to reproduce the ancien régime.

Some have already leveled charges against external powers (Libya, France and even Israel) that seek to abort this social revolt. The role of the military is also still unclear as it attempts to pacify the Tunisian street. Its future position behind the scenes is key to a true democratic shift in Tunisia and to maintain a clear distinction between civilian and military lines of authority. Let's not forget the sudanese uprising that took down Ja'afar Numeiri, to later degenerate into a military dictatorship.

The "Jasmine Revolution" has sparked a lot of debate as to its nature and factors behind it. Some dubbed it a "twitter" or "wikileaks" revolution, but the truth is that it was a spontaneous popular uprising against a thuggish police state that has long abused and violated its own people. The social uprising has triggered hopes of an "Arab spring" of democracy. It has also engendered fear in many Arab capitals, which have so far maintained a deafening silence in reaction to it. Except for Libyan leader Mu'amar Qaddafi, who condemned the Tunisians for toppling Ben `Ali, lamenting wikileaks, facebook and twitter for fomenting the uprising.

There is still a long road towards democratic transition in Tunisia. History has shown that the early days of any revolution are key in determining the future path of the political system. So far, the new government looks more as reconciliatory attempt from the old, still existing regime to perpetuate itself and reinvent it in a new façade calling for democratic change. The Tunisian people behind the remarkable revolution ought to stand steadfast and stop nothing short of a complete removal of all relics of Ben `Ali's regime.

Ben 'Ali is OUT!

2011-01-14T13:28:00.000-08:00

Unbelieavable news from Tunsia as president Ben 'Ali has left the country this morning towards an unknown destination. Twitter has been buzzing with information, mostly unconfirmed at this point, that Ben 'Ali was refused landing in Paris, and is on his way to Saudi Arabia. This came a day after Ben 'Ali speech, in which he promised major political concessions, namely stepping down after 2014. The speech was followed by some faux pro-regime demonstrations.

The remarkable and unprecedented popular uprising, dubbed as the Jasmin Revolt, is on the brink of becoming the first ever social uprising to topple an autocratic Arab regime. One can imagine that Arab dictators are in a state of high alert, especially as there early unconfirmed twitter reports of riots in Libya. More information to come..stay tuned.

The Maghreb in Turmoil

2011-01-10T13:47:00.000-08:00

The Maghreb continues to erupt under the yoke of authoritarian rule with riots in both Tunisia and Algeria. The thuggish regime of Ben `Ali has entered in an open confrontation with defenseless protesters using live ammunitions and killing dozens of citizens (some 30 people were killed so far). Tunisians have shown no signs of stopping the uprising fomented by a deep seething sense of frustration, lack of hope and injustice. Today, protesters were filmed burning the picture of Ben`Ali.

Ben`Ali is surely not capitulating either. In today's televised address, he vowed socio-economic changes and a ten-year tax break for businesses of 10+ employees. The aging autocrat also laughably called on political parties and institutions to increase their efforts to address the grievances of the citizens. Ben 'Ali stopped short of addressing the political significance and reverberations of the uprising. Ignoring how the riots are emblematic of a deep political and institutional inertia resulting from years of mismanagement, nepotism and corruption. Ben 'Ali also condemned in the strongest terms the "masked gangs" of protesters that assaulted and looted public property in acts of "terrorism."

Ben`Ali is correct that some protesters are masked, but that is to protect their identities from the violence and retribution of his police state. Similarly, the only acts of terrorism were perpetrated by the forces of Ben `Ali killing scores of peaceful citizens,

Algeria's protests, erroneously dubbed as "food riots," are the culmination of years of small scale skirmishes between the corrupt Algerian ruling elite and an increasingly disenchanted population with the failure of the state as an agent of redistribution of resources. In this vein, Algeria's riots are similar in motives to those in Tunisia. The increases in food prices in Algeria or the self-immolation of Tunisian unemployed youth are only immediate causes for the protests. The underlying factors are corruption, institutional decay and state neglect of the basic socio-economic services of its citizens (for an excellent piece on Algeria and Tunisia's riots, read Hugh Roberts on the Middle East Channel)

While Tunisians and Algerians are rioting in direct confrontation with the state, the rest of the Arab world and its dictatorships are trembling in their thrones and are on high alert. The protests could well be contagious and escalate across borders to the rest of the Arab street long subdued under years of neglect and violence.

POLISARIO and AQIM: a Marriage of Convenience?

2011-01-03T17:18:00.000-08:00

A recent article in Foreign Policy's Middle East Channel puts forth some bold allegations on a purported association between POLISARIO front and AQIM (al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb). The article bases the reports on accounts obtained from recent arrested members of the POLISARIO in Morocco, Mali, Algeria and Mauritania. According to the piece by Alison Lake:

Recent arrests of Polisario members by the governments of Morocco, Algeria, and Mauritania give credence to the unlikely link between an Islamist group and Marxist nationalists. Maj. Gen. Abdeljebbar Azzaoui, Morocco's director of intelligence and counterterrorism, alleged some 75 arrests by Morocco, Mauritania, and Mali of Polisario members involved in al Qaeda operations. He said the Moroccan government works closely with these two countries and shares a list of captives. On Oct. 30 Morocco's Interior Ministry announced its capture of a supposedly al Qaeda-linked terrorist cell, the "Saharawi Jihad Front," headed by a Polisario supporter.

If true, these allegations could be a devastating blow to the irrendentist rebel group, which has been touting claims of human rights and universal principles of freedom in their fight for the secession of the Western Sahara. One certainly should be suspicious of any claims made under duress and with so much at stake.

Sidi Bouzid's Uprising in Tunisia.

2010-12-31T17:58:00.000-08:00

As the year winds down, one must wonder again about the state of the Arab street. Past years witnessed quiescence and relative calm. 2010 may stand as an exception as Tunisia is arguably enduring one of its most spontaneous revolt against the despotic regime of Ben 'Ali. For the past few weeks, the oft marginalized town of Sidi Bouzid has been under the brunt of the police assault of the Tunisian authorities. The protests were triggered by the attempted suicide by immolation on December 17 by unemployed 26-year old man Mohamed Bouazizi. The riots that followed are wholesale rejection of the socio-economic plight of millions of Tunisians lingering in poverty, unemployment and bleak future. The demonstrations are also a rejection of the corrupt and clientelistic regime of Ben 'Ali.

Ben 'Ali condemned the rioters and vowed to create more jobs for the thousands of unemployed youths. Ben 'Ali also pledged that "the law will be applied in all firmness" to punish "a minority of extremists and mercenaries who resort to violence and disorder." Mr. Ben 'Ali, what about your own mercenaries and thugs that have assaulted civilians? Ben 'Ali seemingly does not recognize that this is not a minority of Tunisians, but the majority of his own citizens that are reaching the zenith of their frustration with his police state and dictatorial rule. The riots in Sidi Bouzid soon escalated to other towns outside the capital Tunis, including Kairouan and Ben Guerdane.

This blogger is firmly in support of the brave Tunisians that are rioting against arguably one of the most brutal regimes in the Arab world. Stay steadfast in your fight and protests. As the year 2010 comes to a close, Ben 'Ali should carefully ponder his list of new year resolutions. Top priority on that list must be to loosen up the grip of his mukhabarat state on Tunisia. His tyrannical rule can only be sustained for so long without a mass volcanic-like social eruption.

Wikileaks and the Western Sahara

2010-12-08T18:57:00.000-08:00

As in various regions of the world, the Maghreb has not been immune to Wikileaks. The leaked cables provide some empirical insight into the politics of the region and the interplay of power between different states of the Maghreb. Over the next few blog posts, I will attempt to condense some of these leaks as they pertain to the Maghreb region. Today, I came across an interesting exchange during a February 2008 meeting between Tunisian President Zine al-'Abidine ben 'Ali and US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs David Welch about regional and bilateral relations in the Maghreb.

According to the leaked cable from March 2008, Ben 'Ali blamed Algeria for obstructing the resolution of the conflict in the Western Sahara. The Tunisian president also claimed that Algeria has to come to the full realization that there will never be an independent Sahrawi state in the Western Sahara. The conflict, according to Ben 'Ali, is complex and will not be resolved through the UN Security Council. Moreover, the cable also states that Ben 'Ali tried to summon a Maghrebi summit on the Western Sahara, which both Libya and Morocco agreed to, but was met with Algeria's rejection.

The following is the full quote from the leaked cable:

On the Western Sahara, Ben Ali said the Algerians are responsible for the ongoing impasse. Welch agreed, saying the issue was blocking progress in the region. He said the Algerians need to accept that there is not going to be an independent state in the Western Sahara. Ben Ali said the problem is complex, and will take years to resolve. He added it cannot be settled through the UN Security Council. He noted Tunisia had tried to convene a Maghreb meeting on it in Tunis. While Morocco and Libya had agreed to attend, Algeria refused, saying there was nothing to discuss.

Arab Democracy?

2010-12-05T09:38:00.000-08:00

A recent article in the Economist on the state of the political progress in the Arab world singles out a few Maghrebi states with much consternation. Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya continue on their path of "cyclical" political reforms, introducing sheepish reforms as a safety valve to deflect mounting social unrest. As the Article states, many explanations are advanced for the democratic deficit in the region. But whether they are religious, structural or cultural, millions of Arabs still live under the yoke of autocratic regimes devoid of free, fair, competitive elections (recent farcical Egyptian elections are a case in point), rule of law, and basic individual and group liberties.

The question that concerns this blogger is how long can the current dictatorial regimes maintain this facade of political reforms? Many have long written obituaries of Arab regimes, republican and monarchical. However, Arab leaders have proven resilient and adept at crafting ingenuous political ways to sustain their rule. Arab Sheikhdoms still gamble on oil rent in exchange of political contestation, while republican regimes have carefully restructured the political sphere in their countries. Libya just recently celebrated the 41st year anniversary of the "Brother Leader's" revolutionary coup. The Economist recently featured an article on the looming succession struggle between Qaddafi's sons Seif al-Islam and al-Mu'tassim Billah.

The panoply of manipulation ranges from electoral engineering, management of the opposition to mere old style coercion. All Arab regimes feature a variation of these strategies. Elections are mere instances to renew the regime's solid control of the political system. Opposition is often barred from contesting electoral races, often prosecuted and jailed on trumped-up charges. More alarming is the shrinking space for political dissent and freedom of the press and expression. In the past few months, several newspapers, journalists and blogs bore the brunt of the state's might and censorship.

Massive Popular March in Casablanca

2010-11-28T12:38:00.001-08:00

Some 3 million people took to the streets of Casablanca in support of the Moroccan claims to the Western Sahara. The peaceful marches come at the heel of weeks of media warfare after the events at Gdeim Izzeik. The popular demonstrations garnered wide support from all the major parties and figures in Morocco against the unfair portrayal of Morocco in the aftermath of the riots in Gdeim Izzeik. The marchers spoke particularly to the perceived Spanish media biased coverage of the upheavals in Gdeim Izzeik. The protesters also brandished signs calling on Spain to rein in the anti-Moroccan rhetoric advanced by some of its parties such as the Popular Party. Recently the Popular Party has been vociferous in its criticism of Moroccan handling of the criminal activities at Gdeim Izzeik. Similarly, the Spanish media showed a biased coverage of the events and has contributed to the unfavorable view of Morocco.

The Government in Morocco is partially to blame for this state of affairs for their chronic reactionary posture towards the events. They should have been on the offensive and exposed the true nature of the protests in Gdeim Izzeik, which were largely led by disaffected camp dwellers calling for greater socio-economic equality, and not in protest of Moroccan control of the Western Sahara as purported by most of the western media.

The Western Sahara conflict continues to draw much controversy as a national and regional issue. For Morocco, any future solution has to be done with the parameters of the Moroccan plan of autonomy under Morocco's sovereignty. The plan already has the support of both the US and France. For POLISARIO and its benefactor Algeria, the conflict can only be solved through a complete secession of the territory away from Morocco. Faced with such irreconcilable stances, the UN's Christopher Ross is trying what is perceived a last ditch attempt to revive the negotiations.

Riots in La'ayoune

2010-11-08T19:16:00.001-08:00

Morocco and the Polisario are meeting in Manhasset, NY for another round of negotiations aimed a resurrecting the 35-year stalemate in the Western Sahara. In its latest issue, the Economist features a piece on the trajectory of the often-maligned process of negotiations. The article accurately points out to the regional stakes involved in the conflict and the dilatory practices that have delayed an ever lasting resolution of the stalemate.

My thoughts are that the plan on the table: autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the best the kingdom can offer given the overwhelming internal support for the "Moroccanity" of the territories. The recent rounds of talks come in the midst of renewed tensions and demonstrations around the Sahraoui city of Laayoune.

Riots took place in the Gadim Izik camp have resulted in 5 fatalities among the forces of order, and scores of injuries amongst the rioters. According to local news, the new cycle of tensions is primarily caused by the attempt of the Moroccan police and auxiliary forces to break the siege laid by a group of protesters calling for equal economic rights and housing in the Gadim Izik. Moroccan media blames the Polisario and Algeria in fomenting the riots.

It is clear that these latest riots and the ensuing allegations will only further complicate the tasks of negotiators at Manhasset. The question is after 35 years of conflict, is there still any real will to move the issue past the status quo of obstructionism?

Morocco and Tunisia in the Economist

2010-08-03T11:56:00.000-07:00

Two recent articles in the Economist bring the Maghreb center stage. The articles tackle the much talked about issues of Christian missionaries' expulsion from Morocco, and the ever increasing tightening of political and civil liberties in Tunisia.

Over the past few months, Morocco has engaged in a systematic cmapaign against Christian missionaries, which have settled in the country over the last decade or so. The Economist article mentions the case of "Village of Hope," which has supported several poor and abandoned children in the region south of Fes. The missionaries and aid workers that ran the home deny any proselytising, but the Moroccan government maintains the expulsion was due to their mission work that "took advantage of the poverty of some families and targeted their young children."

It is difficult to asses any clear lines between relgious conversion and aid work, and one can certainly support religious groups' right to advance any reglious belief. However, foreign relgious groups have to respect local beliefs, customs and traditions. In an already tense international enviornment rife with religious debates and conflict, any attempt to export religiosity will trigger tremendous reaction from both society and state.

The case of Tunisia is more troubling. The country has been under the radar for the past years and even hailed as a model for stability and economic progress. But exactly at what cost is Zine al-'Abdine Ben Ali maintaining this facade? And why is the EU continuing negotiations with Tunisia on its application for "advanced-partner status"?

In recent months and after his October victory in the presidential elections, Ben Ali has moved to suppress any glimmer of dissent in Tunisia. Journalists, activists, bloggers and dissidents alike have been jailed and harassed by the security forces. The Economist mentions the case of journalist Fahem Boukadous, who was sentenced to four years in jail for his coverage of workers protests in the mining town of Gafsa in 2008.Despite his ailing health, Boukadous remains in Tunisian jail, while the EU has been eerily quiet about Tunisia's continuing descent into autocratic dictatorship.

Maghreb Center Journal

2010-07-11T19:18:00.000-07:00

The first issue of the Maghreb Center Journal is available online and it is entirely focused on Algeria as a major regional actor in the Maghreb. I recommend the article by Yahya Zoubir on Algeria's relations with the U.S. and Jacob Mundy's Algeria and the Western Sahara Dispute. I will offer my own comments in future post.

Naciri Scandal in Morocco.

2010-05-24T04:05:00.000-07:00

Just when I think Morocco is moving sheepishly towards some semblance of legality and rule of law, the current minister of communications, Khaled Naciri and his son's thuggery shake my belief. Friday night, the son of said minister was involved in an altercation with another motorist in front of the parliament building in Rabat. The argument escalated into Naciri jr.'s assault and stabbing of the other motorist, a local doctor residing in Rabat.

The police was vigilant this time and quickly moved to arrest the son of the minister. However, the latter was quick to call his father, who showed up personally at the scene to extract his son and take him home. According to eye witnesses, the minister was quick to threaten the recalcitrant policeman holding his son in custody, stating: "are you going to let the boy go, or should I do my work?" Consequently, the policeman releases Naciri jr. amidst vociferous condemnation by the few present bystanders (on youtube).

This is the latest in a long series of similar events that showcases how Morocco's officials treat the corpus of the laws in the kingdom. Instead of being a role model for all Moroccans by respecting law enforcement, Mr. Naciri's message is loud and clear: there are two sets of laws in the country, one for those that wield any form of state authority, who abuses their power with impunity. Another set of laws is duly implemented when downtrodden Moroccans are concerned.

Any country's move towards a modicum for good governance has to empower the supremacy of the laws. In fact, the rule of law is key to improving the quality of governance of any political system. In democratic states, such abhorrent and blatant disregard for the rule of law would result in investigation of the minister's actions and eventual resignation. We should not settle for less in Morocco. Mr. Naciri (and his son) should be held accountable for their actions that Friday night.

Elections and Party Politics in Morocco!

2010-05-12T09:52:00.000-07:00

An analysis of Morocco's Elections and Party Politics as it appeared on the Middle East Institute's website last week.

A Draconian Censorship Campaign in Tunisia

2010-05-04T18:45:00.000-07:00

Tunisia is targeting freedom of expression yet again. The authorities have carried out one of the most extensive campaigns of censorship in the world. So far, 59 sites and 64 blogs have been blocked. The list includes the online photo-sharing site flickr, blip.tv and metacafe.com. Social networking and media sharing website, Wat.tv fell also prey to these draconian censorship measures. I should note that these sites join their counterparts Dailymotion and YouTube, which have been banned since 2007. I wonder what the state in Tunisia is trying to hide that we don't already know about the excesses in corruption, abuse of power, lack of individual and group freedoms and rampant authoritarianism?

A group of bloggers and activists have addressed an open letter to the president of Tunisia, Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali calling for a reversal of what they call "arbitrary" measures and decision to block content on the Internet. The text of the letter is quoted below in both French and Arabic:

Monsieur le Président de la République,

Par la présente, nous avons l'honneur d'attirer votre attention sur un sujet qui préoccupe un grand nombre de tunisiens.

Depuis son indépendance l'État tunisien a toujours été porteur de progrès par ses politiques en faveur de l'éducation et la formation, par l'incitation ou encore par l'exemplarité. Le domaine de l'Internet n'a pas dérogé à la règle et depuis 1996, l'État tunisien, sous votre Présidence, a développé une politique volontariste de diffusion de l'outil Internet. La création d'une administration de d'Internet et la mise en place de mesures nécessaires ont porté leurs fruits.

En effet, les internautes tunisiens ont été des pionniers dans l'utilisation de cet outil dans différents domaines. Aujourd'hui, ils sont des centaines de milliers à en faire un usage quotidien. Or, les tunisiens sont confrontés de plus en plus à des mesures restrictives, manifestement illégales, de la part des administrations responsables du réseau national. Ces mesures privent les tunisiens d'un espace indispensable à leur épanouissement social, culturel, professionnel, paralysant ainsi l'évolution de notre pays.

Alors que l'année 2010 a été, à votre initiative, déclarée année internationale de la jeunesse, par l'Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies, une partie de la jeunesse tunisienne est aujourd'hui frustrée de ne pas pouvoir accéder à leurs sites Internet favoris. Certains internautes tunisiens qui ont fait le choix de participer au débat public, ont vu leurs espaces personnels d'expression censurés en Tunisie.

Après la multiplication inquiétante de ces décisions arbitraires, et au-delà du tort considérable qu'elle inflige à l'image de notre pays et à sa marche vers le progrès, nous souhaiterions que vous réagissiez face à cette situation; de sorte à ce qu'il n'y ait plus de sites bloqués d'une manière illégale ne reposant sur aucune décision de justice et en totale contradiction avec l'article 8 de la Constitution de notre pays et l'article 19 de la Déclaration Universelle des Droits de l'Homme.

Monsieur le Président de la République, vous avez déjà par le passé décidé la réouverture du site communautaire Facebook après son blocage. Nous vous appelons aujourd'hui à intervenir pour rendre accessible à nouveau les sites illégalement censurés.

Nous vous appelons également à exiger des responsables de l'administration d'Internet de cesser ces pratiques illégales qui paraissent aux yeux des tunisiens, aussi aléatoires qu'incompréhensibles.

Nous vous prions d'agréer, Monsieur le Président de la République, l'assurance de notre parfaite considération.

ا
رسالة مفتوحة إلى سيادة رئيس الجمهورية

سيادة رئيس الجمهورية

يشرفنا، فخامة الرئيس، أن نلفت نظركم من خلال هذه الرسالة إلى مسألة تخص عددا كبيرا من التونسيين

منذ الإستقلال، اختارت الدولة التونسية التطوير من خلال سياسات تعطي الأفضلية لمجالي التربية و التكوين و ذلك عبر التشجيع أو بأن تكون مثالا على ذلك. و لم يشذ مجال الإنترنت عن هذه القاعدة منذ سنة 1996، فقامت الحكومة التونسية ـ تحت قيادتكم ـ بتشجيع إستعمال الأنترنت في كل المجالات و قد أعطت هذه السياسة أكلها عن طريق تأسيس الوكالة التونسية للأنترنت.

و لقد أصبح مستعملو الانترنت التونسيون سباقين في استعمال هذه الأداة في مجالات عديدة و مختلفة. و يبحر منهم على الأنترنت مئات الآلاف يوميا، لكنهم، و للأسف، يواجهون قرارات ـ غير قانونية على ما يبدو ـ تحد من حريتهم و ذلك من قبل الجهات المسؤولة عن تنظيم هذا المجال على المستوى الوطني. و تؤدي هذه القرارات إلى حرمان التونسيين من فضاء يمكن من الإنفتاح الإجتماعي و الثقافي و المهني متسببة بالتالي في إعاقة عجلة التطور في بلادنا

و في الوقت الذي أعلنت فيه "الأمم المتحدة" سنة 2010 سنة عالمية للشباب على إثر إقتراح سيادتكم، يشعر جزء من الشباب التونسي بالاحباط بسبب حرمانه من الدخول الى مواقعه الالكترونية المفضلة. و البعض ممن أراد المشاركة في نقاش الشأن العام، تعرضت مواقعهم الشخصية إلي الحجب.

بعد التزايد المقلق للقرارات العشوائية في حجب المواقع الالكترونية، بالاضافة الى أنها تشوه صورة بلادنا في العالم و تعرقل مسيرتها للتقدم، نتمنى أن تتدخلوا لاتخاذ الإجراءات اللازمة بحيث لا يحجب أي موقع بصفة غير قانوية دون إستناد إلى قرار قضائي و هو ما يتعارض مع الفصل الثامن من دستورنا و الفصل التاسع عشر من الإعلان العالمي لحقوق الإنسان.

سيادة الرئيس، لقد تدخلتم من قبل لإعادة فتح الموقع الإجتماعي "فايسبوك" بعد حجبه، و نرجو من سيادتكم مجددا التدخل ثانية لرفع الحجب غير القانوني عن العديد من المواقع

نرجو أيضا من سيادتكم، أن تطالبوا المسؤولين عن إدارة الأنترنات بالكف عن هذه القرارات اللتي تبقى في جل الأحيان غير مفهومة و إعتباطية لدى نسبة كبيرة من التونسيين

وتقبلوا فخامة الرئيس احترامنا وتقديرنا مع خالص التحية

Haidar's Latest Comments.

2010-04-13T18:10:00.000-07:00

Aminatou Haidar is at it again. The Sahraoui activist is critical of Morocco for allegedly annihilating the Sahraoui people, using napalm and phosphorus mortar bombs on Sahraouis. Haidar, currently in Spain, in a conference to support the Sahraoui people has called on the international community, in particular the United Nations to establish some mechanism to monitor human rights violations in the Sahara. Aminatou Haidar made headlines late last year for her staged hunger strike in Spain, after she was expelled from Morocco for rejecting to recognize her Moroccan citizenship on the landing card. Haidar has since been allowed back in Morocco. Her latest comments come at a time of impasse between the parties involved in the Western Sahara talks.

I have said enough on the conflict in previous posts. I would just like to add here that it is odd that Haidar continues to advance a Polisario/Algerian line, while still technically living in Morocco. This is definitely a story to follow to see whether she would face any repercussions for her inflammatory statements. The new policy of the state has been to tolerate no dissent or questioning of the territorial integrity of Morocco. In last year's Green March speech, Mohammed VI forcefully declared that the time of ambivalence has gone, and that Moroccans are either for or against territorial unity of the country.

I certainly hope that Aminatou Haidar does not suffer for her comments, for the same reasons that I think every Moroccan should enjoy their full freedom of expression. By the same token, her comments are vitriolic and one sided. One should also call for an investigation of human rights violations perpetrated by the Polisario in the Tindouf camps, where freedom of movement and travel are severely restricted. Human rights organizations have documented the dire conditions where the refugees live. Human Rights Watch, for instance, in its 2008 report, attributed the plight of the Sahraouis in the camps to the Polisario and its benefactor Algeria, and not just to Morocco.

Back After A Long Absence!

2010-03-27T17:40:00.001-07:00

I am back after a long absence due to work and international travel. Not much has changed in the stagnant MENA region in the month or so that I have been away from my blog. I read many sad stories of continued statist abuse in the Maghreb, and one particularly disheartening news story about the Tunisian youth Abdessalam Tremeche, who set himself on fire to protest the Monastir's city council's refusal to grant him a permit for a street shop. It is disgusting when the state takes all vestiges of hope away from its youth, and compel its own citizens to embrace death in reaction to a bleak socio-economic future.

Moroccan-Algerian relations continue to be contentious on the heels of Morocco's latest accusation of Algeria's "destruction of Arab Maghreb Union." A Recent visit by UN special Envoy Christopher Ross showcased the degree of difficulty in finding common ground for negotiations away from mutual finger pointing. Morocco still rejects the referendum, while Algeria/POLISARIO maintain the Sahrawi's claim to independence through a UN-sponsored referendum. Thus, what Ross has on his hands is an impasse that would require a committed and focused effort on the part of the international community to break through.

More meaningful blogging to follow!

Blogging in Morocco...And Bureaucratization of Religion

2010-02-25T19:50:00.001-08:00

Just back from Morocco, where I had the pleasure to meet various young and upcoming bloggers from Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco. Conversations were inspiring and informative. Exploring the blogosphere in the Maghreb, Morocco and Algeria seem to be relatively freer than Tunisia subject to a stifling environment. Whereas in Morocco, one knows the red lines and taboo subjects outside the limits of freedom of expression, Tunisia's guidelines are arbitrary. Recently, fellow blogger Lina Ben Mhenni's blog (Tunisian Girl بنية تونسية) and facebook page were censored by "Ammar," name 'affectionately' given by Tunisian bloggers and activists to state Internet censorship in Tunisia. The authorities' actions are an attempt to silence Lina's writing on the plight of political prisoners and the dwindling space for freedom of expression in Tunisia.

While in Morocco, I attended the Friday prayer, where I thought the Imam was a public announcer speaking for the virtues of driving safety. I kept waiting for Islamic predication, instead what I heard were the enumerable casualties of Morocco's roads. I, by any means, minimize the issue, but the whole purpose of the Friday sermon in my opinion is not to serve as a mouth piece for any state ministry. This episode is indicative of the larger process of the bureaucratization of religion, which is common place in the Muslim world. Some (see Noah Feldman's "the Fall and Rise of the Islamic State) have traced this process back to the Ottoman's codification of Shari'a law, and the effective relegation of the 'Ulama to mere state functionaries, serving as pawns in the apparatus of the regime. Feldman, for instance, argues that it is this subjugation of the religious class to the state, which is at the center of the decline of the Islamic state. The 'Ulama served as an independent check and a legitimizing force of state authority, forcing a sort of horizontal accountability over the state.

Back to Morocco, religion has been integral to regime hegemony. The monarch is considered the protector of the faith, a fact codified in the Moroccan constitution and monitored by the state through the ministry of religious affairs, which supervises the mosques, religious institutions, and appoint imams. The monarchical interpretation of Islam dominates Morocco’s political discourse and religious legitimacy is the basis of the power of the monarch. This claim is buttressed by the monarch’s claim of ancestral descent from the prophet’s family, which makes him “God’s shadow on earth.” This quasi-holy stature is consecrated in the bay’a (allegiance), which Moroccan monarchs command from their subjects every year and is done following an old Islamic tradition of political succession. The centrality of the monarchy in the religious realm has led to the monarch's dominance of religious discourse, proving crucial in the monarch's confrontation with Islamists.

On the Upcoming Western Sahara Talks

2010-02-05T19:28:00.000-08:00

Morocco and the Polisario Front will resume informal talks about the Sahara next week in Westchester County, north of New York City. On the table is Morocco's plan for Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty. The plan has US, France and Spain's support so far, but the Polisario and its benefactor Algeria have rejected the plan as a mere Moroccan attempt to tighten its de facto control of the territory. The talks between the two parties (some say three parties including Algeria) to work on confidence-building measures have led nowhere over the last three years, so it is likely the current round of talks will yield no results either.

In an earlier comment, I was critical of the application of the self-determination concept in the Western Sahara, notably its neglect for Morocco's historical ties to the territory. The historical past of the Western Sahara consisted of the colonial intrusion in North Africa and its indelible marks on culture, the people and the politics of the region. In fact, I argued that the United Nations application of self-determination in the Saharan territory completely ignored the colonial powers’ process of re-drawing the borders of the region and how that affected identity of the local population. Furthermore, colonial powers brought both Bled el Makhzen and Bled es Siba together as one unit within a state much like European states, therefore, diluting the historical political system that existed prior to the colonial invasion.

In addition to identity and historical factors, the conflict involves regional and international dimensions. Past non-interventionary strategies followed by major international powers and lack of international urgency of the issue contributed to prolonging of the conflict. Only targeted pressure and active diplomatic engagement from the United States, France or the European community as a block can provide a window of hope in the resolution of the dispute, and a much needed relief to the plight of the thousands of Sahrawis in the camps of Tindouf.

Regional issues also hampered any resolution of the conflict. The nature of inter-Maghrebi politics, especially, the rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, fueled the conflict and exacerbated the situation in the territory. Domestic issues have further fomented this rivalry namely the role of the military in Algeria, its hard line strategy vis-à-vis the conflict in the Western Sahara, and the intransigency of the Moroccan government backed by public opinion and a staunch mass support for the "Moroccanity" of the Western Sahara and the territorial integrity of Morocco.

For the last 35 years, the Maghreb has been plagued with the conflict in the Western Sahara, which greatly stalled any prospects of regional integration and cooperation necessary to face the challenges of the rapidly globalizing world. As the de facto ruler of the Western Sahara, Morocco has looked into the long-term benefits of reaching a compromise with Algeria over the Western Sahara. It has provided a serious plan for resolution of the conflict. Alas, Algeria's military and its political obsession with its larger geo-political ambitions in the region have hindered any attempt at a meaningful consideration of the Moroccan plan.

If the plan is not to their liking, which is obviously the case, then it is incumbent upon Algeria and the Polisario to step up to the plate and propose a non-obstructionist, realistic alternative. The blind rejectionism of anything Moroccan will only lead to maintaining the current status-quo largely in favor of Morocco at this point. Any meaningful compromise between Morocco and Algeria is beneficial, not only to the two countries, but also to the other three countries in the Maghreb region, as it could be a tremendous step towards full economic and political integration.

Le Journal Hebdomadaire n'est plus!

2010-01-30T13:24:00.001-08:00

Another one bites the dust in Morocco's increasingly restricted press landscape. Moroccan weekly in French Le Journal was dealt a final blow Wednesday, when the court ordered its closure due to charges of unpaid taxes in the amount of $1 million. The editor of Le Journal, Abu Baker Jama'i reportedly wrote the following to fellow blogger the Arabist:

Le Journal Hebdo has been shut down. Yesterday, 5, yes, 5, bailiffs showed up armed with a court decision to take over Le Journal Hebdomadaire and the company behind it, Trimedia. The only link is the title: "Le Journal Hebdomadaire" but the title is owned by the publisher himself not the company. Although we are waiting to get a clearer legal picture, we can already officially announce the death of Le Journal Hebdomadiare.

The closure marks an end to the magazine's tumultuous 12 years of conflict with the authoritarian apparatus of the state in Morocco. Le Journal's assets were seized in 2002 after the court ruled in favor of former Minister of Foreign Affairs and ex-Ambassador to the U.S., on whom the magazine published an article contending his purchase of a house in Washington DC. The ruling is the final death nail in the coffin of the much maligned and bold magazine.

Since its first issue appeared in November 1997, Le Journal and its editor Abu Baker Jama'i left no sensitive political or social issue unperturbed. From its highly controversial reportage on the Western Sahara conflict to the sluggish pace of political reforms, the weekly magazine quickly established itself as a watchdog calling for greater government accountability, and more meaningful political and democratic changes. Le Journal engaged in several bouts with the state in its attempt to exercise freedom of expression and the press. and it was banned several times notably after its publication of a letter by former Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP) leader alleging the complicity of the Union Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) (then party in power of PM Youssoufi) in the failed putsch against late King Hassan II in 1972.

The closure of Le Journal is yet another indication of the dwindling threshold for journalistic expression and dissent in Morocco. In addition to excessive fines and seizure of assets, the strategy of the state to stifle freedom of the press was perfected through a repressive press code and an advertising boycott against the magazine that drove Le Journal and Jama'i to bankruptcy. As political and economic reforms continue to be anemic, the state appears to be less tolerant vis-a-vis any form of dissent, and perhaps the state has also finally settled its account with the 12-year thorn of Le Journal in its side.

New Page on Facebook against Fassi Fihri's abuse of Power!

2010-01-29T09:55:00.001-08:00

UPDATE: Still on the Facebook page ban. Moroccans are so resourceful. After the state has blocked access to the old Facebook page denouncing Fassi Fihri's nepotistic excesses, a new page on the same topic has been created.

Anti-Nepotism Facebook Page closed in Morocco

2010-01-28T19:01:00.000-08:00

Last week, I posted a comment about the new facebook page (this is the updated link to the new facebook page--the old one was deactivated) denouncing the abuse of power and nepotism perpetrated by Fassi Fihri family in Morocco. It turns out that Facebook has closed that page for Moroccan users based in Morocco. This is a regrettable act and I continue to marvel at the complicity of these global corporations' propensity to aid and abet authoritarian forms of governments around the world. The facebook page named "together against the exploitation of political power by Fassi Fihri Family" (now accessible here) has planned a valentine's day protest in front of the Moroccan parliament.

Facebook and the state in Morocco seemingly complicit in this blatant abuse of freedom of expression should know that this only adds to the popularity of the page. What is the harm in naming some of those that threaten to derail Morocco's path towards true political and social reforms? towards greater transparency and accountability? Fassi Fihri clan has been under increasing scrutiny from the Moroccan media, but they seem oblivious that their family's assault on the public service is not subject to resistance because of Moroccans' "envy and jealousy" as Minster of Health, Yasmina Badou (wife of Ali Fassi Fihri, Nephew of the PM) advanced on Moroccan TV 2M.

Badou invoked colonial times and the French use of the Berber Dahir (Decree) to divide Moroccan society along ethnic lines in the 1930s, in a failed analogy to victimize the Fassi Fihris as a target of discrimination. This supposed discrimination and jealousy, in the words of Badou "set the country backwards." No Madam Minister, it is nepotism and abuse of power that are driving the country every day down the path of political corruption. Moroccans are not racists, nor are they discriminating against your family. Rather, the facebook page and the media's concern are mere attempts to expose abuses by those that put personal and family interests above those of the public good.

Western Sahara: Identity and Self-Determination

2010-01-24T09:34:00.000-08:00

Thus far, I have resisted giving my own analysis on the Western Sahara conflict, but the whole Aminatou Haidar saga helped crystallized for many the sensitive nature of the issue. Morocco, Algeria, and Spain were involved in a diplomatic showdown, with each trying to win points for seemingly human rights reasons. The blogosphere was virulent with pro- and anti-Western Sahara self-determination, a concept that has long dominated the discourse on the conflict. In addition to regional rivalry, a solution to the conflict has been defined in terms of a rightful modicum for identifying who is considered Sahrawi, and henceforth eligible to vote in the ever so elusive referendum. Though talks of referendum have been de-emphasized given the recent Moroccan plans for granting Sahrawi autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty, the quintessential issue, at least, in my estimation is an issue of identity, and how it has been conceptualized within the modern self-determination discourse.

As I wrote elsewhere, modern self-determination could grant people in the Western Sahara a choice for autonomy and sovereignty. However, it does not lay down the parameters of defining such people. A simple theoretical discussion on the evolution of the norm of self-determination leaves us with the contentious question of who is entitled to take part in deciding the future of the Western Sahara through the UN sponsored referendum? To be sure, the dizzying number of UN resolutions, as the Western Sahara conflict shows, fail to demarcate the contours within which an identity exists, while clearly positing the right of self-determination as sine qua non to self-governance. However, such conceptualization of the Western Sahara case also reflects the United Nations’ lack of historical knowledge of the territory, which could have enriched its understanding of the complex identity issues that are at stake for all parties involved in the conflict.

The issue of self-determination, specifically a Wilsonian conception of it, would have granted a vote for minorities in the region. however, this is difficult as we try to ascertain the legal ties since the territory was not demarcated and may local tribes paid allegiance to different powers. It is also disingenuous to distance said allegiance away from the context of the Sherifen State, which exerted a pseudo-control over the territory. In fact these Sahrawi tribes led an autonomous life and paid allegiance to the central authority of the Makhzen. Each tribe had an internal governance structure. This is in fact not far from what Morocco is offering today, which is located between paying allegiance to the central power and leading an autonomous lifestyle from within the tribe.

The interplay of power within the Makhzen between Bilad al-Makhzen (territories firmly under state control in terms of rule and taxation) and Bilad es-Siba (territories paying allegiance to the Sherifien Sultan, but not necessarily paying taxes) is often de-emphasized by analysts of the conflict and the international community's attempt to force a self-determination referendum. Boundaries of the territory itself are colonial creations and were drawn with no respect for existing nomadic tribes that roamed the whole sub-Saharan region. Self-determination of peoples, only in the Western Sahara (as demarcated now) legitimizes colonial structures that were imposed in the first place. In other words, the international community through the United Nations is trying to implement the referendum for self-determination in the Western Sahara based on the colonial imposed demarcations of the region. Morocco has been opposed to such practice simply because such discourse of self-determination completely denies its historical ties with the region.

Facebook Group against PM Nepotism in Morocco

2010-01-16T20:15:00.000-08:00

A new facebook page entitled "Together against the abuse of political power by the al-Fassi Fihri Clan" has called for a Valentine's day protest in front of the Moroccan parliament against prime minister 'Abbas Fassi Fihri's nepotistic excesses.

'Abbass Fassi Fihri has steadily populated public service positions with his own kin. The list of high level officials from the Fassi Fihri clan is egregiously expanding, to the point where the opposition in the upper chamber in the Moroccan parliament is calling for an investigation into recent government hires made by the PM. Nepotism and clientelism have always been part of the socio-political fabric of Morocco. similarly the stronghold that Fassi (from the city of Fes) families have had over the apparatus of the state is historically undeniable. However, the current PM has taken it to a whole new level appointing his family members and friends at random to positions they are seemingly unqualified to hold.

Let us consider some of the high level political officials and public servants affiliated and benefitting from their ties with clan Fassi Fihri:

*Abdelmajid Fassi al-Fihri, son of the PM, allegedly slated to take over the presidency of the Moroccan news channel al-Ikhbaria.

*Nizar Baraka, son-in-law of the PM, Minister of Economic and General Affairs

*Mounir Chraibi, nephew of the PM, former governor of Marrakech and ex-head of the CNSS.

*Ali Fassi al-Fihri, nephew of the PM (from his step-brother Mohammed Fassi Fihri), Director of the ONEP and head of the Royal Football Federation.

*Yassima Badou, wife of Ali Fassi Fihri, current Minister of Health

*Taieb Fassi Fihri, Brother of Ali Fassi Fihri, current Minister of Foreign Affairs

It seems the PM is using state institutions to construct a fiefdom for his family and friends, while thousands of qualified educated Moroccans are loitering in squalor and unemployment. Nepotism and political corruption have long offset Morocco's potential for socio-economic and political development, its ability to provide for its citizens, and to guarantee a life of dignity and hope. it behooves Morocco's political elite to hold itself to higher standards of transparency and accountability, in order to build a meritorious and impartial public service. The opposition's demand for an investigation of Fassi Fihri's abuses will fall on deaf ears, but the facebook group and other outlets can at least serve to name and shame the practice.

Ministerial Changes in Tunisia

2010-01-16T14:28:00.001-08:00

It seems that ministerial re-shuffles are in vogue in the Maghreb these days. After Morocco's partial cabinet changes, Tunisia's Zine al 'Abidine ben 'Ali reshuffled his deck of ministers as he appointed new ministers at the helm of finance, defense and foreign affairs. Ben 'Ali made a total of 11 changes in an attempt to display what som analysts see as a renewed commitment to economic reforms. This is the first major institutional step the five-term president has taken since his October 2009 landslide electoral victory in the presidential elections, winning over 89% of the votes.

I should note that both Interior Minister Rafik Bel Haj Kacem and Prime Minister Mohamed Ghannouchi will continue in their current functions, in an indication that the ministerial shuffle is largely a cosmetic shift, and does not really aim at introducing vast effective policy changes or core institutional reforms. How about a shuffling of the constitution, limiting the scope of presidential powers and granting both individual and group rights?

Constitutional Reforms in the Arab World: A Moroccan View

2010-01-11T18:51:00.000-08:00

A summative report in the Arab Reform Initiat ive highlighting the trajectory of the past two decades of reforms in the Arab world. The report evaluates the future path of reforms in five Arab states. Three of which are three Maghrebi states: Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania. In general, El Messaoudi observes that each country has some idiosyncratic factors enabling or offsetting reforms. However, she recognizes five major areas that were subject to constitutional reforms: State sponsored human rights law, gender equality and women's representation, support for constitutional law, multipartyism, and financial regulation.

Reforms in the 1990s are also due to several external factors. El Messaoudi argues that vast economic and political changes in the aftermath of the demise of the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of the Soviet Union led to an era of heightened political awareness in the Arab world and the resurgence of a somewhat variegated civil society. the five Arab states followed different paths to reform. in some states, such as Tunisia, Egypt and Algeria, reforms were top-bottom whereby the state initiated and calibrated the pace of constitutional reforms. In some cases the opposition exercised a great deal of pressure on the state to open up the tap of liberalization. Morocco, according to Messaoudi, fits this last category. While others factors such as Civil society, the media also played a role in Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Mauritania. Lastly, Messaoudi points to the influence of national treaties in Algeria and Bahrain to introduce constitutional reforms.

The case of Morocco is interesting, but reforms should not be solely credited to civil society groups and the opposition. The regime has been capable of managing an increasingly fragmented political party scene and devised what Ellen Lust termed a divided structure of contestation to allow selected political opponents to take part in the political system, while excluding others. These structures condition government-opposition relations and dictate the rules of the game that the opposition plays within the formal political system. State agents have infiltrated Morocco political electoral contests and create new allies for the regime. The general tendency of Morocco's elections is they have yielded a fragmented governmental coalition, always under the tutelage of the monarchy, and subject its whimsical tendencies, as we just witnessed in last week's partial cabinet shuffle.

El Messaoudi praises the valiant role of civil society in Morocco, and surely there is some merit behind that praise. Much of social policy changes in areas of human rights, family law, and gender equality have been spurred by civil society organization. However, the state has been able to co-opt and set the boundaries of such issues. Women's rights, human rights and democratic reforms are but a few examples of state's attempt to redefine the main points of contention during electoral contests and within civil society. Furthermore, the state sought to fully integrate them in the apparatus of the state. For instance, the institutionalization of the women rights discourse was done through the creation of the Cell for the Integration of Women in Development (CIFD) and the special commission that the speial commissin that was entrusted with the task of reforming the Moudawana (family code).

With respect to human rights, the state forced a new understanding of the years of human rights violation in the kingdom. The strategy is to link violence and torture to the lack of education within the ranks of the forces of security and a not a direct result of a systematic state policy of violence. Thus deflecting all responsibility away from the regime and its state apparatus. Similarly, the state's introduction of the Advisory Council of Human Rights (CCDH), the release of political prisoners are mere attempts to diffuse blame away from the regime, and close a dark chapter from " les années de plomb" (Years of Lead).

Cabinet Shuffle and Regionalization Plans in Morocco

2010-01-05T09:44:00.000-08:00

King Mohammed VI made a partial ministerial change Monday. The cabinet changes inculde two ministries of sovereignty: the powerful Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Justice. Mohammed VI appointed president of Morocco's Supreme Court Tayeb Cherkaoui to replace former Interior Minister Chakib Benmoussa, while Mohamed Naciri replaced Abdelouahed Radi at the helm of the Ministry of Justice. The soverign also appinted two new minsters: Yasser az-Zanaki and Mohammed Sa'ad al'Alami to head the ministeries of Tourism and Handicrafts, and Relations with Parliament and Modernization of Public Sectors respectively.

The appointment of Tayeb Cherqaoui is particularly intriguing given his juridical and legal background. Hopefully, this is an indication from the king that the Ministry of the Interior will no longer rely on questionable extra-legal means in its day to day affairs. The appointment of Tayeb Cherqaoui, former president of the Supreme Court, could be a new and unprecedented page in the annals of the Ministry, as there is a high expectation that the new minister will steer the ministry towards respecting principles of the rule of law.

This cabinet shuffle comes in the aftermath of , and is linked to, the key royal speech on the regionalization plan in Morocco, which the monarch delivered Sunday. In the speech, the monarch announced the founding of a new Advisory Commission on Regionalization, headed by Morocco's ambassador to Spain and ex-minister of Justice and former president of the Advisory Council for Human Rights (CCDH), Omar 'Azziman. The commission is also composed of 21 members, including three women from different academic and professional backgrounds. The commission is entrusted with the task of developing "a general plan for a sophisticated, national regionalization model, covering all of the Kingdom's regions, to be submitted to me at the end of June 2010," King Mohammed VI said in the speech.

Regionalization policy has been long championed by late Hassan II, but no significant inroads have been made in the decade since his death. The creation of the advisory commission and their mandate to develop and present a concrete plan to the king is certainly a major push towards finally implementing a comprehensive process for regional governance.

Human Rights Violations in Tunisia

2010-01-04T18:26:00.001-08:00

Human Rights Watch recently criticized the October arrests and recent convictions of two journalists in Tunisia. Pursuant to what many have condemned as unfair trials, Tunisian authorities convicted journalists Taoufik Ben Brik of assaulting a female motorist and sentenced to six months in jail. Ben Brik, who launched a hunger strike early in December, has maintained his innocence and accused the police of a set-up to silence his criticism of the government. Zohair Makhlouf (see picture) was sentenced to three months in jail and a $4600 fine for what the authorities charged as "harming a third party by way of a public telecommunications network." Makhlouf is accused of publishing photos without third party consent. Makhlouf is the editor of el-Mawkif, an opposition daily for the Progressive Democratic Party (PDP), and has in the past exposed the Tunisian state's violation of human rights.

Trials for both Ben Brik and Makhlouf were derided as mock trials, in which the two never had adequate access to legal counsel and were summarily sentenced in short trials. Ben Brik's trial, for instance, only lasted three hours. Human Rights watch lists several other cases of journalists and human rights activists who were denied their defendant rights, and have been subjects to a systematic "vengeful campaign [by president Ben 'Ali] to punish the few journalists and human rights activists who dared to question his record during the election," according to Sarah Leah Whitson, Middle East and North Africa director of Human Rights Watch.

AQIM Responsible for Kidnapping Italian Couple in Mauritania

2009-12-28T11:04:00.001-08:00

Al-Qaeda's offshoot in the Maghreb has claimed responsibility for the December 19th kidnapping of two Italians in eastern Mauritania (see picture). Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) released an audiotape stating that the group has seized the couple in retaliation against what they called "crimes of the Italian government in Afghanistan and Iraq." AQIM has been active in recent months claiming several kidnappings mostly against foreign tourists and aid workers in the Sahel region. In addition to Eastern Mauritania, northern Mali has also been theater to AQIM's operations. In November, AQIM claimed the kidnapping of a French national, and Malian authorities believe that three Spanish aid workers that went missing in Mauritania are held in Mali by AQIM.

Over the past two years, AQIM has largely demanded ransom money in exchange for the hostages, and it is largely unclear what specific political demands the group has beyond the anti-US foreign policy brandishments in their public statements. The border between Mali and Mauritania are rife with lawlessness and corruption, which complicates the task of policing a largely nomadic territory. Some even advance possible government involvement in facilitating drug smuggling and explicit involvement in the kidnappings.

UPDATE 1/1/10: French daily Le Monde reports that AQIM has demanded a $7 million (4.8 million Euros) ransom in exchange for the three Spanish aid workers kidnapped in northern Mali. The demands came pursuant to intense efforts by Mali's president Amadou Toumani Toure, who has dispatched his consul in Saudi Arabia, and former Touareg rebel Iyad Ag Gali, north of Mali to the border region with Algeria where the hostages are believed to be held captive.

Haidar Returns to La'ayoune

2009-12-19T21:25:00.000-08:00

The saga comes to an end. Haidar's hunger strike is finally over after the Moroccan authorities reversed their expulsion orders of the Moroccan Sahrawi acitivist. It appears that Morocco bowed to a request (some see as a demand) from l'Elysee to re-issue a Moroccan passport to Haidar after a personal intervention from President Nicholas Sarkozy, and an implicit endorsement of Morocco's proposal of broader autonomy for the Western Sahara (said to have angred the POLISARIO). The reversal has been hailed by Haidar as a triumph of human rights and international law. Haidar returned to La'ayoune and was received by her family and friends like a hero, who managed to defeat the apparatus of the Moroccan state.

The blogosphere is jubilant about Haidar's return and sees in the break in the Lanzarote gridlock a major PR failure of the Palace, its foreign policy machine, and a monumental victory for Algeria and the POLISARIO. The stalemate definitely re-introduced the issue in its human form to the International scene, even in the U.S, where a certain neocon former foreign policy maker demonstrated in front of Morocco's Embassy in Washington D.C.

In addition to Sarkozy's statement welcoming the Moroccan autonomy proposal of the Western Sahara, a possible silver-lining for Morocco in this PR fiasco is the overwhelming consensus that the conflict garners in Kingdom. A cursory look at newspapers and Moroccan blogs reveals an incendiary support for the Moroccan position. Haidar's staged hunger strike and international pressure managed to galvanize Moroccans against what was seen as an Algerian-Spanish conspiracy to embarrass and to depict Morocco as a human rights' violator. The quagmire was equally embarrassing to Spain, in which territory the whole drama unfolded, but undoubtedly strained already tense Moroccan-Spanish relations. Spain appears to have offered no concessions to Morocco in regard to the Aminatou Haidar case at this point.

So what's next for Haidar now that she has become an international sensation, already dubbed as the "African Gandhi," a symbol of defiance for human rights? One can easily see her the focus of International human rights organizations seeking to cast more light on the never-ending conflict of the Sands. For Morocco's part, it will be interesting to see what kind of perspective they would cast on the whole debacle and their perceived public and international capitulation.

Possible Resolution of Aminatou Haidar's Case

2009-12-17T18:01:00.000-08:00

BBC reports that Haidar was taken to the hospital today in the Canary Islands, because she was suffering of "severe stomach and abdominal pain." This happens amidst reports that the whole stalemate is coming to a resolution as the Sahrwai activist may finally be on her way back to La'ayoune. According to POLISARIO Ambassador to Algeria, Ibrahim Ghali: “Effectively everything has been resolved, according to our information…a plane is at Lanzarote airport awaiting instructions.”

Haidar has been on a hunger strike for the last month at Lazarote Airport in the Canary Islands, after she was refused entry to Morocco through La'ayoune. Moroccan authorities maintain that Haidar refused to acknowledge her Moroccan citizenship on the airport entry documents, thus renouncing her citizenship. Haidar's case has sparked intense media and international attention. European countries have continued their efforts to pressure Morocco into re-issuing Aminatou Haidar's passport. The Haidar quagmire in the Canary Islands also travelled across the pond, where in the US, Republican Senator James Inhofe of Oklahoma recently issued a statement calling for a swift resolution to Haidar's hunger strike.

Improvements in Libya's Human Rights Record

2009-12-13T08:22:00.000-08:00

Human Rights Watch commended Libya for progress in its human rights record Saturday. The human rights organization cited "limited improvements" in the country in the areas of freedom of expression. The report states that progress was partially spurred through the efforts of the G addafi International Charity and Development Foundation. Back in October, Libya freed 88 Islamists, some accused of ties to al-Qaeda in a further indication of the country's new found focus on human rights. the Despite the slow pace of reform, journalists and political dissidents continue to be harassed by the state. Just Last Monday, Jamal al-Haggi, a former political prisoner, was arrested for his criticism of the government's detention of political prisoners.

Libya's efforts come at a time where the North African state is trying to move away from its international isolation and the label it had as a pariah state. In recent years, Libya's policies have signaled a move towards conciliatory foreign policy. Perhaps censing his own vulnerabilities, Qaddafi renounced all involvement in international terrorism and Libya’s ambitious WMD program. Libya has also abandoned old fantasies of Arab leadership, and has gradually emerged as an African leader as Qaddafi, “king of kings of Africa,” aided by his son and heir apparent Saif al-Islam, showed tremendous resilience in shaking off early erratic and bellicose image. Now More has to be done to charter a similar conciliatory domestic policy towards local political opposition and freedom of expression, to which the Jamahiriyya has only offered cosmetic changes.

Stalemate in the Canary Islands

2009-12-09T21:22:00.000-08:00

Still on the continuing Moroccan-Spanish crisis surrounding the staged hunger strike of Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar. Latest news suggests that Aminatou continues to refuse a second medical examination to assess her health. Both Spain and Morocco are facing mounting pressure amidst several reports of Haidar's deteriorating health at Lanzarote Airport in the Canary Islands. The blogosphere is buzzing about the Haidar affair with several strongly condemning the Moroccan intransigence and Spanish alleged connivance with their southern neighbors, especially from pro-secession blogs.

It is clear that Morocco will continue to press its position amidst sheepish support from some in the EU and an overwhelming political and popular support, judging from comments on Moroccan press sites and blogs. However, if Haidar's health continues to worsen leading to her death, Morocco would find itself in a tight spot with Spain and the international community.

Haidar’s sit-in and hunger strike have already generated intense press coverage in Europe and the Maghreb. The Spanish Press has claimed that Morocco planned for the expulsion of Haidar even before she arrived in La'ayoune on November 13th. Thus, Haidar's alleged renunciation of her citizenship was just a pretext to get her expelled from Morocco.

The stalemate is embarrassing to Spain as well, since the events are unfolding within its territory sparking a fervent debate among the political elite in the kingdom. The socialist-led government of PM Zapatero is ardently looking for a swift resolution of the problem. Some in Spain have even called for tough diplomatic measures against Morocco, which at this point, is holding true to Mohammed VI's new tough dichotomous line of either you are "a patriot or a traitor" on the issue of the Western Sahara. Unfortunately for Aminatou Haidar, she is considered to be in the latter category as she has been labeled by Moroccan press, state and political elite as a conspirator against Morocco's territorial integrity.

The Saga of Aminatou Haidar

2009-12-06T11:22:00.001-08:00

Spain has formally requested that Morocco issues a passport for Sahrawi activist Aminatou Haidar, amidst worries about her health as she continues on a three-week long hunger strike at Lanzarote Airport in the Canary Islands. Aminatou Haidar renounced her Moroccan citizenship in al-'Ayoun airport last November, claiming that she was visiting the Western Sahara and not Morocco on a trip from the Canary Islands. In a publicity stunt, Haidar, accompanied by two Spanish journalists refused to fill out " Morocco" in her entry card at the airport, provoking her arrest and expulsion back to the Canary Islands. Spain and other European countries have exercised considerable pressure on Morocco to re-issue a passport for Haidar and allow her to go back to Morocco.

Moroccan authorities seem intransigent on the issue and claim that it will be difficult to grant Haidar her citizenship back, after she has allegedly renounced it. Earlier in November, Mohammed VI in a televised address on the occasion of the 34th anniversary of the Green March, issued a stern warning to all Moroccans that doubt the "Moroccanity" of the Western Sahara, stating:

Let me clearly say there is no more room for ambiguity or deceit: either a person is Moroccan, or is not. There can be no more duplicity or evading of duties. Now is the time for clear, unambiguous stances, and for responsible conduct. One is either a patriot, or a traitor. There is no halfway house. One cannot enjoy the rights and privileges of citizenship, only to abuse them and conspire with the enemies of the homeland.

European Malaise with Islam

2009-12-02T09:53:00.000-08:00

Not Maghrebi news per se, but this has been on mind lately, especially in light of the Swiss potential ban on mosque minarets. Reading this piece in the New York Review accentuated my utter puzzlement with this European malaise with Islam, taking on one of the most controversial Muslim European intellectuals, Tariq Ramadan.

The author reviews two books, one of which is Tariq Ramadan's latest What I Believe. Ramadan felt compelled to write such a short book in order to explain his views on Islam, which he has articulated over the past 25 years. The reviewer advances Caroline Fourest's book Brother Tariq: The Doublespeak of Tariq Ramadan as a reference for criticizing Ramadan. However, that book should hardly serve as a reference. In a recent show on French TV France 3, Ramadan debated Fourest on her charges in the book, in which he found more than 200 citation errors and misquotes. It is also odd that the fervor against Ramadan and the charges of "doublespeak" seem to center around his lineage to maternal grandfather Hassan al-Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamist father Said Ramadan. Do we need him to abjure his family ties to remove that specter of fundamentalism?

Ramadan has always been clear in his argument for promoting Ijtihad (interpretive reasoning), and for a new reading of Quranic and Hadithic texts in areas of social and interpersonal affairs. His much publicized call for a moratorium, during a debate with Nicholas Sarkozy in 2003, on corporal punishment, stoning and death penalty was an indication of an Islamologist's serious attempt to force Muslims to adopt a pedagogical stance towards their scripture when it does not pertain to creed or the fundamental beliefs of the religion.

Jail for Moroccan Human Rights Activist

2009-11-25T16:17:00.000-08:00

It has become customary to report state attacks on freedom of expression in Morocco. The latest episode in this unfortunate trend took place Tuesday. A court in Casablanca upheld an earlier court's three-year jail sentence against human rights activist Chakib Khayari, who previously accused some high-level civil servants of aiding in the cannabis trafficking. Khayari is the head of the Human Rights Association of the Rif region in the north of Morocco.

As I reported in earlier posts, this regressive trend of stifling dissent is becoming the norm in the kingdom. The margin of tolerance is lower and lower and indicates the regime's inability to deal or absorb this form of dissent. The future trajectory of the state and its purported commitment to democratic reform inevitably has to go through the path of political expression. Such continuous repression of all forms of journalistic and individual criticism of the government and the regime will only serve to erode the last vestiges of entente between regime and society.

Morocco and its people deserve at a minimum the right to address the most pernicious of topics. Drug trafficking is one of those dossiers that has to be subjected to open investigation and debate. The fact that the state moved quickly against Khayari only reinforces his allegations against state officials.

"Hereditary Republicanism" in MENA

2009-11-20T15:03:00.000-08:00

The Middle East and North Africa is a region known for authoritarian innovations. Their menu of institutional manipulation and political engineering is extensive, and will soon feature yet another innovation. Authoritarian republics are setting the stage for a new political system: "hereditary republics." This is of course not without precedent in the region following in the footsteps of Syria's late Hafidh al-Assad, who bequeathed the Syrian republican "kingdom" to his son Bashar.

Several aging dictators are positioning their offspring for an eventual changing of the guards. In Egypt, it's Mubarak's son Gamal; in Libya, it is Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam. Now it is Tunisia's and Ageria's turn. It is rumored that Algeria's Bouteflika is grooming his brother Said for power. As for Tunisia, allegedly increasingly under the sway of Ben 'Ali's wife Leila Trabelsi, it is Sakhr al-Materi son in law of Ben 'Ali, who is favored to succeed the aging and ailing president.

Girls for Qaddafi

2009-11-16T12:12:00.001-08:00

Brother leader Qaddafi is in the news again. According to Der Spiegel, the Colonel in Italy for a World hunger Summit, has put ads for Italian beauties to come join him to "exchange views. " Instead, Qaddafi gifted them with a Quran and 50 euros. He never ceases to surprise the king of all kings of Africa.

Royal Dahir in Morocco

2009-11-13T18:51:00.000-08:00

The Moroccan French weekly Tel Quel, recently censured by the state for its attempt to publish a public opinion survey on king Mohammed VI, devoted its centerfold to an article on the Dahir. A dahir (royal decree) is a royal discretionary act in regulatory, administrative and legislative domains, and one of the manifestations of the unbridled institutional powers of the Moroccan sovereign. During the process of modern state formation, the constitution replaced the old system of consultation with a new representative body. However, the legislative body is a rubber stamp institution not characterized by democratic practices such as those present in western style polities. The dahir, on the other hand, persisted as one of the main features of Morocco's political system.

The use of dahir in Morocco is different than the discretionary powers that extra-presidential systems possess in Latin America. The dahir emanates from the monarch’s religious authority and is treated by the legislature and the cabinet as a sacred text. In keeping with Islamic traditions, the parliament and the local assemblies are consultative branches of the royal power.

This was made apparent after Hassan II’s accession to power, when he addressed the parliament in 1963: “I shall bestow upon you part of the powers that have been with the ruling family for twelve centuries…I have made the Constitution by my very hands, and it has not given the deputies any powers, only obligations.” This authoritarian feature is characterized by the absolute power of the monarch, who can at his will, dissolve the parliament. It is noteworthy here that the monarchy has never considered its perennial status as authoritarian. On the contrary, it has maintained its Islamic-democratic nature, since any constitutional pronouncements are subject to plebiscitary powers of the jam’a (community). However, in the absence of free competitive elections, strong legislature and political participation, the consultative process is far from its Islamic ideal and has since the independence been used to legitimize royal absolutism.

Consultation is also buttressed through royal discretionary power of dahir, which constitutes the single most important source of legislation in Morocco. All royal decisions are taken under the guise of dahir. These are above the political system and all constitutional texts. In fact, the constitution itself was promulgated according to the 1963 dahir, which effectively enabled the king to exercise his dominance over all political aspects of the Moroccan system.

Dahirs have the force and appearance of laws, always begin with a religious greeting and are signed under the title of commander of the faithful. This is done to invoke the religious stature of royal decrees, which are not subject to annulment or appeal. Dahirs were codified into an “official bulletin” in the years after 1969 with the publication of the finance law. The continuity of this institutional decision-making practice is invoked in all royal appointments and is given the formal status similar to that of ancient sharifian letters and correspondence. The dahir is a sacred act of sovereignty, immune to all judicial processes and inviolable.

Free Fatma Riahi

2009-11-09T18:10:00.000-08:00

In support of a fellow blogger, I post this for Fatma Riahi, Tunisian dissident, whose weblog, Fatma Arabicca blog, was shut down by the Tunisian authorities. Fatma Riahi was also arrested for running the Debat Tunisie weblog and its parody of Ben Ali's landslide election of October 25th. There is a facebook page dedicated to Fatma calling on Tunisian authorities to free the blogger. As Michael Dunn opines Arab regimes have to realize that shutting down blogs and restricting freedom of expression on the Internet, brings more attention to the set of issues, cartoons and parodies they seek to censure.

More Hardline Approach towards the Press in Morocco

2009-11-03T21:42:00.000-08:00

Just an update on the case of the two journalists from the Arabic daily Akhbar al-Yawm, who published a cartoon deemed insulting the Moroccan flag and Prince Ismail, cousin of King Mohammed VI. Editor Taoufiq Bou'achrine and Cartoonist Khalid Gueddar were found guilty of "desecrating the national flag and failing to show proper respect for a member of the royal family." They were sentenced to one year in prison and a fine of 100,000 Dirhams.

Landslide Victory for Ben 'Ali in Tunisia

2009-10-25T21:33:00.001-07:00

As it was expected, Zine al-'Abidine Ben 'Ali won a fifth presidential term in today's elections in Tunisia. According to early results released by the Ministry of the Interior, Ben 'Ali won in a landslide receiving 89.62% of the votes. The newly re-elected president's support didn't dip below 84% in most of the 26 regions of Tunisia. In two of the regions, Ben 'Ali won 99% of the vote. Ben 'Ali came to power in 1987 after former president and independence leader Habib Bourguiba was declared unfit to rule. In the last two decades, Ben 'Ali set the country on an impressive economic trajectory, while maintaining an authoritarian political rule dominated by his Democratic Constitutional Rally party RCD.

Crackdown in pre-Election Tunisia.

2009-10-23T13:38:00.000-07:00

Some more articles on Tunisia's upcoming elections and the crackdown on the opposition and the press. The LA Times lists some of these egregious breaches of individual and group liberties on the eve of the presidential and legislative elections. For instance, leftist candidate of the Ettajdid Movement, and probably most serious rival of Ben Ali, Ahmed Ibrahim saw his manifesto seized by the Tunisian authorities. The Independent's Adrian Hamilton has a similar piece on the stifling of the freedom of expression and ability of the opposition to contest freely and fairly. Hamilton provides a scathing portrait of "a soft dictatorship" in which "political control is more discrete and more legalistic."

Portal on the Tunisian Elections

2009-10-19T19:52:00.001-07:00

Maghrebia has a useful portal on the upcoming October 25th elections in Tunisia. The page features short synopses on the four candidates for the presidency: Ahmed Ibrahim of the Ettajdid movement, Ahmed Innoubli of the Unionist Democratic Union (UDU), Mohamed Bouchiha of the Popular Unity Party (PUP), and the favorite and current president Zine el-'Abidine ben 'Ali of the party in power Constitutional Democratic Party (RCD). Fora biased state coverage of the elections, see the official Tunisian Press Agency's online page devoted to campaign for the incumbent president Ben 'Ali.

Upcoming Elections in Tunisia

2009-10-10T10:20:00.000-07:00

An interesting article in the Arab Reform Bulletin on the upcoming October 25th presidential and legislative elections in Tunisia. It is expected the current president Zine al-'Abidine Ben Ali will win a sixth presidential term, while his ruling Constitutional Democratic Rally (RCD) will win the majority of seats in the Chamber of Deputies. In case of his all probable re-reelection, the 73 year-old Ben Ali will be ineligible to run for re-election again as the Tunisian constitution sets the maximum age for presidency at 75 years. But we have seen this episode elsewhere in the Arab authoritarian system. One can definitely see a constitutional amendment to raise the age requirement beyond 75 years to accommodate Ben Ali's possible future bids for the presidency.

Women and Politics in Morocco

2009-10-08T21:50:00.001-07:00

As women continue their struggle for gender equality, various social and economic problems beset their full integration in Moroccan society. Last June, some 3400 women candidates won seats to local city councils around Morocco and the first female mayor of a major city in the history of Morocco was elected in the city of Marrakech. however, million of others continue to be politically alienated and economically dependent. The recent edition of the Arab Reform Bulletin has an interesting short piece on the plight of women in the kingdom and the state's apparent attempt to co-opt them at least politically at the moment, in order to offset their vast marginalization on the social and economic fronts.

Interpol Arrest Warrants in the Ben Barka Case SUSPENDED!

2009-10-06T17:38:00.000-07:00

As it was expected, the Prosecutor's office in Paris has decided to suspend the arrest warrants against the four Moroccans sought in the disappearance of Mehdi Ben Barka citing more information was requested from Interpol. The warrants were issued for the arrest of, among others, General Hosni Benslimane, head of the Royal Gendarmerie (pictured above). Some Moroccan pundits argue that France's push behind the issuance of the warrants and their swift suspension is an attempt to flex French political muscles over its sphere of influence, that for France, also comprises the francophone and former protectorate Morocco. Moroccan Arabic Daily al-Massae reports that according to a high level anonymous French source, the whole episode sought to "shake" Moroccans and Morocco's political system by opening up old wounds as a punishment for the recent Moroccan decision to purchase U.S. F16 fighter jets over French "Rafale."

Interpol Arrest Warrants in the Ben Barka Case

2009-10-05T10:14:00.000-07:00

Interpol has issued international arrest warrants in the case of the 1965 disappearance of Moroccan leftist activist and opposition leader Mehdi ben Barka. The warrants are for four Moroccans allegedly involved in the kidnapping and disappearance of Ben Barka in Paris. Among the four wanted are General Hosni Benslimane, head of the Royal Gendarmerie and powerful military man in the kingdom; General Abdelhaq al-Qadiri, former head of Morocco's internal intelligence services, and former intelligence officers Miloud Tounzi, aka Larbi Chtouki, and Abdelhaq 'Ash'ashi. The case of Ben Barka has captivated the Moroccan political psyche for the past forty years, and it is highly unlikely that the warrants will be served at all. However, these warrants are seen as an indictment of the former regime of Hassan II and its possible involvement in the disappearance of the opposition and non-aligned movement leader. Mehdi ben Barka was a leading figure behind the emergence of the Union National des Forces Populaires (UNFP), which broke away from the Istiqlal party in 1959. Ben Barka, along with Fquih Basri, establsihed the New Left movement, which among other things, sought to overthrow the monarchical regime and to establish a socialist-leaning republic.

Another Attack on the Press in Morocco

2009-10-04T11:42:00.000-07:00

Over the last couple of days, Morocco has been the scene of yet another state investigation into the press. This time, Akhbar al-Yawm has been closed until further notice and is target to prosecution after it published a caricature depicting the newly married Prince Moulay Ismael on a wedding platform ('amariya), and a partially complete Star of David on the Moroccan flag in the background. The palace has already denounced the cartoon and its attempt to "politicize a family ceremony." The editor of the daily Akhbar al-Yawm Taoufiq Boua'chrine and caricaturist Khaled Kedar are under investigation for "insulting the national flag."

Qaddafi's Speech at the UN: Some Preliminary Thoughts

2009-09-24T20:48:00.000-07:00

In recent weeks, it seems Qaddafi has been making the news quite regularly. His latest show was delivered yesterday in a one of the most visible of all world platforms. While many have been quick to dismiss it as lunacy, I propose we look at it in a different light. Qaddafi’s speech at the United Nations' General Assembly makes some useful points that all outside the Permanent Five in the Security council could agree on. Granted the style, antics and the delivery leave much to be desired, the Colonel had a point when he argued the largely ineffective international body is in need of reform. The United Nations has long been relegated to a forum for great powers to legitimize and impose a new world order, which is in essence, shaped in their image.

Qaddafi’s speech emanates from 60 years worth of the developing world’s frustrations with the world body. The Colonel unleashed on the world community demands to investigate everything from the death of Patrice Lumumba to the execution of Saddam Hussein. While such claims are outlandish, they highlight the ever-increasing rift between the developed world powers and the majority-developing world that has been disempowered and disenfranchised from any meaningful decisions at the world stage. Those that claim the United Nations’ General Assembly has lost moral legitimacy for allowing Qaddafi and Ahmadinejad a platform to spew their objectionable rhetoric seem to forget that the Assembly is exactly the forum for all forms of discourse.

Qaddafi’s unorthodox 90-minute diatribe, while lacking all forms of decorum, is his right as the leader of a sovereign state, member of the United Nations and president of the current session of the General Assembly. Internally, his regime has been a reprehensible panacea of political repression for the last 40 years. That, however, does not exclude him from the company of other equally rogue world leaders represented or present at the United Nations. His speech has only reminded the world of Qaddafi’s theatrics, and it is a missed opportunity for the Colonel (“King of Kings of Africa, as he was introduced yesterday) to persuade the world that he has somehow corrected his erratic behavior and is ready to join the circle of respectable world leaders.

A Moment of Contentment: The 40th Anniversary of the Qadhafi Regime

2009-09-16T14:24:00.000-07:00

One of my fellow Maghrebists was kind enough to contribute this piece to our blog. Professor Yehudit Ronen, Political Studies Department, Bar-Ilan University and Senior Research Fellow, Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, is the author of Qaddafi's Libya in World Politics published by Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008

A Moment of Contentment: The 40th Anniversary of the Qadhafi Regime

September 1, 2009 marked the 40th anniversary of Muammar al-Qadhafi's overthrow of the Libyan monarchy and establishment of the Great Socialist Peoples Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya. Four days of lavish commemoration, complete with a military parade, marked the event. For Qadhafi, the achievement has been singular. No head of state in the world today (apart from the Sultan of Brunei) matches his longevity in power.

Looking back on Qadhafi's military coup detat in 1969, almost nobody in Libya, let alone outside of the country, had heard of the young army officer, who had burst forth - literally and metaphorically - from the depths of the Libyan desert. With unprecedented nationalist, Arab and Islamic zeal, he seized the reins of power from King Idris al-Sanusi, who had led the country since independence in 1951. At that moment, the Libyan state and society embarked on an entirely new journey in all facets of life, which would be marked by wide vicissitudes encompassing both significant successes and profound, even catastrophic failures.

In contrast to 1969, Qadhafi's Libya is today most definitely on the map. Neither Africa, nor the Arab world, nor major international powers have been untouched by Qadhafi and his policies.

Qadhafi's successful accumulation of power over his countrys domestic and foreign policies, and his resulting impact internationally, stemmed from a variety of factors, including: his nationalization, early on, of Libya's immense oil resources, which enabled him to accumulate unprecedented power (for Libya) in the military-security realm; his charismatic and unconventional personality, along with a militantly revolutionary and anti-imperialist agenda; and the important backing provided by the Soviet Union in its global competition with the United States during Qadhafi's first twenty years in power.

Libyan political life during the 1970s and 1980s was highlighted by a number of developments: the implementation of Qadhafi's Peoples Power political system, in line with his self-styled revolutionary ideology, which included the propagation of the Third Universal Theory as formulated in Qadhafi's three-part Green Book, which he touted as the only genuine democratic rule in modern times; the substantial upgrading of the socio-economic fabric of life and overall welfare of the Libyan population; the construction of the Great Man-Made River to transfer water from aquifers under the Sahara in southern Libya to its populated coastal areas in the north; an iron-fisted crackdown against Libyan opposition figures and groups, whether at home or abroad; and initial steps to suppress the first manifestations of a radical Islamic insurgency, which would seek to eradicate Qadhafi's infidel regime, notwithstanding its sworn Islamic character.

One of the most prominent features of Libyan foreign policy during these initial decades was Qadhafi's continuous efforts to shape the Arab world and African politics according to his own pan-Arab, anti-Western and anti-Israeli predilections. These included military interventions in Africa (highlighted by disastrous wars in Chad and Uganda ); chronic hostility with Egypt, which even escalated into a brief military confrontation in 1977; active subversion of pro-Western regimes in Africa and actions to undermine Israel's interests on the continent; strategic and political collaboration with the Soviets; and involvement in international terrorism, particularly directed against the US, with whom relations had run a troubled course from the very moment of Qadhafi's ascent to power.

Indeed, the Libyan-American conflict reached two peaks during this period, challenging Qadhafi's hold on power in an unprecedented fashion. The first was the American air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi on 15 April 1986. The second was the Lockerbie dispute, which came to the fore in the wake of American and British accusations of Libyan responsibility for the explosion of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland while on route from London to the US in December 1988.

The last twenty years has witnessed a dramatic alteration of Libyas domestic and foreign affairs. In the wake of the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, Libya was left alone and defenseless in international politics. In view of the Lockerbie-induced UN sanctions against Libya, imposed in 1992, and America's two military campaigns (1991, 2003) against Iraqs Saddam Hussein, Qadhafi internalized the fact that the US was capable and willing to flex its muscles in the Middle East against states deemed hostile to its interests. The tangible political inputs of his son and possible heir, Saif al-Islam, were also influential in the evolution of Libyan policies.

It took seven years of UN sanctions to compel Qadhafi to extradite to Scotland two of Libyas citizens suspected of responsibility for the Lockerbie explosion, in return for the sanctions suspension. Even so, the Lockerbie dispute would remain a central issue on Libyas foreign affairs agenda, as well as have an enormous impact on the countrys domestic affairs, including Qadhafi's continued political survival.

In early 2001, the Lockerbie trial concluded with a guilty verdict and lengthy prison sentence for Abd al-Basit al-Maqrahi. (He has just been released from prison in Scotland on the grounds that he suffers from terminal prostate cancer, and was greeted with open arms upon his return to Libya.) The verdict, accompanied by mounting threats and pressures, compelled Qadhafi to alter his conduct in favor of diplomatic engagement with the West. These pressures included the growing menace posed by Libyas violent Islamist opposition, the fears of becoming the next Iraq, i.e. being militarily invaded by the US, and economic difficulties stemming from the devastating combination of UN sanctions and the cumulative decline of the countrys oil revenue as a result of chronically sluggish global oil prices.

Dramatic results were not long in coming. In late 2003, Libya announced its decision to dismantle its clandestine nuclear and other WMDs program, halt its drive to develop long-range missiles and open all weapons stockpiles to international inspection. As a quid pro quo, Libya was removed from the US State Departments list of state sponsors of terrorism. This, in turn, enabled Qadhafi to proceed apace towards his economic goals and attain greater political stability at home, while reaping a series of diplomatic gains in foreign affairs.

Hence, Libya can no longer be considered a pariah state. After 40 years of tumultuous times, Qadhafi is the Great Survivor of contemporary international politics, and is now contentedly celebrating his ascent to power.

The Press questioned yet again in Morocco!

2009-09-07T13:34:00.000-07:00

In the Aftermath of the unprecedented palace communique about King Mohammed VI's health and contraction of Rotavirus, the state court in Rabat will launch an investigation into the Arabic-daily al-Jarida al-Oula, as it has summoned both its editor Ali Anouzla and journalist Bouchra Dhou, who published a story challenging official press releases on the health of King Mohammed VI. The paper claimed the King’s illness would disrupt his public schedule and his Ramadan religious seminars. This intervention in the media continues a recent alarming state trend to stifle freedom of the press in the kingdom, after the controversial decision last month to ban editions of two weeklies, TelQuel and Nichane, which contained a public opinion poll about the King. It is interesting to note that this ban has backlashed into an online movement called the “9 Percent Movement” after the 9 percent of survey respondents who expressed their dissatisfaction with Mohammed VI's performance in his first 10 years on the throne.

Qaddafi's 40th Anniversary in Power

2009-09-01T21:26:00.000-07:00

Qaddafi's 40th anniversary in charge of Libya has been foreshadowed by the release of Lockerbie Bomber al-Megrahi, and international condemnation of Libyan jubilant welcome of the convicted bomber. Amidst the lavish celebrations, the discussion should center on Qaddafi's record in office, especially in the last two decades where he has taken the oil-rich country down the path of economic and political stagnation. Agence France Presse (AFP) reports that promises of a written constitution and privatization of the state press are yet to be achieved. The aging colonel is seemingly bent on further cementing his authoritarian regime and laying the grounds for his son, and heir apparent, Seif al-Islam to take over the reigns of power in the Jamahirriya. In his defense, Seif al-Islam has advocated political reforms in the past, but it is premature to ascertain whether there is any real commitment behind that support.

Reforms and Islamic Radicalism in Morocco

2009-08-30T10:05:00.000-07:00

This recent article in the New York Times highlight the sluggish pace of reform in Morocco in recent years. Erlanger and Mekhennet contend, rather unconvincingly, that the king has reversed course on democratic reforms under pressure from Islamic radicalism. With the increasing threat of AQIM in neighboring Algeria and Sahel countries, and growing conservative forces at home, the king has chosen to freeze meaningful political and social reforms until further notice. However, state officials still maintain that the king is still committed to vast political and economic changes, but places a high premium on the "balance between freedom and social cohesion." This is in reference to the massive crackdown on Islamist radicals and Islamist politicians, who are in jail for plotting acts of terrorism according to the state. Maintaining that balance between freedom and social cohesion has also meant censorship and prior restraint against major independent publications. The case of the French language weekly Tel Quel and its Arabic sister Nichane are indicative of this alarming trend of limiting freedom of the press.

Gaddafi's Clown Show

2009-08-22T19:10:00.001-07:00

Libya is in the news these last few days after the release of convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdul Basset Ali al-Megrahi. Amir Taheri provides a scathing account of Gaddafi's authoritarian regime. Taheri paints a gloomy picture of a mismanaged and corrupt political system, which over the last 40 years, has squandered billions of dollars in oil revenue: "Over the past 40 years the colonel has had something like a trillion dollars in oil revenues to play with. That much money could have done wonders in a nation of four or five million. However, visitors to Libya would be struck by the rundown aspect of public infrastructure and the widespread poverty. A few new buildings in the capital Tripoli may impress some Westerners. Elsewhere, however, many Libyans live in substandard homes and experience daily power cuts, water rationing and frequent shortages of staple foodstuffs. Parts of Benghazi resemble slums in black Africa, not neighbourhoods in the second-largest city in an oil-rich country. In neighbouring Malta, one often runs into Libyan refugees begging in the streets."

Suicide Bombing in Mauritania

2009-08-11T07:27:00.000-07:00

Mauritania witnessed its fist suicide bombing on Saturday. The event took place at a proximity from the French Embassy in Nouakchott. The suicide bomber has been identified as Ahmedou Ould Sidi Ould Vyh al-Barka, 22 years-old from Arafat district in Nouakchott (graphic pictures of bomber here). It is unclear at this point if he is tied to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) at all. The attack killed the bomber and injured six other bystanders. It is worth noting that these attacks come at the heels of the contentious elections of President Mohamed Ould Abdel Aziz, who during his campaign and recent inauguration, vowed to combat terrorism in a clear reference to the growing threat of AQIM in the region.

Prior Restraint in Morocco.

2009-08-01T15:52:00.000-07:00

The Ministry of the Interior in Morocco has blocked the publication of the two upcoming issues of the French weekly magazine Tel Quel and the Arabic weekly Nichane, both directed by the controversial Ahmed Benchemsi. The magazines have marked the tenth anniversary of King Mohammed VI's enthronement by dedicating a series of issues to the record of the king in office. The Ministry has singled out the upcoming issues number 384 and 385 of Tel Quel and issues number 212 and 213 of Nishan, for "assault on the person of the king and Morocco's socio-political foundations." According to a communique released by the Tel Quel Group, the issues in question would have pulished an opinion poll done in partnership with the French daily Le Monde on the approval rating of King Mohammed VI's ten-year on the throne. The group claims that the results of the poll were positive for the monarchy, as %91 of those surveyed approved of the king's management of the country. Tel Quel has always dared to go where other press outlets could not, and its director Ahmed Benchemsi is known for his weekly poignant editorials. No subject, political, social or cultural is taboo for the weekly french magazine. It remains to be seen whether the state will throw the book at the magazine and Benchemsi, or whether this is a mere slap on the wrist and a warning of things to come in the future of Tel Quel and Nichane.

Freedom of the Press in Morocco

2009-07-24T17:31:00.001-07:00

A new report by Reporters without Borders hails the relative relaxation of restrictions on press freedom in Morocco. Still, it also highlights the state's tough stance on those journalists who dare transgress against the monarchy or issues of the territorial integrity of the kingdom. The examples of Rachid Ninni and Aboubaker al-Jamai are reminders that in the absence of true information autonomy, Moroccan journalists are still under the confines of a repressive press code in dire need of reform.

Early Election Results in Mauritania

2009-07-18T18:49:00.002-07:00

Despite the results of recent polls, which projected a tight three-way race between Ould Abdel Aziz, Ould Boulkheir and Ould Daddah, Taqadoumy forum reports a sizable lead for Ahmed Ould Abdel Aziz in the initial stages of vote counting. As the results keep coming, Ould Abdel Aziz seems destined to win the presidential elections with over 53% of the votes with 80% of the ballots counted. opposition has already denounced "the electoral masquerade, which seeks to "legitimize the coup," declared Messaoud Ould Boulkheir, the principal rival of Ould Abdel Aziz.

Elections in Mauritania

2009-07-18T18:03:00.000-07:00

Mauritanians head to the polls today in landmark presidential elections. The front runner is Ould Abdel Aziz, former junta leader who is running on a platform based on populism and being anti-Israel. Ould Abdel Aziz has also called for an end to corruption and instituting principles for good governance. According to recent polls, General Ould Abdel Aziz is trailed by Ahmed Ould Dada and Messaoud Ould Boulkheir. The former's agenda emphasizes the morals and values of "justice, equity, tolerance." Ould Boulkheir has espoused ideals of democracy and human rights, and has pledged his support for trade unions. There are high hopes that the elections will "renew lost trust" with Mauritanians after the 2008 coup that toppled the government of democratically-elected president Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi.

The Decline of Political Islam?

2009-07-17T01:18:00.000-07:00

Interesting article on the demise of political Islam thesis. Nathan Field argues that the decline in Islamist electoral gains in authoritarian political systems is hardly a measure to assess the potential end or actual decline in Islamism. At the societal level, Islamists are engaged in their primary objective which is Da'wa and predication. The whole post-Islamism stance advanced by French scholars Gilles Keppel and Oliver Roy is premature and naive. Islamism is a current socio-political reality that will be part of the landscape of Muslim societies for years, if not decades, to come. In the absence of real political ideologies that could bring about concrete plans to immanent political and economic ills, Islamism remains the solution for many in the Muslim world.

al-Qaeda in North Africa

2009-07-10T08:40:00.001-07:00

A growing and important threat to the Maghreb, the Sahel region and the rest of the Middle East, as a resurgent affiliate of al-Qaeda will only embolden other Jihadist groups in the region to seek a second wave of attacks against both foreign nationals and local societies. These groups, including AQIM, are not gangs of criminals devoid of any ideological political goals.

First female general in Algeria

2009-07-05T12:49:00.000-07:00

After Morocco's second ever female city mayor of Marrakech, Algeria has now its first female general. The Jerusalem Post reports that "Colonel Fatma-Zohra Aardjoun was named a general at the National Defense Ministry, in a promotion ceremony for the National Army, along with seventeen other male colonels. Four generals were also promoted to the rank of major-general."

In Morocco, an Alternative to Iran

2009-06-30T18:26:00.000-07:00

A flattering portrait of Morocco in today's Washington Post. Anne Applebaum sets the kingdom as a model for "slow but profound transformation from traditional monarchy to constitutional monarchy, acquiring along the way real political parties, a relatively free press, new political leaders -- the mayor of Marrakesh is a 33-year-old woman -- and a set of family laws that strive to be compatible both with sharia and international conventions on human rights." As I opined elsewhere, it would be a stretch claiming that Morocco is a constitutional monarchy, as the monarch still holds vast executive, legislative and discretionary powers.

Positive Step in Mauritania

2009-06-29T17:07:00.000-07:00

The United Nations and the African Union have hailed the Mauritanian decree setting up a transitional government ahead of the presidential elections next month. This step comes at the heels of the Framework Agreement, concluded between the three major Mauritanian political poles, in Dakar on 2 June 2009.and signed in Nouackchott on 4 June. Analysts view the transitional government as a prelude towards setting up a democratically elected government in Mauritania.

Why is it that the Arabs don't revolt?

2009-06-27T08:48:00.000-07:00

Rami G. Khouri tackles this fascinating question. The Maghreb, like the rest of the Arab world, suffers from this social quiescence. However, his argument that factors of nation and state legitimacy, efficacy and credibility highlight the difference between Arab quiescence and Iranian revolts is not sufficient, as there are various micro level factors such as the nature of the political systems that govern each of the Arab countries and the great extent of political management style that is exercised within those states. More analysis is needed with case by case differentiation.

Secret talks between Morocco and POLISARIO?

2009-06-26T16:48:00.000-07:00

Moroccan Daily al-Massae reports that Spain, Qatar and Libya are to host secret talks between Morocco and the POLISARIO front. While this is not confirmed, this could be an interesting development given the current attemtps by UN mediator Christopher Ross to start a new round of negotiations between the parties involved. Ross just finished his visit to Algiers where he met Bouteflika. He is scheduled in Rabat tomorrow Saturday.

First woman mayor in Morocco

2009-06-22T09:50:00.001-07:00

Just some breaking news from Marrakech: The first woman city mayor in Morocco has been voted in the red city's city council meeting today. Fatema Zahra al-Mansouri, a 33 year-old lawyer from the Party of Authenticity and Modernity, will assume the new responsibilities for the next six years, replacing Omar Jazouli who has been at the helm in Marrakech for 12 years. al-Arabiya reports what Sheikh Biyadellah, SG of PAM said: "reflects the image of a modern Morocco."

Response to Obama's Cairo Speech

2009-06-16T10:41:00.000-07:00

I was asked by the Center for the Study of Islam and Democracy in Washington D.C. to contribute a short response to Obama's Cairo speech to be compiled with other comments from scholars and experts on the Middle East and North Africa. These comments will be forwarded to Mr. Obama. The following is the text of my response:

Mr. Obama's speech to the Muslim world hit most of the major notes he was supposed to address. His eloquent speech is not a general policy formulation towards the Muslim world, but extended a much needed olive branch to the Muslim world after eight years of marginalization and short-term political goals. Having said that, Mr. Obama's has to show us his concrete plans for revamping the Arab-Israeli peace process and more importantly to demonstrate a true commitment to political reforms.

A change in tone is not sufficient to reverse years of irresponsible US foreign policy in the Middle East and towards the Muslim world. No longer can the US turn a blind eye as the Muslim world sinks deeper and deeper into political and economic decay. In his speech, Mr. Obama never promoted the building of democratic institutions and devoted little space for democracy promotion. He generally noted that the governments “should reflect the will of the people” and that citizens should “have a say” in how they are governed. His administration has shown an awkward pragmatism in its foreign policy by sacrificing human rights and political reforms for the sake of regional and global stability. This was particularly clear in Mr. Obama's grand gesture towards Iran during the celebration of Nayrouz. A gesture that Iran has largely shunned amidst continuing abuses of human rights. The choice of Egypt itself, ruled since 1981 by an aging dictator in the process of grooming his son for power, is indicative of this blind pragmatism.

Mr. Obama's speech is definitely a departure from the Bush discourse and is applauded for signaling a sea of change in U.S. relations with the Muslim world. Now is the opportune time to engage the Arab Muslim world in a meaningful commitment to the rule of law and fair transparent elections. Mr. Obama needs to further press for good governance, rule of law and accountability in order to increase the scope of individual and group liberties.

It would be a grave mistake if the US abandons those ideals which have taken a back seat to political and strategic calculations in the making of U.S. foreign policy past or present. The past has taught us that continued political oppression was key in fanning the flames of those bent on setting Islam on a collision course with the rest of humanity. Mr. Obama you have the Muslim world in the palm of your hands but only for a short time, I hope you can seize on this immense capital but daunting responsibility.

More on Morocco's Local Elections

2009-06-16T04:40:00.000-07:00

I continue to hear horror stories of electoral fraud and irregularities. The electoral process in Morocco is rife with violations related mainly to the use of unregulated money. Some candidates went door to door armed with Qurans and wads of cash. After the target resident swears an oath of allegiance to a particular candidate on the Quran, they receive up to 250 Dirhams/20 dollars. I also hear that this has been done by almost all political parties as it has become a common feature of campaigning in the country.

All the party list winners are currently engaged in intensified negotiations for the leadership of city and county councils. For the most part, parties have to navigate through compromises with PAM elected politicians in order to determine the make-up of those councils. These negotiations often involve acts of ideological transhumance. No party is firmly committed to an ideological vision: In Agadir dominated by the USFP, for instance, there is increasing chatter of a possible coalition with the Islamist PJD. In Marrakech, it seems that the dominant mayor of the city, al-Jazouli of the Constitutional Union Party, is facing a daunting challenge from PAM's Adnan Ben Abdallah for the majority of the 91-member council. There is also a battle for mayor of the capital of the Kingdom Rabat. The current mayor al-Bahraoui of the Popular Movement party is facing a potentially damaging coalition between the PJD and PAM. Thus, it seems that all roads to local governance go by PAM, further consecrating its status as a dominant force in the new political landscape of Morocco.

PAM victory in Morocco!

2009-06-14T10:22:00.000-07:00

It's official: The new palace Party of Authenticity and Modernity, as expected, has won most of the seats in the Moroccan local elections. The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM) won 6,015 seats, giving it 21.7 percent of the vote, ahead of the governing Istiqlal (Independence) party with 5,292 seats and 19.1 percent. The Ministry of the Interior has reported thousands of irregularities. The Ministry of the Interior has reported a 52 percent voter turnout; markedly higher than the 37 percent turnout in the last legislatives of 2007. The Islamist Party of Justice and Development won a meager 1,513 seats and 5.5 percent of the vote.This is expected as the PJD didn't contest in a lot of the rural areas, and focused on the major urban centers where it has traditionally enjoyed large support from professionals, university professors and students. The elections succeeded in achieving regime goals of avoiding voter apathy of 2007 and further marginalizing the Islamists. The victory of PAM signals a shift in the political elite in Morocco, and analysts predict larger gains for the party, currently in opposition, in the next legislative elections of 2012 and potentially ruling the government.

Communal Elections in Morocco.

2009-06-13T11:57:00.000-07:00

Early results of the 2009 communal elections point to a victory of the four main parties of Istiqlal, Constitutional Union, RNI, USFP and the newcomer PAM. The Ministry of the Interior reports a 51 percent voter turnout, which is an improvement from the meager 37 percent of the legislative elections of 2007. However, it is slightly less than the 55 percent turnout of the last communal elections in 2003. Various Moroccan newspapers report incidents related to electoral irregularities. Several fights erupted when members of several parties continued campaigning the very same day of the elections. Others paid and drove voters to election booths. I will be posting election results as they become available.